

The Effect of Terrorism and Insurgency on the Security of African Nations: An Appraisal

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Abstract

Recently, Africa has been labeled a theatre of war due to incessant terrorist attacks that plagued its landscape. This situation, among others, explains why the continent's development has been slow or stagnated in all spheres, and Africa has been accorded little recognition in the international arena. Against this background, this paper examined the effects of terrorism on the security of African nations. The descriptive method was adopted, and a secondary source of data collection was used in sourcing relevant data. At the same time, content analysis was utilized as a framework for analyzing the data. The paper revealed that though terrorism and insurgency have been issues rooted in history, they have recently become serious challenges to the security of African nations, impacting negatively on African nations and their development. The paper posited that religious prejudice, deprivations, and the feeling of neglect are the underlying factors breeding terrorism and insurgency in Africa. It further averred that though a lot of combative efforts have been made to checkmate the trend of these phenomena in Africa, such have, however, achieved limited success. It is due to a combination of factors ranging from weak leadership to confronting the phenomena, corruption, and the porosity of national borders, which encouraged illegal migration of people that form the core of terrorists'/insurgents militia, and accentuated arms proliferation, among others. The paper is a modest effort in order to arrest this unpleasant situation and extreme religious radicalism, which should be timely nipped in the bud. The security architecture of African nations needs to be re-engineered and directed towards generating employment opportunities for their increasing youth population. Also, collaboration in intelligence gathering and information sharing should be encouraged among African nations to ensure early response to such challenges.

Keywords: African Nations, Appraisal, Insurgency, Security, Terrorism

Introduction

The phenomena of terrorism and insurgency worldwide have been an issue of old, which have been experienced in both developed and developing nations, thus constituting security challenges

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of serious magnitude over the years. However, scholars like Adedire, Ake & Olowojulu (2016) observed that it came to the fore on September 11, 2001, when terrorists attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in the United States. Prior to this period, it was relative of less apprehension to many sovereignties, policymakers, academia, and other stakeholders whose major obsession then was concentrated on resolving the crises of drug abuse, identities, arms proliferation, and wars, among others (Adedire, Ake & Olowojulu, 2016).

The logical inference deducible from the preceding is that the past few decades have witnessed terrorists' activities in almost all parts of the world. Thus, the phenomenon implies that every nation within the global community has been negatively affected and, therefore, constrained to invest enormous resources, devise strategies, and collaborate in intelligence gathering and sharing to curb the menace locally and internationally.

The ever-increasing attacks of terrorist groups on African nations became prominent in the 1990s when Osama bin Laden, the leader of the Al-Qaeda, started his operations in Sudan, from where he organized and launched an attack against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (Harbeson, 2001). Some years later, in 1998, Al-Qaeda cells dealt a lethal blow to the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salam in Tanzania. In retaliation to these worrisome developments, the United States bombed a chemical plant in Sudan under the pretense that it was producing elements of chemical weapons for Al-Qaeda (Harbeson, 2001).

The widespread attacks by terrorists across the nooks and crannies of the African Continent leave no one in doubt of the adverse effects that the phenomenon inflicts on the world in general and African nations in particular. In other climes, such as South Africa, where there are reduced attacks by terrorists, development thrives, and such societies naturally enjoy economic growth (Bester, 2015). Whereas, in Nigeria, for example, anxiety and stagnation encapsulate all spheres of human activities in areas exposed to violence occasioned by incessant killings, suicide-bombings, destructions, kidnapping, and other forms of insecurity exacerbated by terrorism (Adedire *et al.*, 2016).

African nations have the misfortune of being bedeviled by various terrorist groups like the Ansar-al-Sharia in Tunisia, Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mauritania and Morocco, Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM), and AJhad Misr in Egypt, the Al-Qaeda and ISIS-WA in Sudan, the Tuareg Rebels in Mali, the Boko Haram in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, the Lord's

Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, and the Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya (Fidelis, Wakili, Muhammad, & Saidu, 2016; Otinche, 2016).

Many African nations have been suffering incessant attacks from these different terrorist groups. In Somalia, for instance, the Al-Shabaab has become virtually notorious for paralyzing the country's economy apart from the gargantuan security challenges it had created for the government to combat. Al-Qaeda has even harassed and terrorized nations like Morocco, Mauritania, Sudan, and Cote d'Ivoire. Adepelumi (2018) observed that since 2009, the people of Nigeria's northeast had experienced varying degrees of violence instigated by Boko Haram insurgents, thereby reducing the quality of life and instituting a large-scale disruption of developmental processes in the region. As a result of the pact signed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with a faction of Boko Haram, a more deadly terrorist group named Islamic State in Iraq and Syria for West Africa (ISIS-WA) emerged under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Barnawi. As a result of this coalition, a more discordant tune is being added to the insurgency tormenting Nigeria's northeast in recent times.

It is pertinent to note that a combination of factors causes these insurgencies. One major factor responsible for the upsurge in terrorists' insurgency is the illegal migration of people across borders due to the ineffectiveness of the immigration control and management of the borders. Though there are established regulations guiding movement across the borders of nations, the porosity of the borderlands of African nations makes illegal migration of men and women from nations to other neighboring countries possible. This uncontrolled movement makes the recruitment of people for criminal activities conceivable. Many of those involved in insurgents' attacks in African nations are usually recruited through this medium (Rosenje & Adeniyi, 2020).

Another contributory factor that has accentuated terrorists' attacks is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), which the industrialized nations have tacitly encouraged for economical interest. As a result of arms acquisition by terrorists and insurgents, many communities have been ransacked, and inhabitants either kidnapped, killed, or seriously maimed. At the same time, invaluable properties were wantonly destroyed, invariably leading to family dislocation or displacement, desertion of towns and villages, and the disruption of the economy (Rosenje, 2018).

Given the devastating consequences that the terrorists' attacks have inflicted on the world and African nations in particular, many concerted combative efforts have been initiated, especially in a collaborative manner, by stakeholders. These efforts include the funding of operations by agencies like the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, whose membership includes many nations across the world, including African countries like Algeria, Benin Republic, Congo, Egypt, and Nigeria, among others (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2022). Other efforts include training military personnel, supplying military equipment and logistics, and signing the military pact (Otinche, 2018). In addition, the US and African nations, in collaboration, devised strategies for intelligence gathering and sharing of information (UN, 2001). Other non-state actors like international agencies and community vigilante groups volunteered to combat the much-dreaded monster (Nwogwugwu, Alao & Ikechi-Ekpendu, 2018).

Though in some instances and climes like Indonesia (White, Mazerolle, Porter & Chalk, 2014), the United States (Brannen, 2014), and Ethiopia (Maru, 2015), these efforts have attracted success, such could, however, not be said about other countries like Somalia and Nigeria. As such, terrorists' attacks remain incessant, sporadic, and continuous, in a nutshell, unabated with the adoption of the slogan of 'no retreat, no surrender' by the insurgents. This is why the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's northeast has remained recalcitrant. In Somalia, the situation is even worse. Given the fragility and its declining capacity to checkmate Al-Shabaab's onslaught, much of the territory has fallen into the hands of warlords (Maiangwa, 2014).

Therefore, the question could be asked: why has terrorism and insurgence remained persistent despite efforts to crush the phenomena? What are the security implications of the protracted terrorism and insurgence? What could be done to flush out terrorists and insurgents from African nations? For ease of progression and the intent of accomplishing the objective of this paper, the study is structured into six sections. Section one discusses the conceptual and the theoretical framework, while section two treats the evolution of terrorism and insurgence. Section three examines the causes, incidences, and trends of terrorism and insurgence in Africa Nations; section four assesses the effects of terrorism and insurgence on African states. Section five evaluates the efforts made to checkmate incidences and trends of terrorist insurgence, while section six offers the conclusion and recommendations.

Conceptual Framework

Terrorist Insurgency

Scholars of various ideological persuasions and backgrounds like Zalma (2011), Ayeni-Akeke (2008), Golder & Williams (2004), Roberts (2002), Heng (2002), Whitaker & Sloan (1978) (cited in Rosenje, 2018) as well as many institutions like the United Nations (UN) (2004) have given a variety of meanings to terrorism and insurgency. There is difficulty among nations and organizations to have a mutually acceptable definition of terrorism basically due to differences in ideological perception of the individual nations and organizations on the notion that 'one man terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.'

Despite these divergences, an attempt is made to offer some of these definitions. Terrorism, for Kiras (2007, cited in Ayodeji, 2018), is often perceived as the continuous use of violence by a small group of people against predetermined targets with the sole aim of realizing a political agenda like instilling fear in the people and government and drawing attention to a political grievance. It is perceived as a politically motivated tactic involving the use of threat, force and violence, and widespread propaganda to achieve a set goal (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2010). The 2004 United Nations Security Council Report (cited in Akpotor, 2013) depicted terrorism as any act embarked upon and intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.

On the other hand, the insurgency is often regarded as an organized resistance movement deliberately created to challenge and ultimately usurp the powers of established political authority. Hence, the United States Department of Defence (DOD) (2016, cited in Rosenje, 2018) perceives it as an organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control over a region. In other words, it seeks to overthrow an established government and replace it with an autonomous national territory within the confines of the existing state. In tandem with this perception, Hayden (2007, p. 270) avers that insurgency is best defined as an organized movement aimed at overthrowing or destroying a constituted government through subversion, espionage, terrorism, and armed conflict. O'Neil (cited in Moghadam, Berger & Bellakova, 2014, p. 3)

conceives insurgency "as a struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling government or authority, where the former uses a combination of political and military means to challenge government power and legitimacy while trying to obtain or maintain control over a particular area."

For the terrorist insurgents, the Machiavellian notion of the end justifies the means is an appropriate strategy for attaining goals. By implication, terrorists' insurgency could, therefore, be conceived as an organized and violent movement that adopts the use of terror or violence to achieve its ultimate goal, which is usually political in nature. Hence, in terrorism, all methods, approaches, and strategies are welcome in the pursuit of achieving their goals. For instance, suicide-bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hijacking, arson, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and incessant and sporadic violent attacks of the guerilla warfare model are usually adopted by insurgents.

Security

Security is regarded as one of the core values of every nation and thus accorded utmost attention by the state and other stakeholders. There are divergent perceptions from scholars concerning the meaning of the concept. Hence, scholars have no unanimity about what the term connotes. Security is generally regarded as a state of existence that guarantees freedom from fear and intimidation, which could hinder the growth of the individual or group and the actualization of his/its dreams and desired goals. By this perception, any situation threatening peace, law, and order is referred to as a security risk and should be avoided or quashed to ensure the good of all within the state.

According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary online (2020), security refers to measures to guard against espionage, sabotage, crime, attack, or escape. Though this definition gave us an insight into the nature of security needs and the specific spheres which require safeguards, it has downplayed the issues of peace and tranquillity, which are the core building blocks upon which security is initiated. For Ufot, Peter, John, and Anietie (2014), security involves the protection of lives and properties and providing a peaceful and tranquil environment where individuals can go about their lawful businesses. Also, security is conceived by Asmau and Abdurashed (2020) as being secure and free from both fears of physical and psychological abuse, violence, persecution, or death and wants such as food, health, and a good job. The term security thus constitutes a

variety of ideas to different people depending on the prism through which it is perceived and the philosophical construct of the individual perceiving it.

From the perception of neo-liberalists, security is viewed as a primary responsibility of the state, while the post-modernists regard it as being within the purview of non-state actors, thus denying the role of the state as being the major provider of security. The latter, therefore, canvasses that the state should be more concerned with the economic security of individuals and groups rather than the security of the state, emphasizing that the root causes of insecurity could be found within the confines of economic interactions (Ogunleye, Adewale, Alese & Ogunde, 2011). From the foregoing explication, security could imply the state of existence which promotes or facilitates an atmosphere of peace, order, and tranquillity that guarantees development and the realization of individual or group aspirations.

Theoretical Framework

Frustration-aggression theory is adopted as a theoretical framework for this paper. The origin of the frustration-aggression theory is traceable to John Dollard and his associates (1939, cited in Best, 2012). However, the concept was later expanded and modified by scholars like Leonard Berkowitz and Aubrey Yates (1962, cited in Best, 2012). Theorists of this perspective rely predominantly on psychological theories of motivation and behavior and frustration-aggression doctrine. Sigmund Freud, the doyen of psychoanalytic theory, believes that human actions are determined by instincts. In line with this perception, Freud, Rahman & Momtax (2013) asserted that when the expression of these instincts is frustrated, it triggers an aggressive drive in man. Furthermore, Zartman (2005) averred that conflict has an ontological basis in human needs and that the denial of the satisfaction of these needs causes violent conflict or causes resolvable differences to degenerate into armed conflict (p. 45).

While expatiating on the issue, Berkowitz (1993) explained that aggression is predicated on any action that devastates the victim either psychologically or physically or both (p. 213). Furthermore, aggression is depicted by Bulhan (1985) as any relation imposed by any actor that impairs the well-being of another (p. 102). Elucidating further on aggression, scholars like Feierabends & Nesvold (1969) and Davies (1962, cited in Faleti, 2012) pointed to the difference

between what people feel they want to deserve and what they actually get, that is, want-get-ratio, implying the difference between expected need satisfaction and actual need satisfaction (p. 47). The theory thus argues that where attainment does not meet expectations, the tendency is for people to confront those they hold responsible for frustrating their ambitions. This is the central argument that Ted Robert Gurr's (1980, cited by Faleti, 2012) relative deprivation thesis addressed in saying that the greater the discrepancy, however marginal, between what is sought and what seems attainable, the greater will be the chances that anger and violence will result (p. 47).

In reinforcing this notion, Gurr (1980) holds a strong correlation between frustration and aggression, stressing that people usually tend to fight against what they perceive as an impediment to attaining their goals. The implication is that aggression becomes inevitable whenever frustration occurs. This is in concurrence with Mayor's (1976) perception that the frustration of desire increases the tendency toward violent aggression. This illustration indicates that frustration leads to the building of aggressive instincts within the mental calculations of the brain, which, when released, leads to violent behavior. Hence, aggression requires a series of steps, namely activation of demands, the frustration of such demands, mental calculation of what or who is responsible for the frustration, and action against the perceived cause of frustration.

It is, therefore, gratifying to mention that aggression in this respect is not just a product of natural reaction or instinct as realists and biologists' theories perceive it. Instead, it is the outcome of frustration. For instance, they are conceived within the process of governance, the stark reality of what the individual or group, in this case, the terrorists, who more often than not, are ignited by religious extremism, stand to lose in the aftermath of not achieving their goal-establishing an Islamic state. In such a situation, they stare such individuals or the group in the face and psychologically move them taking laws into their hands to upturn the situation. In other words, in a situation where the legitimate desire to establish an Islamic state fails either by direct or by indirect consequence of the way the crisis is conducted, the feeling of disappointment may lead such individuals or groups to express their anger through violence that will be directed at those they hold responsible or people who are directly or indirectly connected to their failure.

This is what the pervasive terrorist attacks in northeast Nigeria within the last decade portend for Nigeria. Suffice to say that though the frustration-aggression theory is tenable and useful in

explaining the occurrence of violence, it, however, has its limitations. Human actions from the political theory perspective are not only guided by psychological feelings alone but by a series of other considerations such as economic, political, emotional, moral, rational, and even spiritual. As such, it is expected that the drive for human action should be demonstrated with restraints and moderation and not necessarily by violence. Most of the escalated crises that had degenerated to open war have been resolved on the table in the long run. From an African political thought perspective, this perception is encapsulated in Yoruba proverbs and idioms such as: ‘the end of war is usually uncertain’ (*ibere Ogun laamo, enikan kii mo ipari ogun*).

Despite the noticeable flaws in frustration-aggression theory, as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, it is still useful in explaining terrorism because terrorist groups always perceive that they are excluded in political and socio-economic considerations of government. Their objective is, therefore, to force the government to initiate inclusive policies that will take care of their peculiar challenges. Frustration-aggression theory is thus a useful theoretical framework for this paper because a bloody phenomenon cannot be explained with a bloodless theory (Horowitz, 1985, p. 140).

Evolution of Terrorism and Insurgence

The origin of terrorism and insurgency could be located within the context of history. The modern history of terrorism shows a metamorphosis otherwise called waves, which could not be ignored. To Rapoport (2013), the historical background of terrorism is provided in four waves of the analytical framework, which explains the origin of terrorism in the modern sense. The Anarchists' wave, the first of the four, culminated in the Russian populist group "Narodnaya Volya" (People's Will), prevalent in the 1880s. This, in succession, was followed by the anti-Colonial wave, which intersected between the 1920s and the 1960s and was clandestinely designed to seek freedom and liberation for the colonies of the imperial powers. The third wave, referred to as the New Left Wave, started in the 1960s and lasted till the end of the 20th century, and lastly, a radical Religious Wave, which could be traced from 1979 till now.

To corroborate Rapoport's theoretical underpinnings, Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, otherwise called the 9/11 attacks,

leave no one in doubt that the religious wave is systematically ravaging the global world today. The emergence of ISIS, which is regarded as a brainchild of Al Qaeda, has brought to the limelight the deadliest terrorist group in the contemporary era, thereby affirming Rapoport's perception of the fourth wave. Parker and Sitter (2016) averred that the 19th-century origins of modern terrorism could be located within the context of a series of technological advancements, which grew amidst the communication revolution and arms technology at the end of the 19th century. The indiscreet nature of these developments, which characterized the last wave of 19th-century terrorism, made destructive military formations fall into the hands of a few reckless non-state actors, as evident in the trends of current terrorist attacks worldwide.

No wonder the United Nations (2018) argued that the contemporary insurgents adopt an array of strategies to unleash terror on targets, ranging from military installations to other soft spots. These insurgents are often regarded as saddled with liberating their people or striving for good governance. In contrast, ISIS and other terrorist groups justify their actions on religious grounds as freedom fighters seeking the protection of their rights and privileges. Meanwhile, all these radical groups have a shared behavior of hand-twisting their national governments to concede to their requests. To Morozov (1880), terrorists adopt assassination of prominent figures, attacks on major national installations, and disruption of national events as calculated strategies of sending strong warning signals to those within the corridors of power. These attacks are strategically coordinated toward the attainment of a set of demands, notwithstanding the obvious reality of diversity and religious mix.

However, Africa is not immune to the trends within the global community of nations, as it has to do with the threat of terrorism and the devastating effects of such actions unleashed daily by terrorist insurgents. Terrorism in Africa may be traced to the expansionist wars fought many years ago, the long years of the slave trade, colonial rule, and its attendant dehumanizing characteristics. According to the United Nations (2016), the North African nations of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania have come under one form of terrorist attacks in the recent past or are even going through one in the present.

The West African sub-region, comprising Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, could be described as a deadly theatre of war, due to the series of incessant attacks by

a number of terrorist groups chiefly among which is Boko Haram and ISIS-WA of recent, which have taken responsibility for a number of damages in the Northern Nigeria and now symbolize terror to all within that sub-region.

Elsewhere in Central Africa, in nations like Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, and Sao Tome, the story has not been different compared to the odds witnessed and the terror that pervades other sub-regions. In fact, Chad and Cameroon have remained in the news in the past two years, ditto the activities of Boko Haram. The story within the East African sub-region has not been different from that of other regions. Countries like Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania have suffered at the hands of Al-Shabaab, which has killed both military personnel and civilians in large numbers (Maiangwa, 2014). Though different in terms of terrorist invasion, the Southern-Africa sub-region has been able to maintain a good level of counter-terrorist protocols compared to other African nations when placed side by side (Bester, 2015).

Rapaport (2004) observed that the fourth wave of religious-based terrorism is a powerful and destructive wave that has ravaged the global village. Recounting the woes of the fourth wave of Rapaport, Nigeria has suffered different incidences of devastating losses of both human and critical material components of the society since the first attack launched by Boko Haram in 2009. According to Uzochukwu (2014), the Boko Haram insurgency geared toward Islamising Nigeria because of the shared belief that "western education is forbidding" started as an ideological stance but subsequently evolved to promote the Islamic faith through jihad.

Causes, Incidences and Trends of Terrorism and Insurgency in African Nations

Scholars such as Piazza (2007) and Wilkinson (1977) and institutions like World Bank (2006) and United Nations News Service (2001) have canvassed various factors for the emergence of terrorism and insurgency. Paramount among these factors is the issue of economic deprivations, the feeling of political alienation and neglect, the porosity of borders and arms proliferation, and religious prejudice, among others.

Terrorism and insurgency are often regarded as products of poverty, economic deprivation, and vocation for economic gains (Adedire *et al.*, 2016). The prevailing poverty encourages the incubation and flourishing of terrorist insurgency. It is contended that the endemic corruption prevalent in Africa has discouraged equitable distribution of wealth and resources, thus giving the privileged few the opportunity to plunder state resources for their selfish advantage. This situation has deepened the poverty crisis, invariably widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Suffice to say that the poverty level in Africa is disquietingly high and estimated to be between 50 and 60 percent in comparison to the 30-45 percent in other developing nations (World Bank, 2006). This is why the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan (United Nations News Service, 2001) while speaking before the General Assembly, asserted that no one in the world can be comfortable or safe when so many people are suffering and deprived.

Furthermore, Piazza (2007) averred that impoverished nations populated by poorly educated and unemployed masses, displaying a widening gap between the rich and the poor, and characterized by low literacy rates are fomentation tanks for dangerous and violent militants. What this suggests is that low economic standard of living and weak socio-economic potentials make people prone to political extremism, which encourages violence in developing nations, particularly in Africa, where poverty has often led to identity conflicts along ethnic, religious, and regional lines.

In Africa, terrorism is often triggered by political alienation, exclusion, injustice, and denial of rights. Wilkinson (2007) defined politically motivated terrorism as the systematic use of murder and destruction and the threat of murder and destruction to terrorize individuals, groups, communities, or governments into conceding to the terrorists' political demands (p. 49). It is pertinent to point out that most of the insurgent groups in Africa emerged as a result of resistance to government inefficiency, maladministration, and highhandedness. They could also be regarded as the product of response to the specific political context of a milieu. For example, the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, emerged from the misrule of Milton Obote's regime in Uganda (Maiangwa, 2014), while the killing of Yusuf Muhammed, the leader of Boko Haram, made the group to assume a violent posture in Nigeria during the regime of President Jonathan Goodluck.

Another factor that accelerated terrorist insurgence is the porosity of borders and arms proliferation in African countries. Though there are rules guiding the movement of persons across borders in Africa, the unguarded nature of borders facilitated illegal and unrestrained migration of people who formed the core of the insurgents. The readily available pool of men from which recruitments are made advanced the cause of the insurgents, while the arms at their disposal gave them the effrontery to dastardly attack people and communities. This development has invariably turned insurgency into a lucrative business for a lot of cartels in Africa, especially those involved in the illegal sale of guns.

More importantly, there has been a paradigm shift in contemporary warfare within the last three decades. The war between and among nations has paved the way for that between state and non-state actors in the form of insurgency against established governments of various nations, such as the Boko Haram insurgence against Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The terrorists' insurgences are fast escalating partly due to the need to create markets for the sale of arms and ammunitions manufactured by the developed arms-producing nations and their accredited trading cartels/conflict entrepreneurs and somewhat the need to strengthen the bond of military dependency of the developing nations of the world (Otinche, 2018).

Perhaps the fascinating factor in the emergence of terrorists' insurgence is the issue of religious prejudice. Fundamentally, religion and culture are critical in explaining terrorist insurgence in Africa. These issues have generated fractious conflicts in culturally segmented societies of African nations where social affiliations are built along identity-based considerations. Due to the sentiments and emotions attached to religious and cultural issues, many African individuals tend to be more fanatical about devotion to their faith and cultural heritage than their nation.

This situation brings about the tendency to create animosity among people with ethnic diversity, invariably raising religious dogma to the level of radicalization of every aspect of life, with people getting disconnected from government calculations and seeing nothing good in government, its policies, and programs. This is usually the situation with every terrorist group, which repulses every government action and displays anger and hatred towards government agents, institutions, and western civilization. For instance, the Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin

Laden, on the strength of Islamic religion and culture, accused Saudi Arabia of allowing the US, a Kafar (infidel) nation, to occupy and establish a military base in Saudi (Maiangwa, 2014).

Within the last two decades, the nature and dimensions of attacks of these terrorist insurgent groups are similar. In strategy, they all adopt the guerrilla warfare approach of incessant and sporadic attacks on their targets, which range from the bombing of government institutions to the kidnapping of government officials, suicide-bombing of public utilities, massive attacks on an unarmed civilian population, and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The killing splurge became more heightened with the pervasive proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), which has become prevalent in Africa.

In countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Libya in North Africa and Algeria, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Sudan, and Chad in the Sahel region, where Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) holds sway, where numerous violent attacks have been carried out at intervals on the population of these nations. ISIS terrorist group, which is entrenched in the Middle-east, has extended its tentacles, activities, and operations into West Africa under the banner of ISIS-WA, with a stronghold in Sudan where it has been extending its operations into Nigeria in collaboration with a splinter faction of Boko Haram led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi (USDOS, 2018).

As already observed in the preceding paragraphs, African nations have not remained the same since the emergence of contemporary terrorist attacks within the last two decades, which have left thousands of people dead and many more physically injured. The continued insurgents' attacks have become worrisome to all and sundry within and outside African nations. For instance, Gillespie (2014) and Hanna (2015) argued that violent deaths from Boko Haram insurgency alone were estimated to be about 12,000 over time. However, the number had soared significantly since 2009, when the group began to acquire more deadly military equipment.

According to Olugbode (2016), the affected region has, in terms of infrastructure and socio-economic facilities, suffered massive destruction worth N1.782 trillion (\$9 billion) while the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has escalated to over 2.8 million people. Since the commencement of ISIS-WA joint operations in Nigeria, Boko Haram is said to have overtaken the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Death attributed to the group has increased by 317 percent to 6,644 in 2014 (IEP, 2015).

Though the US Department of State (2019) posited that since the September 11, 2001 attack, the United States had been constrained to devise and nurture a new state's response to terrorism internationally, while on the other hand, Boko Haram, in collaboration with ISIS-WA in Nigeria has continued to sustain acts of terror against government and civilians. The strategies adopted by the latter included kidnapping, suicide-bombing, inflicting injuries of varying degrees on the victims, and sometimes the execution of the captured victims. Among other large-scale terror acts carried out by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA is the abduction of 276 school girls from Chibok, Borno State, in 2014 (Amnesty International, 2015). These incidences heightened the feeling of terror and insecurity years after the devilish acts were carried out.

Furthermore, these terrorist groups have not relented in inflicting deadly harm on the general public, as evident in the US Department of States report (2019). In another instance, suspected Boko Haram terrorists killed about 30 people. They left about 42 injured on June 12, 2019, when three Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were detonated at a market in Konduga, Borno State (Rahim, 2019). Furthermore, suspected ISIS-WA terrorists were reported to have attacked a convoy of Action Against Hunger (AAH) and Health Ministry employees in Borno State on July 18, 2019, in which a driver was killed while one AAH staff member, two drivers, and three health ministry workers were declared missing or reportedly taken as hostages (Haruna, 2019).

The trend of operations of Boko Haram and the ISIS-WA coalition indicates that they adopt hit-and-run tactics, otherwise called guerrilla strategy. As observed, both groups usually lay ambushed to catch their unsuspecting victims unawares. These operations are unarguably aimed at frustrating the government's actions through terror attacks. The insurgents prefer these trends because they know that a face-to-face confrontation with government forces may lead to large casualties for their men because the government will have an advantage over them in terms of a higher number of military personnel and equipment.

About four prominent Islamic groups in Somalia, Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, AhluSunna Wal-Jama'a, and al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya, engage in sectarian and clan wars and are invariably opposed to Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Of all these, the most perceptible and lethal is Al-Shabaab. The group was originally known as Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen and is based in East Africa. Its operations cover Somalia, some parts of Kenya, and Tanzania. Apart from

benefitting from foreign fighters to strengthening its terror machinery, the organization received equipment and training from countries like Iran, Syria, and Libya (Solomon, 2015). Somalian communities in the diaspora equally provided logistics and financial support to the group. Such support came from Eastleigh in Nairobi and Dubai (Ploch, 2010). Notably, the group earned significant revenue from controlling ports, road tolls, and taxes on businesses in Somalia (Ploch, 2010).

Since Somalia has got no stable government for almost twenty years, it has enabled non-state actors to move in and out of the country without detection, interception, or neutralization (Burgess, 2015). Though there were collaborative efforts between and among the Somalian government, African Union forces led by the Kenyan and Ethiopian military, and the US to crush the Al-Shabaab offensively, Al-Shabaab’s allegiance to Al-Qaeda strengthened the group to withstand the coalition. Al-Shabaab attacks, therefore, indicate how terror groups use ungoverned spaces- the porous borders, non-existent or ineffective immigration control, and lack of central authority in Somalia to recruit and network in East Africa. Thus, it became a terror and dealt many devastating blows to the Somalian nation, inflicting serious damage on its economy and a threat to its security.

Another terrorist group that has been active and operating in Northern Uganda and some parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo is the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). This is a Christian sectarian group under the leadership of Joseph Kony.

Table 1 chronicles terrorist insurgent attacks in some African nations and depicts the pervasive and dastardly operations being carried out by these terrorist groups.

Table 1: Chronicle of Terrorist Insurgents' Attacks in Some African Nations

S/No	Date of Attack	Name of Terrorists' Insurgents	Place of Occurrence	No of Casualty
1.	June 16, 2011	Boko Haram	Nigeria Police Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria’s capital	13 people killed
2.	August 16, 2011	Boko Haram	United Nations Building, Abuja	About 34 People killed
3.	December 25, 2011	Boko Haram	Bombed St Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla	46 people were killed

4.	January 21, 2012	Boko Haram	Multiple bomb blasts in Kano	About 185 people killed
5.	March 11, 2012	Boko Haram	Bombed St Theresa Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos	11 people were killed and many were injured.
6.	March 23, 2013	Boko Haram	Attacked Kano, Adamawa and Borno, burnt banks, police stations and prisons	28 people were killed and many injured.
7.	September 29, 2013	Boko Haram	College of Agriculture, Gijba, Yobe State	78 students killed
	2014	ISIS-WA backed Boko Haram	Chibok, Borno State	Abduction of 276 female students
8.	February 9, 2016	Boko Haram	Two suicide bombers attacked IDPs camp in Dikwa, Borno State	58 killed and 78 injured
9.	January, 2017	ISIS-WA	Night attack against Nigerian troops at Kamuya village	3 Nigerian soldiers killed
10.	2018	Boko Haram/ ISIS-WA	Dapchi in Yobe State	113 students were abducted
11.	February 12, 2019	Suspected ISIS-WA	Attack on the convoy of Governor Babagana Umara Zulum of Borno while on checks along Nigeria/Cameroon border	10 persons were killed
12.	July 27, 2019	Suspected Boko Haram	Near the Borno State capital	About 65 people killed
13.	January 18, 2013	Radical Islamist linked to AQIM	Algeria Gas Plant Hostage	34 foreign nationals, including Algerians killed
14.	March, 2015	Radical Islamist linked to AQIM	Attack on Bardo National Museum, Tunis	20 people were killed and 44 injured
15.	June, 2015	Radical Islamist linked to AQIM.	Attack on Tunisia beachside hotel in the popular resort of Sousse	38 tourists were killed mostly British and 20 injured.

16.	September 25, 2019	ISIS-WA	Borno	media reported ISIS-WA claiming that it had executed one of the missing aid workers
17.	13 th Dec., 2019	ISIS-WA	Borno	ISIS-WA made public that it had killed four of the remaining five hostages.
18.	December 26; 2019	ISIS-WA.	Borno	A video was portraying the execution of 11 Christians claiming that the killings were revenge for the assassination of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
19.	July 11, 2010	Al-Shabaab	Kampala attack during the FIFA World Cup Final in South Africa.	
20	February, 2011	Al-Shabaab	Attacked on African Union base in southern Somalia.	Dozens of soldiers were killed.
21.	September 21, 2013.	Al-Shabaab	Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya.	Over 70 people were killed & over 200 injured. Casualties include Italian, French, British and German nationals
22.	May, 2014	Al-Shabaab	Attack of a restaurant in Djibouti popular with Westerners.	
23.	April, 2015	Al-Shabaab	Attacked Garissa University, Kenya	Over 147 killed
24.	July, 2015	Al-Shabaab	A suicide bomber rammed a car laden with explosives through the gate of Aljazeera hotel in Mogadishu	8 people were killed and 21 injured
26.	January, 2016	Al-Shabaab	Penetrated the El-Ade military base in	Killed over 100 Kenyan soldiers and

			southern Somalia	drove away with their trucks and weapons.
28.	February, 2004	Lord's Resistance Army	Barlonyo Camp	300 civilians dead as a result of fire.

Source: Adapted from Maiangwa, J. S. (2014); Otinche, S. I. (2018); and modified by Rosenje, M. O., *et al.* (2020).

Though a lot of combative efforts were made, especially the military option, by the various governments of these countries, while another collaborative assistance was initiated by the leadership of other countries and institutions/agencies, these efforts, nevertheless, seemed to be inadequate and subsequently ineffective in tackling the scourge of terrorism and insurgency due to some factors such as corruption and weak leadership or its lack of political will. The increasing wave of terrorist attacks has, therefore, deepened the insecurity crisis of African nations to the extent that many of them have continued to nosedive abysmally in the ranking of the Global Terrorism Index within the last six years, as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2: Terrorism Ranking of African Nations between 2015 and 2020

S/ No	Country of Operation	Name of Terrorists' Insurgent Group	Year 2015	Year 2016	Year 2017	Year 2018	Year 2019	Year 2020
1.	Algeria	ISIS-WA	34 out of 162	42 out of 163	49 out of 163	54 out of 163	57 out of 163	65 out of 163
2.	Morocco	AQIM & ISIS	92 out of 162	95 out of 163	122 out of 163	132 out of 163	92 out of 163	102 out of 163
3.	Mauritania	AQIM	107 out of 162	130 out of 163	130 out of 163	138 out of 163	138 out of 163	135 out of 163
4.	Mali	AQIM	26 out of 162	25 out of 163	25 out of 163	22 out of 163	13 out of 163	11 out of 163
5.	Sudan	Al-Qaeda & ISIS-WA	16 out of 162	18 out of 163	18 out of 163	18 out of 163	20 out of 163	26 out of 163
6.	Niger	Boko Haram	51 out of 162	16 out of 163	20 out of 163	23 out of 163	23 out of 163	24 out of 163
7.	Chad	Boko Haram	75 out of 162	27 out of 163	34 out of 163	38 out of 163	38 out of 163	34 out of 163

8.	Cameroon	Boko Haram	20 out of 162	13 out of 163	15 out of 163	16 out of 163	15 out of 163	13 out of 163
9.	Nigeria	Boko Haram and ISIS-WA	3 out of 162	3 out of 163	3 out of 163	3 out of 163	3 out of 163	3 out of 163
10.	Somalia	Al-Shabaab	8 out of 162	7 out of 163	7 out of 163	6 out of 163	6 out of 163	5 out of 163
11.	Kenya	Al-Shabaab	18 out of 162	19 out of 163	22 out of 163	19 out of 163	21 out of 163	23 out of 163
12.	Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army	30 out of 162	40 out of 163	45 out of 163	52 out of 163	49 out of 163	55 out of 163

Source: Extracted from Global Terrorism Index, 2015-2020.

Looking at the placement or position that these countries occupied among the total number of countries rated in the Global Terrorism Index in Table 2 above, one discovers that insurgency has become prevalent, and the security of such countries is persistently threatened and deteriorating. For instance, in 2015, Somalia was 8th worst out of the 162 rated countries, 7th worst out of the 163 countries in 2016 and 2017. In addition, she occupied 6th worst of the 163 rated countries in 2018 and 2019, while in 2020, she was rated 5th worst out of the 163 rated countries in the Global Terrorism Index. In a nutshell, she has terribly declined from 8th worst position in 2015 to 5th worst in the 2020 Global Terrorism Index rating.

Effects of Terrorism and Insurgency on African Nations

The effects of terrorists' insurgency are too numerous to enumerate. Notwithstanding the complexity associated with it, an attempt is made to discuss a few. Terrorists' insurgency often results in the destruction of infrastructure. These inimical acts culminate in infrastructural deficits, which may linger for years as a result of the dwindling economic resources available to the government at a time or the lack of interest or political will by an incumbent political leadership to pursue such program

Just as the destruction of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon during the 9/11 attacks has impacted negatively on the US, African states have recently lost a lot of their public infrastructure to terrorist insurgency (Maiangwa, 2014; Otinche, 2018).

Governments of terror-prone nations in Africa usually have their attention preoccupied with counter-terrorism initiatives and investments while starving other segments of their national life.

The aftermath of the terrorists' insurgency brings about increased government spending on defense infrastructure instead of on the welfare of the citizenry. This claim is reinforced by the fact that heavy investments are made in the procurement of defense infrastructures such as jet bombers, armored tanks, and other sophisticated instruments of warfare, which usually cost African nations millions of dollars.

There is no gainsaying that the aura of uncertainty and fear of the unknown usually pervade terror-prone regions. The incessant insurgents' attacks on unarmed citizens have contributed to the desertion of businesses and farmlands in search of secured greener pastures for the people of Nigeria's North-East like their counterparts in other terror-prone regions of Africa such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia to mention only but a few. The lack of security and the imposed psychological trauma occasioned by terrorists' insurgence make life unbearable and stifle the pace of development. Suffice to say that development could only thrive in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility, which is currently lacking in the terror-prone regions.

The low rating on the ease of doing business indices is a crucial consequence of terrorists' insurgency. The constant low rating of African nations, when measured by the (Global Ease of Doing Business, 2020) scale, has always stood against the states of the continent compared with other nations in relatively secured continents. Such indices as security, power, and type of government, among other things, have often counted against African states, which are either low or lacking in all indices of the scales. In a broader context, nations like Nigeria, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and Cameroon can barely generate electricity sufficient for their local consumption. Additionally, the pervasive kidnapping, and the bombing of soft targets, among other crimes, have made it impossible for the global rating of the African nations to improve when scaled.

There is no doubt that terrorists' insurgency brings about a reduction in government revenue. This fact is inevitable in terror-prone societies of African nations as in other continents. Terrorists' insurgency will, for example, hinder movements and thus reduce tourism activities, which is one revenue-spinning industry in every African nation nowadays. In contemporary times, local and international tourists naturally stay away from nations or regions blacklisted to be unsecured or volatile the advice of their national governments or security agencies. The

consequence of the foregoing leads naturally to the loss of revenue and foreign exchange earnings until the security situation improves and tourists can be guaranteed their safety.

Suffice to say that the drainage and destruction of human capital constitute a product of terrorist insurgency. The terrorists' activities in their different colorations negatively impact the psyche of the citizens of terror-prone regions of Africa, thereby instigating an exodus of the energetic workforce out of their local communities or national borders to other conducive environments where their aspirations could be realized in tranquility. While some relocate to neighboring communities, others prefer to seek greener pastures in Europe and the US, leaving a deficit in the human capital needs of their homelands. Thus, Africans readily migrate to Europe and other parts of the developed economies, thus changing their environment as a result of the increasing hardship confronting them at home.

Since no economy flourishes in an environment of insecurity or hostile business circle, terror-prone nations are usually characterized by stunted economy. In reality, the activities of terrorist insurgents with the carnage that follows naturally repels investors and discourages direct investment flow (DIF). In such a situation, every segment of the economy of African nations suffers, thus reducing the economic viability of these nations and possibly their resilience to spring back on time.

Evaluation of Efforts Made to Checkmate the Incidences and Trends of Terrorists' Insurgency

Just as it has been observed in the preceding paragraphs of this paper, September 11, 2001, remains critical to the radical fight against all forms of terrorism and insurgents within the global framework, giving the spontaneous responses that followed the twin bombing of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. Thus, the post-9/11 attack has witnessed an array of legislative instruments across all spheres of human endeavors, with the UN taking the lead.

To provide the required legal and structural impetus to fight the menace of terrorists' insurgency, the UN took the bold step of initiating protocols aimed at countering terrorism in its holistic sense to affirm the dreams of its founding fathers. According to United Nations (2003), all member states are expected to join the fight against all forms of acts that constitute terrorism. This position became evident in its resolution number 1373 (2001), dated September 28, 2001, in which the highest organ (UN Security Council) opined that:

“acts, methods and practices of terrorism (were) contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (and) that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts (were) also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations” (Para, 5).

In order to reinforce the foregoing position, the UN established protocols, conventions, and committees to give a foothold to the counter-terrorism war and empowers all nations to collaborate via intelligence sharing and tactical advancements to stamp out all degrees of terrorism perpetuated in the world. It is pertinent to point out that besides creating these legal and structural instruments, the UN failed to draft a military contingent or marshal funds to confront this dreaded monster. This complication arises due to World Powers' politics, clash of interests, and the need to realize the vested interest of individual Great Nations. For instance, to date, Russia supports Syria's leadership in its repressive measures against its people to realize its vested national interest.

In Africa, similar legislative backings have been granted while different laws have equally been initiated by the African Union and are expected to be replicated by all states within the continent. Despite these combative efforts, the government's success over the terrorists' insurgency appears limited. Ogbonnaya (2020) canvassed that the counter-terrorism war waged by the Federal government of Nigeria has chunked a great deal of resources in the past decade with very few positive results to show for it. According to him, despite the enormous expenditure of the government, terrorists' insurgence has killed well over 30,000 people, with over 2.4 million now living in the Internally Displaced People's camps spread across Nigeria's Northeast.

The foregoing trend affirms that the Nigerian state has consciously deployed resources to counter-terrorism, even if much success has not been attained, possibly due to some challenges such as corruption (Saliu & Saka, 2019). The initial government efforts at checkmating Boko Haram insurgency revolved largely around the security approach, which is the traditional military deployment to confront the scourge (Nwogwugwu, Alao & Ikechi-Ekpendu, 2018). This invariably brought about the allocation of huge funds to prosecute the war. With the allocation of 6.7 trillion Naira to the security sector between 2010 and 2017 for the counter-terrorism war, Ogbonnaya (2020) argued that the funds are mismanaged. He justified that the collaboration with

the Multi-National Joint Task-Force is one of the significant diversions; otherwise, the war is expected to have ended by now.

Furthermore, recent reports indicated that much of the allocations meant for the procurement of arms and ammunition were diverted to private pockets to fund political campaigns and elections (Nwogwugwu, Alao & Ikechi-Ekpendu, 2018). For instance, the allocation earmarked to fight the Boko Haram insurgency during Goodluck Jonathan's administration was diverted by the former National Security Adviser (NSA) Sambo Dansuki and shared among the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) leaders (*Daily Post*, 2015; *Vanguard Newspaper*, 2015). In a nutshell, the government has deployed both technical and financial resources towards combating terrorism using military strategies under varying codenames but yet to no avail.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Considering the security risks, which have continually disrupted the relative peace enjoyed in African nations before the escalation of terrorists' insurgence and its attendant destructive effects on almost all spheres of the nations, this paper has attempted an insight into the effects of terrorist insurgents across some African nations in particular. Using the frustration-aggression theory in explaining the possible causes of the various types of terrorism, it has been argued that the inability of an individual or group to actualize a conceived aspiration may naturally breed frustration which metamorphosed into aggression or violent clashes; it was established that an aggressor of this kind would target to get possible attention of the government through social disturbance, abduction of public officers and in extreme cases, suicide bombing. Acknowledging the scholarly position of Rapoport (2004), one would no doubt agree that there exists indeed a fourth and destructive wave with visible religious connotations.

Having critically observed the activities of such terrorist groups as AQIM, Boko Haram and ISIS-WA, Al-Shabaab, and LRA, it could be inferred that their mode or operations trends are similar, and their demands are fundamentally religious in nature. On the other hand, governments' responses to curb the scourge occasioned by these terrorist insurgents have equally taken a fire-brigade approach but subsequently appealed for advocacy for international collaborations. In a nutshell, reality has shown that the effects of terrorists' insurgence on the world and African nations, in particular, have been so overwhelming and disquieting for a single nation to handle. Using the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon

as a reference point, the world lost peoples of different origins alongside valuables worth Billions of dollars when calculated in monetary terms.

Finally, going by the current religious terror wave across the world, the paper submits that in order to arrest this ugly situation, the government should monitor the preaching of religious fanatics to ensure that extreme religious radicalism is timely nipped in the bud while the security architecture of African nations should be re-engineered towards meeting the needs of the component units of African nations. In other words, within the framework of federalism, the leadership of the component units of African nations should, through constitutional provisions, policy formulation, and implementation, be allowed and empowered to establish local security outfits to take care of their peculiarities to enable them to respond promptly to security crises in their respective domains. In addition, in cognizance of the African proverb, which states that an idle hand is the devil's workshop, gainful employment opportunities should be provided by the leadership for the ever-increasing youth population of African nations in order to stem the tide of restiveness, which readily escalates insurgency.

There is equally the need for the enactment of strong legislation by the government of African nations against all acts of terror and insurgents within their states, as provided for in their national legal framework. To achieve this, it is suggested that all sections of the national and international actors must be on red alert to gather the information that would contribute to the deterrence of possible terrorist attacks before it occurs, especially when warning signals are identified. Furthermore, governments should pay apt attention to collaboration in intelligence gathering while sharing intelligence information so as to ensure an early response to such challenges by relevant agencies.

More crucial to checkmating terrorist insurgency is the need to contend with the interest of the developed arms-producing nations and their agents, those who profit from the sale of arms, ammunition, and other logistics equipment to the terrorist insurgents. It is thus advocated that the vested interest to make huge returns from investment in arms production, which propelled the illegal sale of SALWs to non-state actors and thus perpetuated arms proliferation in Africa, should be pacified.

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