

Transformational Leadership and Conflict Management in Zanzibar

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Abstract

Zanzibar has had a turbulent political history for more than half a century, from the time of nationalist struggles in the 1950s. The major bone of contestation has revolved around the politics of identity with its resultant long-standing political conflict. In November 2009, the then President of Zanzibar, Amani Abeid Karume from Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the Civic United Front (CUF) Secretary-General, Seif Shariiff Hamad met and declared their commitment in public to end the long-standing political conflict between the two main political parties on the islands. This article seeks to explain the process of reconciliation in Zanzibar with specific reference to the role of leadership in transformational change. The study was conducted between March 2015 and February 2017, involving two main data collection methods: in-depth interviews and documentary reviews. Interviews were conducted with politicians, government functionaries, academics, journalists, and leaders of civil society organizations. The study found that the only substantive achievements that were realized in the short run were power-sharing under the Government of National Unity (GNU) and some changes in attitudes among some of the key political actors, which, to a certain degree, amounted to a discourse switch from a hostile political attitude based on zero-sum politics to the recognition of the need for cooperation across party lines. The uniqueness of the power-sharing arrangement in Zanzibar was that the system was entrenched in the constitution. The constitution was negotiated and established before the election. The theory of transformational change suggests that transformational leaders tend to have a strong personal attachment to their missions. Their absence in the course of implementation may sometimes negatively impact the transformation process, even in the context where the mission has been translated within the legal and constitutional framework. The case of Zanzibar indicates a pressing need for deepening the power-sharing deal so that it becomes people-centered rather than a mere elite project entrenched in partisan politics.

Keywords: *Reconciliation, Government of National Unity, Transformational Leadership, Transformational Change, Power-sharing, Maridhiano, Muafaka, Zanzibar Politics*

Introduction

Zanzibar has had a turbulent political history for more than half a century, from the time of nationalist struggles in the 1950s to date. The prominent bone of contestation has revolved around identity politics, with competing conceptions of nationalism by contending parties and who should have the right to rule over the islands. Neither pre-independence multiparty

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elections, the 1964 revolution, and subsequent union with Tanganyika in the same year and one-party politics from 1964 to 1995, nor multiparty elections from 1995 to date have been able to resolve the long-standing tensions. In November 2009, the then President of Zanzibar, Amani Abeid Karume, and the Civic United Front (CUF) Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad, met at the Zanzibar state house and declared their commitment in public to what was popularly known as *Maridhiano*.³The *Maridhiano* sought to end the long-standing political conflict between the two main political parties on the islands. That decision by the two leaders and subsequent choices and actions that followed ushered in a new era of political transformation in Zanzibar. The Zanzibar Constitution was subsequently amended in 2010 following a successful referendum that provided popular approval of an envisaged government of national unity.⁴The government of national unity survived for five years (2010-2015) but collapsed in the aftermath of the 2015 general elections. In this reconciliation initiative, one of the critical issues that seem to have attracted academic inquiry is the role of leadership in the whole process of political settlement or transformation (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012; Matheson, 2012; Moss & Tronvoll, 2015; Nassor & Jose, 2014). Therefore, this article aims to explain the process of reconciliation in Zanzibar with specific reference to *Maridhiano* by examining the role of leadership in the process.

Materials and Methods

It is a qualitative study. It was conducted between March 2015 and February 2017, involving two main data collection methods: in-depth interviews involving politicians, government functionaries, academics, journalists, and leaders of CSOs and documentary reviews of secondary and primary sources. The respondents were selected purposefully based on their involvement in the reconciliation process or knowledge of the process. The sample size had nineteen respondents. This size was considered adequate since it focused much on key informants involved in the reconciliation process in Zanzibar or those who had a vast knowledge

³ It is a Swahili term referring to a 'gentlemen' agreement, i.e., an agreement without specific agreement terms or a formal pact signed by the parties to the dispute.

⁴ See, for example, Section 9(3) of the Zanzibar Constitution (1984 as amended in 2010), which provides that the structure of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar shall be that of national unity. Section 39(1) provides that: "There shall be two Vice Presidents, the First Vice President, and the Second Vice President." The former, who shall be the Principal Advisor to the President, is appointed by the President after consultation with the party which emerged in the second position in the presidential election (Section 39 [3]). Under Section 42(2), the President is required to appoint Ministers in consultation with the First Vice President and the Second Vice President in proportion to the number of constituency seats in the House of Representatives.

of the process. In order to maintain the anonymity of respondents, respondents from different institutions were given specific codes (see Annex 1). Data were processed using content and contextual analysis. As stated previously, this study was limited up to the 2015 general elections and events that took place thereafter. This is because the government of national unity was formed immediately after the 2010 general elections, and it survived up to 2015. Although it is provided in the constitution, the period between 2015 and 2020 had no government of national unity since the opposition party boycotted the elections claiming massive vote-rigging by the ruling party.

However, after the 2020 general election, Seif Shariff Hamad, who had crossed over to another political party, namely the Alliance for Change and Transparency, popularly known as the ACT–Wazalendo, took part in the election and subsequently joined the government of national unity. Therefore, it is vital to focus much on the political dynamics of the 2010-2015 power-sharing deal and subsequent events that shed some light on transformational change. When this study was first conceived, there was quite a high degree of optimism that it represented a striking case of leadership for transformational change in Africa. However, by the time the study was concluded, the sorts of development that occurred, particularly with respect to the collapse of the government of national unity after the 2015 general elections, necessitated a re-thinking in terms of the nature and scope of transformational change itself as well as the role of leadership in that transformation.

Context

Zanzibar, a pair of islands (with several small islets) located about twenty miles off the coast of the Tanzanian mainland, consists of two main islands, namely Unguja and Pemba. Unguja is the seat of government and commercial capital. According to the 2012 Census, Zanzibar has a total population of 1,303,569 people, of whom approximately 68.8 percent reside on Unguja island, and 31.2 percent reside on Pemba island (URT, 2012). Zanzibar effectively became part of the Omani Empire in 1832, when Sayyid Said bin Sultan, the Sultan of Oman, transferred his court from Muscat to Stone Town on Unguja. Sayyid Said established a ruling dynasty and introduced clove plantations using slave labor (Ingrams, 1967, p. 163).

Consequently, as Glassman aptly puts it: "[t]he political and social categories generated by the rise of the Busaid sultanate – Arabs, Indians, indigenous islanders, and slaves – laid the foundation of modern Zanzibar's major ethnic divisions; as has often been the case, race-making was connected to state-building" (Glassman, 2011, p. 31). The political economy created by Arab rule was based on racial and class stratifications. This did not fundamentally change when Zanzibar became a British Protectorate from 1890 to 1963. Indeed, when the British assumed responsibility as a protecting power over the Sultanate, they did not interfere in the socio-economic relations that were in place. Instead, they encouraged their reproduction through a divide-and-rule policy (Bakari, 2001, p. 53).

According to the 1948 Census, the Shirazis⁵ Zanzibari natives constituted 56.2 percent, the Africans (mainly recent arrivals from the mainland) accounted for 19.5 percent, Arabs made up 15.9 percent, Asians (5.8 percent), Comorians (1.1 percent), and others collectively accounted for less than 1 percent of the total population. This diverse population played out during the nationalist struggles that gained momentum in the 1950s. None of the nationalist parties could forge a common national identity and consciousness. Instead, they exacerbated the already existing social stratification with racial and pseudo-class contents (Bakari, 2001, pp. 56–58). The political parties that were formed in the 1950s had been preceded by welfare associations based on ethnic identification since the early 20th century with Arabs being the forerunners, followed by an African Association representing the urban and rural proletariat originating from the mainland and the Shirazi Association representing indigenous Zanzibaris in 1934 and 1939, respectively. When the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) was formed in 1955, many considered it an Arab party representing the upper class of the landed aristocracy (Mapuri, 1996; Mrina & Matoke, 1980; Mukangara, 2000). However, the extent to which that label was appropriate was contentious during that time and even today. Some scholars, while not completely disputing some inclination to Arab aspirations, hold that the relative success of the ZNP in political mobilization and coalition-building with the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) rested largely in its non-racial and non-ethnic strategy by appealing to broad Zanzibari nationalism (Bakari, 2001; Sheriff, 1994; Shivji, 2008). Advancing this argument, Shivji succinctly puts it:

⁵ The Shirazi refers to a native ethnic group of Afro-Arab/Persian origin which is predominantly African but distinguishes itself from recent arrivals from the mainland because of their mixed descent.

In its program, vision, and outlook, the ZNP sought legitimacy in the Zanzibari culture and custom rather than any form of Arabism. Therefore, one has to explore the class base of the party, its relation to the state, and other historical and political factors in determining its character, not the ethnicity of its leaders (Shivji, 2008, p. 19).

Like the ZNP, the other parties, namely the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP), were also perceived differently regarding their ethnic content and class distinctions. The ASP was formed in 1957 following the African Association and the Shirazi Association merger. It managed to attract many followers, particularly among recent immigrants from the mainland, and strong support from the Unguja section of the Shirazi Association representing the poor peasantry mainly in the eastern and southern parts of the island. The ZPPP was formed in 1959 following the split by the Shirazi faction from ASP. This was aggrieved by the perceived dominance of the African faction with its strong leaning towards the mainland. The ZPPP represented largely the indigenous landed petty bourgeoisie, mainly from Pemba. It favored an electoral alliance with the ZNP (Bakari, 2001, p. 61).

All pre-independence elections held (1957, January 1961, June 1961, and 1963) demonstrated that society was divided almost down the middle along with class and ethnic identities. In the last two general elections preceding independence, the ASP had secured a marginal victory of 50.6 percent and 54.2 percent of the total vote, but it could not form the simple parliamentary majority required to form a government. Instead, the ZNP and ZPPP formed a coalition government following the results of the 1963 election. Independence was granted on December 10, 1963, transforming Zanzibar from an absolute monarchy under a British protectorate to a constitutional monarchy, whereby the Sultan remained as a symbolic head of state, and the prime minister became the head of government. On January 12, 1964, the ZNP-ZPPP coalition government was overthrown by the ASP-Umma Party alliance just a month after independence.⁶ Three months later, on April 26, 1964, Zanzibar united with Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Under the union, however, Zanzibar retained its internal government to deal with non-union matters.

⁶ The Umma Party was a leftist party founded in 1963 by one of the staunch African Marxists, Abdulrahman Babu, who had defected from the ZNP.

Against the backdrop of a political economy of a highly fragmented society in terms of race, regionalism, and class differences, the nationalist movement in Zanzibar was fractured right in the middle with one faction, namely ASP, subscribing to black African nationalism and the other faction, notably the ZNP-ZPPP alliance, subscribing to Zanzibari nationalism (Bakari, 2001; Shivji, 2008). The nationalist parties that were formed invariably fitted themselves into one of the sides of the ideological spectrum, exacerbating society's social and political polarization. These different perspectives on nationalism coincided with the political parties' racial/ethnic and regional identities. Unguja generally became a stronghold of the ASP, and Pemba became a stronghold of the ZPPP and ZNP. Most Zanzibaris of Arab origin either supported the ZNP or ZPPP, and most recent arrivals from the mainland supported the ASP. The Shirazis were divided almost equally, with the better off Shirazis of Pemba and the northern part of Unguja predominantly supporting the ZNP-ZPPP alliance and the relatively poorer sections of the Shirazis of the southern and eastern parts of Unguja primarily supporting the ASP (Bakari, 2001; Sheriff, 2001).

More than half a century of Zanzibar's independence and the union with Tanganyika since 1964 have enormously altered the islands' political economy (Bakari, 2001). It is still widely believed that the past haunts the present (Othman, 1993). The union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 did not resolve the islands' long-standing social and political polarization. Instead, it created another front on which contending parties intensified their contestation for political power (Sheriff, 1994). There has been an intense debate on the extent to which the two main parties in Zanzibar, in the wake of the resumption of multiparty politics since 1992, represent the historical divides of pre-independence politics characterized by racial class/ethnic and regional differences. Suffice it to mention in passing, the debate is polarized into two camps: those who see CCM and CUF more or less as a replica of the ASP, and ZNP-ZPPP alliance, respectively (Killian, 2008; Mapuri, 1996; Mmuya & Chaligha, 1994; Mukangara, 2000); and those who view the current parties as institutions with some remnants of the past, but significant contemporary ingredients that would fundamentally differentiate them from their predecessors (Bakari, 2001; Matheson, 2012). The latter analysis cites, among other factors, the changing political economy of the islands as well as the very genesis of the CUF, in that the core leadership of the party was almost entirely a splinter group expelled or defecting from the ruling party, CCM. Most of these individuals were former ASP members (Bakari, 2001, p. 168).

Scholars who have attempted to explain the long-standing political conflict in Zanzibar could be categorized into two different theoretical perspectives. The first perspective, which is considered as the mainstream perspective supported by a large number of scholars, as well as the ruling establishment, has placed more emphasis on explaining the conflict in terms of the racialized nature of Zanzibar politics since colonial days (Lofchie, 1965; Mmuya & Chaligha, 1994; Mrina & Matoke, 1980; Mukangara, 2000). Implied in this perspective, which could be referred to as a primordial view, is the assertion that the Zanzibar conflict is historically and structurally predetermined, and hence it can only be resolved through an incremental approach over the generations. Based on this perspective, what could be feasibly done in the short run is, therefore, an attempt to defuse the tensions and contain the situation to prevent it from further escalation.

The other perspective explains Zanzibar's politics from the vantage point of political economy, primarily in terms of social classes and the current socio-economic and political dynamics (Bakari, 2001; Matheson, 2012; Sheriff, 2001). Building upon the latter perspective, such scholars explain the current political predicament of Zanzibar largely in terms of proximate factors, including the role of leadership, policies, struggles for democratization, greater autonomy within the union arrangement, and political hostility caused by the politics of exclusion (Bakari, 2001; Sheriff, 1994). This perspective recognizes the instrumental role that leadership may play in conflict transformation processes under the existing historical and structural constraints.

Regarding the political contest between the two main parties on the islands, elections have significantly demonstrated their disagreement. In other words, "...none of the six competitive elections in the political history of Zanzibar has produced a legitimate government acceptable to the major political camps" (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012). There has never been a major breakthrough whereby the defeated party concedes defeat and vows to cooperate with the victor for the wellbeing of the islands. The aftermath of each competitive election has been characterized by not conceding defeat, increased hostility, exclusion of a significant section of the community, and suppression of political opponents (Kaiser, 1999; Killian, 2008). This suppression has included intimidation, arrests, detention without trial, imprisonment, torture, rape, looting, discrimination in public employment, demolition of houses, and murders (Bakari,

2001; Heilman, 2004). Since the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, the political crisis reached its climax in January 2001, when the police and the Zanzibar Marine Force (KMKM) used excessive force to deal with the Civic United Front's (CUF) demonstrators. The latter held nationwide demonstrations to demand a new constitution, an independent electoral commission, and a rerun of the Zanzibar election. Thirty-one people, including one policeman, were killed, the property was destroyed, and over 2,000 people fled to Kenya as political refugees.⁷ The killings and associated violent events worsened the situation.⁸ In light of the deteriorating political situation, it became apparent that there was a need for negotiations between the two main political parties on the islands, namely Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF).

Considerable pressure on both the Union Government and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar to initiate the negotiation process was mounted by both domestic and international forces in the aftermath of the bloody events of 26/27 January 2001. This initiative culminated in a second reconciliation accord (*Muafaka* II of 2001) which was negotiated against the backdrop of the failure of the first accord (*Muafaka* I), brokered by the then Commonwealth Secretary-General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku in 1999. Like the previous one, *Muafaka* II was not implemented. The actual terms of the agreement in both *Muafaka* I and *Muafaka* II centered on recognizing each other's existence, the need to respect human rights, and reforms of the electoral laws and election management body. The same controversies and conflicts surrounding the two previous general elections featured again in the 2005 general election leading to another initiative of political reconciliation that was headed by the two Secretaries-General of CCM and CUF, following a commitment given by the newly elected President of the United Republic in his first presidential speech to Parliament in December 2005. Like the previous ones, this initiative also failed, hence cementing the conventional view that Zanzibar was in a cyclical process of a persistent historical conflict. As Ramadhani aptly puts it that:

⁷ According to the Presidential Commission of Inquiry report led by Brigadier Hashim Mbita, the figure is still seriously contested by CUF, who maintain that the number of deaths exceeds forty-five (<http://hakinaumma.wordpress.com/2008/12/17/sura-ya-saba>).

⁸ Relative to other political conflicts in the Great Lakes region, the number of people killed and injured may appear small. However, given the small population of Zanzibar, the impact of the protracted conflict is substantial in terms of people's rights (political, economic, and social rights) as well as overall economic development, unity, and political stability [including that of the Union Government].

...what appears as merely a political stand-off with post-election-rioting has, in fact, most of the characteristics of a deep-seated and protracted conflict. The political divisions are superimposed on deeper racial/ethnic divisions embedded in territorially-defined horizontal inequalities (political and economic). These, in turn, have resonances to very brutal periods in Zanzibar and African history (particularly of the slave trade).⁹

A more critical analysis of the conflict, however, would suggest that the current conflict is not merely a replica of the past as Brown comments:

...despite some obvious similarities, the recent "Zanzibar Crisis" cannot be grasped as a straightforward re-emergence of earlier tensions. The social cleavages that inform this dispute have altered; they have been shaped by the social, political, and economic transformations of the independence period (Brown, 2010).

Theoretical Framework

One of the critical issues emerging in conflict transformation literature is the concept of transformation itself and its scope and magnitude. Analytically, conflict transformation may have several aspects. The first aspect may entail what Johan Galtung would call "a discourse switch" (Galtung & Fischer, 2004) – meaning shifting discourse in terms of how the problem at hand is framed or reframed by the actors, for example, the parties to the conflict may move from a perception of viewing each other as enemies to viewing each other as contenders or competitors. The second aspect involves a situation whereby a new overarching goal is formulated. The third aspect denotes a situation whereby a conflict situation is transformed from a deadly conflict to a conflict that could be managed peacefully through different means such as adjudication, mediation, or negotiation. When any of these characteristics is obtained (i.e., not necessarily all of them) as a result of conscious human action, it is justified to credit those who championed the process as transformational (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994).

⁹ See Ramadhani, Lupa "Identity Politics, and Complexities of Conflict Resolution in Zanzibar." IBIS Discussion Paper No 2, Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin. http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/publications/discussionpapers/identitypoliticsandcomplexitiesinzanzibar/L_Ramadhani.pdf. Accessed 1/7/2021.

There are three dimensions of conflict transformation, in which the term is usually used. The first is a fundamental change in the relationship between parties and a change in recognizing each other's ethnic and national aspirations (Northrup, 1989). Secondly, societies transformed when fundamental social and political changes are effected "to correct inequalities and injustice to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs" (Harrington & Engle Merry, 2018); and thirdly, when there is an attitudinal change in individuals, i.e., "consciousness and character of human beings" (Vayrynen, 1991). At any point, if the transformation in question has occurred out of the will and the capacity of an actor to act consciously to transform a particular situation in the context where the actor could have behaved differently. Then this is logically connected to the role of leadership in conflict transformation (Hay, 2002, pp. 94–95). Of course, this does not negate the fact that due to the changing nature of social reality, conflict and its components are continuously transforming in some ways (Vayrynen, 1991).

Transformational Leadership and *Maridhiano* in Zanzibar

The process leading to the reconciliation deal (*Maridhiano*) and subsequently the passing of the bill for a referendum in Zanzibar on the government of national unity brings a fundamental aspect of political dynamics beyond institutional arrangements. The first reconciliation accord of 1998 (*Muafaka I*) and the second one of 2001 (*Muafaka II*) and negotiations for the third accord (*Muafaka III*), which ultimately collapsed before striking a final deal in 2008, were all strictly speaking carried out within the existing institutional arrangements of the party structures of the two parties (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012, p. 199). Select committees composed of senior members from the two main rival parties were formed under the co-chairmanship of the two Secretaries-General. These committees engaged in structured negotiations and formal agreements in the case of *Muafaka I* and II, with clear terms, which were signed by the leaders of the two parties in official ceremonies at the House of Representatives. Likewise, the processes and procedures for *Muafaka III* were the same, although the process failed before the signing stage.

In the case of *Maridhiano*, however, the process was fundamentally different. The process and the agreement were basically informal and (without degrading the role of some forces behind the scene), by and large, a product of two prominent architects, notably Zanzibar's President Amani Abeid Karume and CUF Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad. No clear terms of the agreement under *Maridhiano* were ever made public. The two leaders simply declared their broad statement

of intent 'to forget the past and open up a new page of Zanzibar's history after they had met in camera at the Zanzibar State House on November 5, 2009. The exact terms of *Maridhiano*, if any, were a secret between the two leaders. According to an interview with the CUF Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad, there were no specific terms of the agreement between the two leaders, except some general understanding of the situation (Interview RN 1, 29/12/2015). After that, a series of measures were taken, signaling a commitment to the reconciliation agenda. The first measure was the recognition of Karume by CUF as Zanzibar's President. The second measure was the formation of a joint committee of six members, three from CCM and three from CUF, to prepare a proposal for the formation of a government of national unity (GNU) and ultimately the tabling of a private bill for the holding of a referendum on the formation of a GNU in Zanzibar after the October 2010 general election. The bill was ultimately and unanimously passed on January 28, 2010, by both parties' members of the House of Representatives.

Based on the interviews conducted with the key actors in the reconciliation process and analysis of the legal measures subsequently taken, it could be plausible to assert that *Maridhiano* did not have specific terms of the agreement between the two contending sides as such save for a general commitment to form a GNU whose composition was to be spelled out in the Zanzibar constitution (Interview RN1, 29/12/2015). This implies that the other critical issues, such as how the electoral system and processes were to be organized and managed, had not been resolved during the negotiation process and thereafter. That is to say, the 2010 general elections and even the 2015 general elections were held under the legal and institutional framework that was in place before *Maridhiano*. Apparently, it was assumed that the spirit of reconciliation would facilitate the conduct of the 2010 general elections, and the GNU formed thereafter would be in a position to initiate and implement a wide range of constitutional and legal measures that would regulate and manage political contestation (Interview RN 20, 15/05/2016). That ambition, however, did not materialize during the entire period of the GNU from 2010 to 2015. Thus, the spirit of *Maridhiano* might have been an overall mission of building a harmonious society with a common national interest. The society is characterized by social and political inclusion under the GNU, the legal system, and the structures in place to manage political competition, such as the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) to facilitate a free and fair political competition.

Thus, the only substantive achievements that were realized in the short run was power-sharing under the government of national unity, as well as some changes in attitude among some of the key political actors, which, to a certain degree, amounted to a discourse switch from a hostile political attitude based on zero-sum politics to the recognition of the need for cooperation across party lines. The uniqueness of the power-sharing arrangement in Zanzibar was that the system was entrenched into the constitution, and it was negotiated before the election, a feature that differentiated it from other arrangements of power-sharing concluded in the aftermath of post-election violence (as was the case in Kenya and Zimbabwe). While it cannot be concluded that the 2010 general election in Zanzibar was free and fair, CUF, for the first time since the inception of multiparty politics, conceded defeat (apparently in the spirit of *Maridhiano*)¹⁰, and the new GNU was immediately inaugurated.

Under the GNU, as stated under Section 42 (2) of the Zanzibar Constitution (1984 as amended in 2010), the President was required within fourteen days after the appointment of the First Vice President and the Second Vice President in consultation with both Vice Presidents to appoint ministers. The appointing ministers must be the members of the House of Representatives and based on the proportion of the number of the constituencies of political parties. The First Vice President is appointed from the party which has won the second position in the presidential election, and the Second Vice President is appointed from the party which has won the presidency. Whereas both are considered principal advisers to the President, the latter has substantial powers as head of government business in the House of Representatives.

The GNU that was formed after the 2010 general elections had sixteen full ministers, nine from CCM and seven from CUF. It also had six deputy ministers, five from CCM and one from CUF. In addition, there were three ministers without a portfolio, two from CCM and one from CUF. Under the GNU arrangement, just like in the previous structure, the President remained with

¹⁰ This time again, CUF leaders and followers believed that they had won the presidency just like in the previous elections. Large numbers of CUF followers had gathered around the election tallying center at Bwawani, Zanzibar Town, waiting for the declaration of results. The outgoing President, Dr. Amani Karume, played an influential role through a respected CCM elder, Mr. Hassan Nassor Moyo [Chairman of the *Maridhiano* Committee of six members], who was tasked to use his elderly wisdom to convince the CUF presidential candidate to concede defeat in the spirit of *Maridhiano*, the initiative which succeeded. See, for example, *Tanzania*, Dar es Salaam, October 20, 2014. See also, International Law and Policy Institute (2010). Elections in Zanzibar: Consolidating Peaceful Multiparty Politics. Available at: http://www.tz.undp.org/ESP/Observer_Reports.asp (accessed January 11, 2017); Archie Matheson (2012). "Maridhiano: Zanzibar's Remarkable Reconciliation and Government of National Unity." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 6 (4): 602.

extensive powers in decision-making, including powers of appointment of a wide range of senior government officials, such as principal secretaries, directors, and heads of executive agencies. This was one of the serious shortcomings of the GNU as it created the impression that the GNU was exclusively operating at the ministerial level, leaving the other layers of government operating just like in the old structures before the formation of the GNU. Despite a wide range of obstacles it faced, however, the GNU was able to survive throughout the entire inter-election period (October 2010 – October 2015).

There have been two sets of arguments regarding the functioning of the GNU. The first set of arguments, which hardliners strongly support within the ruling party, is that it was not working and therefore needed to be scrapped after the 2015 general elections.¹¹ The second set of arguments holds that it was reasonably working despite the numerous constraints and obstacles it faced. Some of those subscribing to this view cite the internal workings of the cabinet, particularly the way decisions were made. For example, consensus emerging from the process of bargaining and compromise between the members of the two parties represented in the cabinet, instead of the President unilaterally or by using his cabinet majority imposing his position or that of his party. Despite disagreements that happened on some occasions, on the whole, the GNU was considered to be reasonably working within the cabinet and also within the House of Representatives (Nassor and Jose 2014).

The Transformation

The GNU structure that was agreed upon by the two sides under *Maridhiano* and later entrenched into the constitution was essentially a product of a power struggle between the two major parties, the CUF and CCM. However, in terms of the scope, the agenda of the GNU was narrow. It centered on power-sharing in the government, particularly the presidency and ministerial posts (Bakari and Makulilo 2012). That is to say, the other fundamental issues causing disagreement and persistent conflict between the two sides, including the management of

¹¹ See, for example, the statement by Waride Bakari Jabu, Secretary of the Zanzibar Special Committee of CCMs National Executive Committee (NEC), Ideology and Publicity. "Serikali ya Umoja wa Kitaifa Yaichefua CCM", February 25, 2015. Available at: <http://www.mpekuzihuru.com/2015/serikali-ya-Umoja-was-kitaifa-zanzibar.html>. Accessed 13/12/2016.

electoral competition and the union issue, were not addressed under *Maridhiano*. In other words, it was virtually taken for granted that power-sharing under the GNU would be instrumental in effecting other desirable constitutional and legal reforms for the management of political contestation. Gradually, it became evident that the mere sharing of ministerial portfolios could not help much. Given that power was reconfigured under the GNU, whichever party would be the second winner in any general elections might suffer from skewed power distribution in the governing process.

With all the challenges the GNU has been facing since its inception, it survived for five years (from October 2010 to October 2015). One of the two principal architects of the arrangement, Amani Abeid Karume, had finished his term in office in October 2010 and therefore did not have an opportunity to oversee its implementation after the 2010 general election. There were still fundamental issues that the GNU had not resolved, and the October 2015 general elections constituted the first litmus test of the resilience and relevance of this new governance arrangement.

However, what can hardly be disputed is that, although the Zanzibar conflict may not have been entirely resolved, Amani Abeid Karume and Seif Shariff Hamad will always be remembered in the history of Zanzibar as two outstanding statesmen. Their contribution to the transformation of the Zanzibar political conflict is by defying the general hitherto hard-line perception to make it intractable. What is so striking about their role as transformational leaders, therefore, is not so much about the evident ultimate success of their mission, but more importantly, is about their individual's capability in transforming the nature of the conflict, or at least some aspects of it, by transcending the formidable institutional arrangements in place. Moss and Tronvoll observe that there was some transformation in intergroup relationships, which is instrumental in peacebuilding as a result of the decision by the two leaders (Moss and Tronvoll 2015). They cite, for example, an interview from one of the CUF Pemba Elders who said: "Karume is a hero and a gentleman. Karume has changed; now he has confidence. It is not easy to stand up in CCM. He is a hero and deserves praise" (Moss and Tronvoll 2015, p. 9).

The 2015 general election was the first to be conducted under the GNU in Zanzibar and was expected to be the first major test of the efficacy of the arrangement. The election was generally managed well in all the initial stages of the electoral process, save for the final stage of the

declaration of results whereby the Chairman of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission nullified the entire election and called for a rerun in a situation whereby all domestic and international observers had declared that the October 2015 general elections in Zanzibar were generally free and fair. The CUF and most opposition parties boycotted a rerun on the ground that the October 2015 general elections were free and fair and the CUF presidential candidate had won the presidential race. Following the March 2016 rerun, the CCM presidential candidate, the incumbent Ali Mohamed Shein, was declared a winner and all constituency seats in the House of Representatives and ward councilors went to the ruling party. That is to say, the government that is in place is a one-party government. In other words, the GNU collapsed in spite of the fact that it was entrenched in the Zanzibar constitution in 2010. The main opposition party, CUF, currently does not recognize the existing government as legitimate or representing the electorate's will. The spirit of GNU that was being cultivated over the period of five years seems to some extent to have waned.¹² Political hostility that was diminishing following the formation of GNU now seems to be intensified.

However, the dominant view from interviews was that the spirit of reconciliation has not completely waned. Commenting on this situation, one senior government official said:

The spirit of reconciliation, to some extent, is still there, there are, of course, some hardliners within the regime, but there are also a pretty large number of moderates, particularly among the youth who do not see a viable alternative under the circumstances other than a government of national unity (Interview RN 8, 03/01/2017).

On the other side of the political spectrum, i.e., the main opposition party, CUF, the spirit of reconciliation and power-sharing is even stronger than in the ruling party, CCM. Interviews with all CUF respondents in this study confirmed their commitment to the GNU as the only viable political solution for the time being. One of the CUF respondents, for example, said:

¹² However, the hope has not been completely eroded as a result of an aborted election of October 2015 for "relative peace." The lack of violence currently exists is not simply a function of heavy military presence on the islands but also an outcome of some spirit of rapprochement that was cultivated during the time of GNU, which still exists to contribute to preventing conflict escalation into violence.

We do not believe that the spirit of GNU has died. We think wisdom will prevail; a lot was achieved under the GNU, it is very difficult to bring us back to where we were prior to Maridhiano (Interview RN 21, 09/07/2017). We do not see any other viable alternative apart from the GNU in the meantime.

The critical question in light of the nullification of the 2015 general election and the collapse of the GNU is, does it make any sense to consider the two leaders who championed the reconciliation process in Zanzibar and the formation of GNU as transformational? The answer might be 'Yes' or 'No', depending on how one defines transformation. If one defines transformation in an ideal sense of getting the final outcomes that are desirable, in this case, ending the long-standing conflict between the two contending parties, the two leaders would obviously not qualify to the status of being transformational. By contrast, if one views transformation as a very complex process, then the two leaders would evidently deserve the status of being transformational. For the purpose of this study, the mere change of some of the characteristics or aspects of the conflict understudy without necessarily resolving or ending the conflict is considered conflict transformation. The schema presented in the theoretical part of this study identified three key aspects which could be subjected to transformation, namely (i) a fundamental change in the relationship between parties; (ii) when there are fundamentally social and political changes aimed at correcting inequalities and injustice between parties; (iii) and when there are changes in individual consciousness and character.

As a result of *Maridhiano* and the subsequent formation of GNU in 2010, some changes have been achieved virtually, as mentioned above. However, more conspicuous changes are noticeable in the last dimension, namely changes in consciousness, attitudes, and the character of individuals among the ruling elite, the elite within the opposition, and even among the common people, the scope and magnitude of change that would amount to what Johan Galtung would refer to as "a discourse switch." The experience of working together under the GNU enabled the elite within both political camps to recognize the fact that while they may have fundamental differences on some of the political issues, they share some common interests on some of the issues. Unlike their previous perception that the conflict between them was a zero-sum game, there was now a change of attitude among some of the members of the ruling elite that power-sharing arrangements were an appropriate system of government. That could fundamentally transform the conflict situation in Zanzibar from a deadly conflict into a conflict of power

contestation that could be largely managed through a democratic process (RN17, 03/02/2017). Consequently, a significant group of moderates within the ruling party emerged, which seemed to share a broad political opinion with the opposition on the need for fighting for greater autonomy for Zanzibar.¹³ As RN17 aptly put it:

Common ground was explored between President Karume and the CUF, Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad, notably the need for greater Zanzibar's autonomy within the Union arrangement. This change of attitude by the top leadership also induced changes in individual consciousness and character among the political leadership and citizens in Zanzibar (RN17, 03/02/2017).

The change of attitude and consciousness was also evident among most government employees. One senior government official commented:

The spirit of GNU is still there. Among civil servants, it is generally very strong. Most of us enjoyed working under the GNU regardless of one's political inclination. Under the GNU, there was a certain degree of harmony in the public service. Today, for example, if a civil servant from Unguja is transferred to Pemba, he/she may be worried due to the prevailing political tensions after the collapse of the GNU (RN2, 3/3/2017).

Notwithstanding the above achievements, there was serious resistance to the idea of a GNU. Such resistance was particularly from some of the leaders of the ruling elite and some sections among the common people, particularly those inclined towards the ruling party. During the national referendum that was held on July 31, 2010, for example, whereby Zanzibaris were asked whether they supported the idea of GNU or not, with a voter turnout of 71.3 percent of registered voters, 186,699 voters (66.4 percent) endorsed the GNU and 95,324 voters (33.6 percent) rejected it.¹⁴ That is to say, the percentage of those who did not support the idea of GNU was

¹³ These include Hassan Nassor Moyo, an elder statesman, a member of the first revolutionary council and a former minister in both the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and the Union Government, Mansour Yussuf Himid, son of the first Chief of Defence Forces of Zanzibar and Mohammed Elmugheiry (Eddy Riyami), Ali Mzee Ali, CCM Party Whip in the House of Representative who was appointed to lead a committee of six charged with voter education for the referendum, etc. These were among the individuals from CCM who were staunch supporters of the idea of GNU.

¹⁴ Zanzibar Electoral Commission, Referendum Results, 2010.

quite significant, and this was in spite of the fact that the authorities had imposed legal and political impediments against those who would campaign for a 'No' vote. The key figures within the 'No' camp had to operate clandestinely, as the top authorities considered them a threat to peace, unity, tranquillity, and political tolerance. However, it was pretty evident that amidst those obstacles, the 'No' camp was able to mount quite a rigorous underground campaign; and in some constituencies, the results show that the 'No' vote outnumbered the 'Yes' vote.¹⁵

The above situation suggests that some significant sections strongly opposed the notion of a GNU among the ruling elite who could use their political influence to mobilize quite a significant number of the common people to reject the idea. At any rate, however, it is plausible to conclude that the general idea of a GNU received wide acceptance among the people who seemed to be tired of hostile politics between the supporters of the two main political camps.

In a mini-survey conducted in some of the *Shehias* of the Urban West Region in Zanzibar in September 2015 (*i.e.*, before the 2015 general elections), the GNU was still enjoying wide acceptance among the ordinary citizens. The findings of this survey indicated that the GNU was favored as the most appropriate form of government by about 66.9 percent of the respondents, given the reality of the Zanzibar political situation characterized by a persistent political impasse after every general election. Interestingly, 31.9 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that the winner-takes-all system is the most appropriate form of government for Zanzibar (Salum 2016, p.50). From these findings, those who support the GNU constitute an absolute majority. However, it is important to recognize that the percentage of those who opposed the idea of GNU is quite significant. Nevertheless, this could not be taken to represent the overall opinion of all Zanzibaris across the two main islands (the survey sample involved only the Urban West Region, a region which is believed to be a CCM stronghold based on election results).

That is to say, the five years period of the functioning of the GNU in Zanzibar provided some kind of transformation in people's minds in terms of realizing the possible merits and demerits of that form of government. Besides, despite its collapse in the aftermath of the 2015 general election, the fact that it has not been removed from the constitution creates some optimism that it is still a viable form of government in Zanzibar; therefore, it may be resurrected in the near

¹⁵ See, for example, the results of Amani, Chaani, Chwaka, Donge, Kitope, Uzini, Makunduchi, Muyuni, Dole, and Kwahani constituencies.

future. Hence, the idea of the government of national unity and a consociational form of democracy as opposed to majoritarianism has not been completely eroded (Lijphart, 2008).

Enablers of the Transformation Process

There were several actors from both political camps who were instrumental in the process towards *Maridhiano* and subsequent decisions and actions thereof. To be sure, even the initial idea of bridging the gap between the two leaders and establishing direct communication was not initiated by any of the two leaders. According to RN 1 and Hassan Nassor Moyo¹⁶ (an elder statesman, who was a member of the first revolutionary council, and who had served as minister in both Union and Zanzibar governments) the idea started at a funeral function of the late Shaaban Khamis Mlool in May 2009 (former national CCM leader who later joined CUF and served as Secretary-General and Vice-Chairman of the party). An informal discussion ensued between Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, Seif Shariff Hamad, Machano Khamis Machano, and Hassan Nassor Moyo (a CCM member who was a very intimate friend of the late Mlool) and CUF. According to RN1, the talk centered on "the political situation of the country." They generally agreed that it was imperative to take urgent measures to rescue the country by ending political hostility among Zanzibaris. Moyo committed himself to send the message to President Karume once he came back from Songea where he had to go for a family affair" (RN1, 29/12/2015).

Meanwhile, the Secretary to the CUF Secretary-General sought an appointment to see President Karume out of his own initiative without consulting any of the CUF leaders, as he later confirmed:

I initially started to informally meet Mansour Yussuf Himid, Minister for Energy and Natural Resources and brother-in-law of President Karume and discuss issues of national interest and request him to send the message to President Karume on the need to reconcile the two contending parties and work together for the good of the islands and its people (RN4, 29/12/2015).

¹⁶ <https://zanzibariyetu.wordpress.com/2010/08/24/siri-ya-maridhiano-zbar-yawekwa-hadharani/>. Accessed 10/05/2016.

Jussa and Himid met about four times. When Jussa ultimately secured an appointment to see the President, he informed Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad and got a blessing for the initiative. The first meetings between Jussa and President Karume, and the later meeting between Moyo and President Karume, were very instrumental in paving the way for the subsequent meetings between President Karume and Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad. By the time the two leaders met, the trust had already to a considerable degree been built by those who had started to follow up the initiative, namely Moyo, Ismail Jussa, and Mansour Yussuf Himid. It is important to note that the whole process was informal, and the two persons who carried the message from the other side, namely Moyo and Himid, had very close connections to the President (RN4, 14/05/2016). Following those informal talks, President Karume embraced the idea and immediately suggested forming a coordination committee, popularly known as the Committee of Six. The committee consisted of three members from the ruling party and three members from the CUF and helped to coordinate the process and concretize the terms of the agreement, and the entire process was carried out informally and in secret.¹⁷

Although much of the discussion focuses on the two prominent leaders, namely President Karume and CUF Secretary-General Seif Shariff Hamad, whose decisions and actions were considered decisive, the role of facilitators or enablers on both sides should not be underestimated. Some were operating underground and were not represented in the formal committees constituted. To begin with, the very idea of reconciliation and the plan to have the two leaders meet did not originate from either of the two leaders under discussion. But the fact that the two leaders instantly decided to embrace it and seriously committed themselves to work on it is in itself a transformational character in the given political atmosphere that existed. That is to say, in any organization, for a transformation process to take place, it is not always necessary that the topmost leader conceives the original idea of transformation; the idea of transformation may be conceived of by other members in the organization who may not even be conspicuous once the ball gets rolling. This is consonant with the conceptualization by James McGregor Burns, the founder of modern leadership theory, who defined a transformational leader as one

¹⁷ The members included Hassan Nassor Moyo from CCM (Chairman), Abubakar Khamis Bakary from CUF as Vice – Chairman, Ismail Jussa Ladhu from CUF (Secretary), Mansour Yussuf Himid (Secretary), Mohammed Ahmed Al-Mugheiry [Eddy Riyami] from CCM, and Salim Bimani from CUF.

who "looks for potential motives in followers, seeks to satisfy their higher needs, and engages the full person of the follower."

From the above account, two different styles of leadership which facilitated the reconciliation process could be discerned. The two top leaders, Amani Abeid Karume and Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad, adopted a style primarily centered on individual leadership, particularly with respect to the initial decision, the Committee of Six, which was concretizing and coordinating the process, by contrast, adopted a collective style of leadership. When the two leaders decided to engage in informal talks at the beginning of the process, they had not consulted their parties' organs or requested their blessings. However, the Committee of Six operated like a flat informal organization with all members more or less having the same status. The initial suggestion, for example, of having co-chairpersons, was rejected in the first meeting by the members who unanimously endorsed Hassan Nassor Moyo, from CCM (who was the eldest member in the team) to serve as Chairperson and Abubakar Khamis Bakary from CUF to serve as Vice-Chairperson.

In contrast, Ismail Jussa from CUF and Mansour Yussuf Himid from CCM served as Secretaries to the Committee. That is to say, during the initial and even later stages of the process, two different leadership styles were utilized. Some issues were resolved by the initiatives of individual leaders, particularly the top leaders, and some issues were resolved based on a collective kind of leadership as exemplified by the modus operandi of the Committee of Six.

The two top leaders, notably the President of Zanzibar and the CUF Secretary-General, invariably faced significant challenges translating their commitment to action. When the CUF Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad, presented the idea for the first time to the national council of his party, there was some resistance among some leaders, not in terms of rejecting the idea of recognizing the Zanzibar President as a prerequisite for a constructive dialogue towards the formation of the government of national unity, but essentially in terms of skepticism about the goodwill of the other party. A more serious negative reaction by CUF members, however, happened at a public rally at Kibandamaiti, Zanzibar Town, when Hamad told CUF followers that the national governing council of the party had held a meeting and resolved to recognize Amani Abeid Karume as the President of Zanzibar to end the political hostility that had engulfed

the islands for decades. He was booed at with massive outrage by the crowd that was moving towards the podium to cause a fracas while chanting: "*hatutaki*"; "*hatutaki*" [meaning: We don't agree; we don't agree].¹⁸ Some of the followers were bitterly complaining, and some of them crying out of rage and disbelief: "How come that some of us have lost our relatives and others are handicapped in defense of the politics of our party, and as a result now our leaders have betrayed us!"¹⁹ The security personnel had to intervene to rescue the situation, and Hamad had to suspend his speech. The Chairman of the party, Ibrahim Lipumba, went to the podium to calm down the crowd and clarify some of the issues on how the process of negotiation was carried out and that the decision was an outcome of a thorough deliberation of the collective leadership of the party and not a unilateral decision by Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad. Lipumba further assured the audience that Hamad had never betrayed Zanzibaris and would never do that while fighting for justice.²⁰ After that, the situation gradually settled, and the situation was relatively calm when a similar rally was held in Pemba.

As days passed, however, most CUF followers understood the wisdom of their leaders and became staunch supporters of *maridhiano* and the government of national unity in Zanzibar. Two main reasons account for the initial trust that developed among some CUF followers. One reason was based on some of the key attributes of a transformational leader, notably the one who commands trust, admiration, and respect from his followers (Bass, 1998). Hamad had evidently these features, given his impeccable long track record as a towering figure in opposition politics in Zanzibar. The second reason was due to some of the earlier decisions taken by Karume, which amounted to confidence-building measures, including the appointment of two CUF members to the House of Representatives.

The decision by the CUF Secretary-General to accept a deal which included, among other things, the recognition of Amani Karume as the President of Zanzibar without any substantive gains in terms of specific terms of the formally agreed pact was precarious. This was mainly because two similar reconciliation agreements that had been formally agreed and signed in the past, namely *Muafaka I* (1999) and *Muafaka II* (2001), were not adequately implemented by the government, and hence they ultimately collapsed. By breaking the news at the public rally that the National

¹⁸ CUF public rally, Kibandamaiti, Zanzibar Town, November 8, 2010.

¹⁹ CUF public rally, Kibandamaiti, Zanzibar Town, November 8, 2010.

²⁰ CUF public rally, Kibandamaiti, Zanzibar Town, November 8, 2010.

Governing Council of the party had resolved to recognize Amani Abeid Karume as the President of Zanzibar without prior underground work to prepare his followers psychologically, Seif Shariff Hamad demonstrated that he was a risk-taker. To be sure, risk-taking is one of the essential attributes of transformational leadership. One of the most challenging times for leaders is when they lead their organizations and followers into the 'unknown'. This, in effect, implies bringing something unpalatable to their members, i.e., pushing them out of their comfort zone. It is quite natural for the followers to resist the change initially. This is what exactly happened at the CUF rally. At this point, leaders have to demonstrate their courage and ability to persuade their followers to build trust to follow their leaders to venture into the unknown. Apart from the major public rallies held in Unguja and Pemba, the CUF top leadership organized internal meetings at district and local levels to explain what had transpired and their prospects. Ultimately, CUF members and followers gradually accepted the deal and recognized the wisdom of their leaders to venture into the unknown terrain.

During the referendum, different groups and institutions in Zanzibar and beyond strongly supported the transformation process. These included political parties, CSOs, religious institutions, the media, and the international community. The electronic and print media was clearly in favor of the Yes vote. Similarly, religious institutions played an important role in sensitizing people to accept the spirit of reconciliation and turned out in large numbers on the referendum day to cast their votes in favor of the GNU (Bakari & Makulilo, 2012). The strong support of such institutions could not be attributed to the role of political leadership in courting for their support, but fortunately, those were generally out of their motivations already committed to the reconciliation process. On the whole, the political environment was conducive for the spread of the idea of GNU across the political divides.

Apart from the internal forces in Zanzibar that facilitated the reconciliation process, the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, had shown strong commitment to support the initiative despite the failure of *Muafaka III*, the process which he had initiated immediately after he took office in October 2005. While inaugurating the tenth parliament, he categorically stated that he was committed to facilitating the process to resolve the political conflict in Zanzibar. What prompted Kikwete to take a more positive political stance is

difficult to tell. However, what could be inferred is that several factors were at play, both internal and external. Internally, with the experience of past elections in Zanzibar characterized by violence and persistent political hostility, it was evident that the use of force could only diffuse the situation for some time but could not resolve the political conflict in Zanzibar. Externally, pressure by the international community was being exerted on the Zanzibar government, including measures to freeze foreign aid by western donors. Against that background, therefore, although we cannot justifiably consider the ruling establishment as one of the key enablers of the reconciliation process,²¹ the role of the President of the United Republic was quite instrumental in facilitating the process.

Likewise, we cannot underestimate the influence of western donors in the reconciliation process. They would very well fit in the categories of the enablers of the process. Although they did not directly involve themselves in the reconciliation process or dictate terms to any of the negotiating sides, they had set more or less clear terms as prerequisites for them to continue with development assistance to Zanzibar. Besides, they consistently reminded the government of the United Republic of its responsibility as a sovereign state in resolving the Zanzibar political conflict. The western donors' role and influence in the reconciliation process did not only end with the passing of the tenth amendment to the Zanzibar Constitution that entrenched the GNU into the constitution, but they also provided significant assistance in the preparation of a conducive environment for the holding of the 2015 general elections.

Conclusion

This article was set to examine the reconciliation process in Zanzibar with specific reference to *Maridhiano*. The prime objective was to see whether it contributed to bring some transformation in the Zanzibar conflict and what has been the role of leadership in that process. The transformational role of leadership was based on the schema presented in the theoretical perspective of this study, delineating three different forms and scales of transformation in a conflict situation. First, whether the fundamental change in the relationship between parties and a change in recognizing each other's ethnic and national aspirations has occurred or not. Second,

²¹ Given the kind of underground campaign by CCM hardliners during the referendum in Zanzibar and the indication by President Kikwete that the ruling party was afraid of Seif Shariff Hamad that he would break the union, it could be plausible to assume that the ruling establishment was not supportive of the process of reconciliation. See interview with Seif Shariff Hamad with Tshaka Ssali VoA.

fundamental social and political changes have been effected to correct inequalities and injustice to provide all groups with their fundamental human needs; and lastly, whether there have been changes in individuals, i.e., "consciousness and character of human beings. In the case of Zanzibar, we cannot plausibly talk of any 'fundamental' change in the first and the second aspect. However, there were some achievements in the first aspect regarding a certain degree of change in the relationship between parties, particularly in terms of recognizing each other's aspirations. The fact that there was a formal agreement in terms of constitutional amendments to entrench the GNU into the constitution, a decision which a national referendum had preceded, is an indication that, to some extent, there was a change of relationship between the parties. However, there have been considerable achievements regarding the third aspect, i.e., individual consciousness and character changes. To be sure, the decision by the two prominent leaders in Zanzibar (i.e., *Maridhiano*) has not been able to resolve or end the long-standing political conflict, but it has significantly changed the *nature* of the conflict, including, to some extent changing individual consciousness and attitudes which amount to a 'discourse switch' by some key members of the elite, as well as by some citizens. Apparently, there is a gradual process of attitudinal change whereby leaders and the common people are exploring a common national cause for cooperation. Regarding the agency of transformation, the case of *Maridhiano* in Zanzibar demonstrates that it was possible to transform the nature of conflict and achieve a significant breakthrough by resorting to individual initiatives outside the formal structural arrangements. Whereas the top leadership may get much credit as transformational leaders, behind the scene, they were also very important strategic actors who championed and facilitated the process. Therefore, the initial success of *Maridhiano* underlines the critical importance of creating a 'vanguard' group among the leaders to spearhead and safeguard the initiative against resisters who will always be there in any transformative process (Stedman, 1997). In the case of Zanzibar, it was also revealed that once the key strategic actors achieved the breakthrough, the other significant actors bought into the idea of reconciliation.

On the other hand, it is widely believed that transformational leaders tend to have a strong personal attachment to their missions and that their absence in the course of implementation may have a negative impact in the transformation process even in the context where the mission has

been translated within the legal and constitutional framework.²² In the case of Zanzibar, the two most prominent transformational leaders, Amani Abeid Karume and Seif Shariff Hamad, were together at the initial stages up to the time of the constitutional amendment and during the time of the 2010 general election. Thereafter, the actual functioning of the GNU was entrusted to Ali Mohamed Shein, the newly elected President of Zanzibar, who, unlike his predecessor, did not seem to have a strong personal attachment to the reconciliation mission.²³

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²² See, for example, Luc Reyhler and Anton Stellamans (2004) "Researching Peace-Building Leadership", Paper presented at the Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Commission (CRPB), Hungary, July 2014. Available at: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/400526/1/Cahier71_ReyhlerStellamans.pdf. Accessed 27/01/2017. The authors explain the case of F. W de Klerk and Nelson Mandela and their instrumental role in transforming an apartheid South Africa into a new multi-racial democracy.

²³ During an interview with RN 1 and RN 4, they confessed to having requested President Karume to delay the 2010 general election to establish a firm foundation of the reconciliation process.

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Annex 1: List of Respondents

No	Respondent	Code
1.	CUF Secretary-General	RN 1
2.	Minister of Legal and Constitutional Affairs	RN 2
3.	Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources	RN 3
4.	Secretary to the CUF Secretary-General	RN 4
5.	Commissioner, Zanzibar Electoral Commission	RN 5
6.	Lecturer, University of Dar es Salaam	RN 6
7.	Political Scientist, Zanzibar State University	RN 7
8.	Director of Public Prosecution	RN 8
9.	Coordinator, Tanzania Women Media Association	RN 9
10.	Member of Parliament (Special Seat), CUF	RN 10
11.	Member of Parliament for Kojani Constituency (CUF)	RN 11
12.	Journalist, MwanaHalisi Newspaper	RN 12
13.	Immigration Department	RN 13
14.	Tanzania Human Rights Defenders (THIRD).	RN 14
15.	Principal Secretary, First Vice President's Office, Zanzibar	RN 15
16.	ACT Wazalendo, Zanzibar	RN 16
17.	Member of the Governing Council, (CHADEMA)	RN 17
18.	UNDP Consultant, Zanzibar	RN 18
19.	CCM Zanzibar leader	RN 19
20.	Member of the Committee of Maridhiano and Former Minister Under GNU, Zanzibar	RN 20
21.	CUF Leader	RN 21