



ISSN(Print): 2707-1308

ISSN(Online): 2707-1316



**PanAfrican
Journal of Governance and Development**

Vol. 01

No. 02

August 2020

Jimma University
Department of Governance and Development Studies
P.O.Box 378

www.journals.ju.edu.et/index.php/panjogov



PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development

An Interdisciplinary Biannual Journal

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5. Commentaries: (1,000-3,000 words)
6. Book Review: (2,000-4,000 words)



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About the Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) and PJGD

Department of Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) is one of the pioneer departments of Jimma University established in September 2007 and functioning as a constituent unit of the College of Law and Governance since September 2014. Since its establishment, the Department of GaDS is playing a vital role in the transformation of society and empowering the government institutions by producing professionals in the area of development and governance. Currently, the Master Program of GaDS has three specializations: (i) Governance; (ii) Development Management; (iii) Peace and Conflict whereas two more specializations (Gender Studies and Federal Studies) yet to be introduced.

The Post-Graduate Program of the Department clearly states its vision as “The Master of Arts Program in Governance and Development Studies (GaDS) institutionalizes a dynamic and strategic vision to provide an interdisciplinary, advanced, research-based and practical education in contemporary issues of national and international governance and development”. This stated vision at the same time echoes the vision of the Jimma University which “aspires to be one of the premier universities in Africa and renowned in the world by 2025”.

It is in pursuance of these stated visions of GaDS and Jimma University, the Center for PanAfrican Journal of Governance and Development (PJGD) is established to offer a platform of expression of new scientific inquiries to all intellectuals/academicians/scholars of the world in general and Africa & Ethiopia, in particular, to reflect on how governance and development can be promoted, strengthened and consolidated. As the nature of the journal is multi-, inter-, and trans-disciplinary, the scope of the journal ranges from the disciplines of political science, governance, development, leadership, national and international law, globalization, human rights, economics, environmental science, public policy, international relations, international organizations, gender, peace and conflict management, international political economy, multiculturalism, civil society, and related areas.

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Trilateral Talks on the Filling and Annual Operation of the GERD: Competing Demands and the Need for Revisiting the *Status quo* towards a Negotiated Settlement

Ermyas A. Wolde* and Abiot D. Habte**

Abstract

The Nile River Basin, with ten riparian countries, lacks any agreed-upon basin-wide legal framework. Attempts at effective management and utilization of water resources inclusive of all countries along the basin have not been possible due to lack of consensus on the legal basis of already existing colonial-era agreements that allocate an absolute share of the Nile water to Egypt and Sudan by excluding most of the upper riparians. The review has specifically focused on the trilateral negotiation processes between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt since November 2019 on the filling and annual operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Ethiopia has been constructing since 2011. It has made a thorough review of a series of events and processes through which the negotiation has passed to conduct a critical analysis of facts, and has suggested reflections on the way forward. It considers the need for political will and flexibility of the negotiating parties to reconcile existing contradictory positions. To this end, pursuing a revisionist approach to take the dynamic socio-economic realities and development needs of co-basin countries is commendable. This further requires renegotiating long existed colonial-era agreements and formulating a basin-wide legal framework in line with existing international standards. Focusing on technical and expertise level of discussions and outcomes would minimize over politicization and specifically would help to address the negative impacts of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and optimize positive externalities. Peace is a necessity than any other option among the co-basin countries and the only avenue towards sustainable resolution of disputes. Negotiating in good faith and in a 'give and take' modality needs to be a second to none alternative to the parties. The international community may also need to play a neutral and genuine role to assist the parties to settle their differences amicably and reach a final negotiated settlement.

Keywords: *Agreement, Dam-filling, Negotiations, Nile Basin, Transboundary*

Introduction

The demand for fresh water is increasing steadily at a global level with the increasing growth of the population at an alarming rate. Fresh water is an essential resource for human survival and the demand for it is growing at an unsustainable rate as populations have grown and nations industrialized. Readily available fresh water is a strategic resource to fulfill domestic needs, food production, livelihoods, power generation, industry, and navigation purposes. However, increasing population pressure added with effects of climate change made water resources subject to change over time and space that results in competition over access and use of such resources (Perlman *et al.*, 2017; Warner & Zawhari, 2012; Biswas, 2008). Especially, developing countries' demand for swift development and economic growth cannot be realized

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without the availability of adequate energy resources. Large-scale generation of electric power requires a large quantity of water. The reliable availability of adequate quality and quantity of water for agricultural production is also vital to feed the increasing demand for food in these countries (Biswas, 2008). In response to these changing circumstances, there has been an alteration of water resources through various mechanisms by users with the cumulative effect of changing the availability, quantity and quality of water resources for other users. Such alterations are potential sources of conflict (Perlman *et al.*, 2017).

Transboundary river basins, in this regard, are experiencing rapid physical and economic changes generating a new era of relationships among the nations sharing them (*Ibid.*). Nations, according to Benvenisti (2004), are faced with the choice between conflict and cooperation as regulation of transboundary resources became desirable due to hiking demands and advancing technology. Countries sharing an international river basin share a complex network of environmental, economic, political, and security issues carrying with it the potential for interstate conflict and opportunities for cooperation (Dinar, 2008).


Efforts at water resource developments are complicated by existing conflicts among riparian states regarding economic development, infrastructural capacity, and political interests. This could be the reason why Biswas (2008) underlined that development and management of transboundary water resources sustainably and efficiently to ensure full cooperation and agreement of co-basin states resulting in a win-win situation is a very challenging and difficult task in the 21st Century. The actual process of allocating water among co-basin countries is the most difficult part in materializing a basin-wide cooperative agreement, particularly in the developing nations.

The Nile River Basin, which is the main focus of this review, is one of the most controversial river basins without a negotiated legal framework for water sharing and management. The existing colonial-era agreements are understood by most upper riparian countries as favoring mostly to the lower riparian countries, Egypt and Sudan, by distributing the entire water resources of the basin while the other nine riparian ones (Burundi, DR. Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) are not parties to such agreements and are excluded from any meaningful utilization of the basin. Weibe (2001) posits that early agreements on the Nile River are very inadequate for managing and conserving the basin resources as they are basically formulated to entertain colonial aspirations of the British on the basis of optimizing the economic and political importance of the Nile for a successful

occupation. Hence, such treaties are being considered as an impediment to current day negotiations (Perlman *et al.*, 2017).

This article focuses on assessing and analyzing the negotiation process among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan as co-basin states of the Nile, on the filling and annual operation of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a 4.8 Billion USD hydroelectric power generation dam with 6450 Mega Watt capacity being constructed along the border with Sudan since 2011. The competing demands of the three countries over the filling and annual operation of the dam led to a deadlock diplomatic stalemate which may lead to destructive conflict unless a negotiated settlement is reached.

Figure 1: The Nile River Basin



Source: Google Map, 2020.

Rationales and Objectives of the Article

Ethiopia's launching of the construction of the GERD in 2011 has been considered a watershed in changing the political landscape in the negotiation process towards a comprehensive legal framework in the management and utilization of the water resources along the Nile River Basin. The GERD marked a new era of trilateral negotiation process among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan focusing on its probable impacts on downstream countries. The trilateral talks mainly focused on dealing with technical and legal matters of filling and operation of the dam. The three countries engaged in series of negotiations since 2013 that resulted in the formulation and signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in 2015, a document that is specifically dedicated to set a framework for future agreements on setting guidelines for the filling and annual operation of the dam (Perlman *et al.*, 2017).

This has demonstrated the choice of cooperation in action among historically rival countries to come to the negotiation table over shared Nile water resources (*Ibid.*). Trilateral talks have been going on since the signing of the DoP but the ongoing negotiation process has started in May 2018 and several discussions were held at technical, expertise, ministerial and Heads of States/ Governments levels. Ethiopia's announcement to start the first phase of filling of the dam in July 2020 intensified the tones of the diplomatic process and the frequency with which the trilateral talks are taking place.

The inability of the United States of America (USA) and World Bank (WB) led negotiation process, from November 2019 to February 2020, to bring a breakthrough has further exacerbated the political stalemate and broadened the differences among the negotiating parties at times even escalating in threats of war. In this regard, the appeal letters presented by all the parties to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) exhibit the prevailing disparities in terms of demands and interests that are unreconciled and unmet due to the state of intransigence character that each party points against each other (MoFA, 2020a; MoFAARE, 2020a; MoFARS, 2020a).

Conflicts over the Nile water would spread out into already existing conflicts in the Horn of Africa adding more complexity to the instability of the region and making it harder to address peace and security challenges in the region (Mbote, 2007). Hence, the review is conducted on a very timely issue that has dragged the attention of politicians, policymakers, experts, the general public, and regional and global multilateral organizations. Capturing the series of events of the trilateral negotiation process and analyzing the ups and downs in a comprehensive manner could contribute to improve understanding regarding the point of views of the three actors and may indicate future directions.

To this effect, the paper was specifically aimed at: (i) describing and analyzing the context and processes of the ongoing trilateral negotiations on the filling and annual operation of the GERD; (ii) exploring and identifying the factors that hinder a negotiated settlement among the parties, *i.e.* Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan, on the GERD talks; and (iii) suggesting the way forward by pinpointing basic issues that negotiating parties should take into account for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. In doing so, the paper has produced a more or less full-fledged document on the incidents and series of events of the trilateral talks in a more analytical manner beyond a mere presentation of facts.

Theoretical Framework

Transboundary water conflicts vary significantly across different basins and times reflected in the form of hostilities having effects on participants and even sometimes beyond. These conflicts usually occur alongside with different forms of cooperation. Transboundary water interactions are also accompanied by complex interests, illusions, power games, and distrust in a political process (Zeitounae & Mirmachi, 2008).

The literature reveals the nature and magnitude of interactions among riparian countries in a river basin categorized in value-based terms as negative, neutral and positive interactions. *Negative interactions* exhibit a state of interactions with a significant degree of resentment among one or more of the co-basin states characterized by high conflict and low cooperation kind of interaction “driven by attempts to capture control of the resources or to contain asymmetric outcome” (*Ibid.*, p. 309). The desire to maintain control and historically existed distrust may reinforce negative interactions. *Positive interaction*, on the other hand, indicates the set of interactions that accommodates the interest of all actors ensuring sustained relations at a broader political level characterized by low conflict and high cooperation. Transboundary water that represents an interaction having little or no effect on the broader political context and characterized by a minimally cooperative and conflictual relationship is *neutral interaction* (*Ibid.*).

Sustainable and efficient management and development of transboundary water resources with full agreement and cooperation among co-basin riparian countries is not an easy task due to constraints arising from various factors of which state sovereignty and absence of agreement on the modalities of managing such resources are major ones (Biswas, 2008). Nonetheless, there are three major notable theories that are being used to define the relationship among countries sharing transboundary water resources and from which water conventions, treaties and agreements are originating. The *absolute territorial sovereignty* theory holds the idea that co-basin states enjoy exclusive authority over the water of an international watercourse within their territory. Hence, they consider themselves of not being duty-bound to consult impacts of utilization on other riparian countries. This entails utilizations without bearing the needs of downstream countries in mind. The *absolute territorial integrity* theory favors the interests of downstream countries entrusting them with the right to the natural flow of the water into their territories. Therefore, interfering with the natural flow of the upstream country requires the consent of downstream countries. The third theory, *limited territorial sovereignty*,

accommodates the interests of all riparian countries by stating that the right to use an international watercourse is limited by the rights of other riparian countries to use the watercourse. It empowers every co-basin state to use shared rivers flowing on its territory as long as such utilization does not violate the rights and interests of other co-riparian (*Ibid.*).

In practice, most upstream countries tend to go along the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, while downstream countries favor the principles of absolute territorial integrity. However, the doctrine of limited territorial integrity is reflected most in the vast majority of international water agreements including the UN convention on non-navigational use of international watercourse upholding major principles such as equitable and reasonable utilization, obligation not to cause significant harm, exchange of data and information and peaceful settlement of disputes (UN, 1997). Considerations of national sovereignty issues might escalate the controversial nature of transboundary water management issues while such resources must be treated as shared and regulated by norms beyond each nation's unilateral measures to gain optimal and sustainable resources (Benevenisti, 2004; Biswas, 2008).

Materials and Methods

This review is conducted with the aim of capturing the negotiation process between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan on the filling and annual operation of the GERD, and analyzing the series of events, revealing the major points of departure among the three parties and commenting on the way forward. Though the review is limited to explicating the trilateral talks since November 2019, it established historical facts on already existing treaties and agreements on the Nile Basin to enable a comprehensive understating of the ongoing process. It, therefore, made a thorough investigation and analysis of legal frameworks and treaties in the past and the possibility of their applications in the existing circumstances.

The review mainly depended on the extraction of facts from treaties, agreements, cooperative frameworks, and principles that have been established among the Nile Basin riparian countries across different periods and under various circumstances. The investigators have also made all possible efforts to capture a series of events of the negotiation process from varieties of media outlets, official letters, communiqués, press releases and official statements from governments and international organizations. The facts are organized in a systematic manner and maintained in chronological order, which is supplemented with analysis by indicating directions towards achieving a negotiated settlement of the matter. The facts are also cross-examined and

triangulated with the existing literature on cooperative frameworks and conflicts on transboundary water resources to forward critical reflections.

Results

The Nile: A River Basin without a Legal Framework

The Nile is one of the river basins where conflicts are persisting over distribution, co-management and utilization of water resources among its riparian countries (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008). Legal frameworks on the utilization and distribution of water shares have been formulated since the early 20th Century among some of the actors and stakeholders, which in most cases are conducted either under the influence of colonial forces of the time or with the exclusion of most countries along the basin when concluded between downstream countries.

Three such agreements, concluded in 1902, 1929 and 1959, are notable. The 1902 treaty was signed between Ethiopia and Britain representing its colony, Sudan with the aim of demarcating the boundary between the two countries. However, the agreement included a provision that precluded Ethiopia from constructing or allowing any construction across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana and the Sobat that could arrest the flow of the water down streams. Such a project, according to the treaty, can be carried out only in agreement with the British colonial administration in Sudan (Wiebe, 2001). Later, in 1929, Egypt and Britain concluded a bilateral agreement with the later representing its East African colonial boundaries (Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika). The treaty outrightly recognized the historical and natural rights of Egypt giving it uncontested veto power over construction projects along the Nile and its tributaries. Moreover, the 1959 bilateral treaty between Egypt and Sudan nailed the historical and natural rights of the two downstream countries by respectively allocating 66% and 22% of the Nile water (*Ibid.*).

The first post-colonial era initiative towards basin-wide cooperation along the Nile basin was launched in the 2010s when the “riparian entered into a multi-stakeholder bargaining process” with the facilitation and support of bilateral and multilateral aid institutions. The initiative finally came with the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999, setting the platform for a basin-wide treaty (Warner & Zawahri, 2012, p. 219). The NBI paved the way for a new comprehensive legal framework for the management of the Nile basin (Mbote, 2007) named as “the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA)”. Egypt was for the first time forced to engage in multilateral relations over the Nile along with other basin states (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008).

The CFA recognized the importance of the Nile River to the economic and social wellbeing of the people in the riparian countries and stressed the importance of strengthening cooperation among them. The framework formulates the establishment of “the Nile River Basin Commission” as an intergovernmental organization to “promote and facilitate the implementation of the principles, rights and obligations provided in the framework” (CFA, 2010, p. 26). The CFA can be considered as the first all-inclusive and organized effort to institute a legal framework for fair and equitable utilization of the Nile River basin water resources. The agreement has been open for signature since May 14, 2010 at Entebbe, Uganda, and it was supposed to become operational after signing and approval by six of the then ten riparian countries. Till now, six countries signed it, and four have already ratified.

Securing and sustaining existing water share has been an obstacle to the realization of the CFA. The major sticking point was on the water security where many of the upper riparians advocated putting each state in the basin under obligation “not to significantly affect the water security of the other.” On the other hand, lower riparian countries, such as Egypt proposed the inclusion of a provision that “obliges all basin states not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin state” (Mahemud, 2020). The other lower riparian countries equated this claim to sustaining the already existing colonial-era treaties along the Basin.

The GERD and Declaration of Principles

Ethiopia launched the construction of the GERD in 2011. Prior to this, most of the projects along the Nile Basin for the use of the Nile water resources were undertaken mainly by Egypt and Sudan. Warner and Zawahri (2004, p. 219) opine “Egypt’s hegemony on the Nile has long impeded hydraulic development along the Nile” and Ethiopia pursued the construction of the dam over objection by the downstream powerful nation of Egypt as well as Sudan (Perlman *et al.*, 2017).

After the launching of the GERD, concerns were raised by Egypt and Sudan over the operation of the dam. Then, the three actors were engaged in series of negotiations since 2013 that resulted in a specific legal framework involving only the three countries focusing only on the filling and annual operation of the dam, the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed in March 2015 (Perlman *et al.*, 2017). They are expected to agree on guidelines and rules on the first filling and annual operation of the dam, a process that should be accomplished within fifteen months since the launching of technical and expertise level studies (DoP, 2015). The other

important provision of the DoP is regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes whereby any dispute arising out of the implementation and interpretation of the DoP shall be resolved in consultation and amicably with the spirit of cooperation and good faith. If such attempts fail, the matters could be forwarded for considerations by heads of states/governments of each country or may jointly request for conciliation and mediation (*Ibid.*).

The application and interpretation of the DoP have become a major sticky point in the negotiation process since November 2019 at the point where Ethiopia is finalizing the construction of the dam and officially announced its plan for first-round filling in July 2020. Diplomatic wrangling and, at times, the threats of war are being experienced due to the absence of negotiated settlement and polarized demands made it more complex and difficult to reach compromise.

Competing Demands on the Filling and Operation of the Dam

Though the DoP (2015) provides a fifteen months timeline for the preparation of rules and guidelines on the filling and annual operation of the dam, this has not been achieved due to lack of conclusive agreement for which both parties accuse each other. The process, therefore, has been lingering until Ethiopia's announcement of the first step filling of the dam set to take place in July 2020.

Such a move triggered a new round of diplomatic discord where the downstream countries demanded Ethiopia not to take any "unilateral action" in filling the dam before a settled agreement is reached among the three actors. It is with this background that the United States of America (USA) and World Bank (WB) initiated a negotiation process in November 2019, assuming observer status. Many rounds of trilateral talks took place among the three parties on the filling and annual operation of the GERD which finally ended without resulting in any settlement acceptable to the three parties with Ethiopia withdrawing from the process rejecting the draft agreement proposed by the USA and WB on condition of its inability to address issues of fundamental concern to its national interest (MoFA, 2020a). Egypt, after a failed attempt to convince Ethiopia and Sudan to sign the agreement, took the matter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by writing a letter of appeal on 1st May 2020.

In a letter addressed to the UNSC on 14th May 2020, Ethiopia stated that 86% of the Nile water originates from its mountains, but its need for use has been arrested for centuries on the basis of colonial-era treaties to which it is not a party but allocated lion's share of the water resources

of the basin to Egypt. Egypt, based upon such treaties, introduces a “self-claimed notion of historic rights and current use” (*Ibid.*, p. 1). The GERD, according to Ethiopia’s view, is a “vital project of the enormous potential for cooperation and regional integration”, the benefits of which are going beyond Ethiopia, including Egypt itself. It should be noted that it is very crucial for the survival, development and prosperity of Ethiopia and its people.

The country is in urgent need to lift millions of its citizens out of extreme poverty struck frequently with recurrent drought and food insecurity. It is yet to provide electric power to 65% of its population and meet the demands for energy that is growing by 19% annually with the majority of its rural population depending on firewood as a source of energy accelerating deforestation. This may reduce the vitality of the Nile and should be a matter of high concern for Egypt as well. The GERD, therefore, is instrumental to the national development efforts of Ethiopia in spurring development through industrialization and alleviation of chronic energy deficit. Ethiopia has legitimate and sovereign rights to use the Nile water without causing significant harm to downstream countries (*Ibid.*).

Egypt has also addressed its concern to the UNSC in a letter officially released on 1st May 2020. In the appeal letter, Egypt mentioned its “hydrological precarious situation” due to high dependence for fresh water on the Nile basin. An upstream project, according to the letter, that comes with a shortage of water could be catastrophic in terms of cultivation, food security, high urbanization and migration. It, generally, underlined Egypt’s vulnerability to any waterworks undertaken in the Ethiopia highlands (MoFAARE, 2020a, p. 9).

The commencement of the construction of the GERD on the 2nd April 2011, for Egypt, is a “unilateral action”, to which downstream countries that could be invariably affected by such a project are not consulted, so it represents a breach of Ethiopia’s international legal obligation. The unilateral filling of the dam was regarded as a development that jeopardizes the water and food security of 100 million Egyptians. It could cause significant harm to downstream countries and pose threat to the peace and security in the region. Hence, the international community is deemed to put pressure upon Ethiopia to refrain from unilateral actions (*Ibid.*).

The Sudanese side of the story was expressed in a letter addressed to the UNSC on 2nd June 2020. It emphasized that Sudan is an important riparian country to the Blue Nile and an immediate downstream country to the GERD, and it could be impacted the most by it. The Blue Nile is the lifeline of Sudan’s 40 million people serving 70% of irrigated land and the heart of agricultural activities in the country (MoFARS, 2020a). Sudan understood the dam to

be “a towering permanent structure presence with the potential of bringing both positive and negative impacts to Sudan.” The GERD, for Sudan, will have positive impacts in terms of regulating the water flow of the Blue Nile reducing the annual flow of floods and ensuring better management of its dams. It also enhances the navigational depth of both the Blue Nile and the main Nile rivers. However, for Sudan, the dam effects change in the “flow regime of the Blue Nile.” It raised technical and safety-related matters of the dam and the risks associated with faulty design, construction and operation which might threaten the lives of its people and safety and operation of its dams. It also indicated environmental impacts across the basin alongside its boarder (*Ibid.*, p. 2). Sudan recognized Ethiopia’s right to develop its water resources but underlined the vitality of addressing negative impacts in consultation with downstream countries (*Ibid.*).

The three parties also reflected contradictory positions on the understanding and interpretation of the DoP as Ethiopia announces the first round impoundment of the dam in July 2020. Ethiopia clearly underlined that its decision is in line with the DoP quoting principle five from the document where filling of the dam is part of the construction process to which Egypt is fully informed and fully consented by signing the agreement (MoFA, 2020a). Egypt’s position, on the other hand, reflects that the DoP puts Ethiopia under a full international obligation not to commence the impoundment of the dam before reaching an agreement governing the filling and operation of the dam with Egypt (MoFAARE, 2020a). Such misinterpretations and understandings of the DoP escalated the conflicting demands and put the three actors in stark diplomatic spats hindering the success of the negotiation process.

Contradictory Views on the USA and WB Brokered Deal Process

The USA and WB joined the negotiation process in November 2019 as observers with the aim of supporting the three countries reach a final agreement on the filling and operation of the dam. Twelve rounds of meetings were held at the Ministerial and experts level with the attendance of the representatives from the USA and WB that finally resulted in the formulation of agreement on the filling and operation of the GERD (MoFAARE, 2020a).

The three parties have different and contradictory positions about the final outcome of the negotiation process brokered by the USA and WB. The proposal by the two observers was questioned by Ethiopia, which requested for postponement of the meeting scheduled to take place on February 28, 2020 (MoFA, 2020a). However, the meeting went on and Egypt took a strong stand for all the parties to accept and sign the agreement. In the eyes of Egypt, “the

agreement is fair, balanced and mutually beneficial and prepared on the basis of positions espoused by the three parties”. It satisfies Ethiopia’s demand to expeditiously generate hydropower and, at the same time, protects downstream states from the adverse effects of the GERD (MoFAARE, 2020a).

Sudan, on the other hand, took a position of both a ‘party’ in the negotiation process and also a ‘mediator’ to convince the two parties to resume talks when the process is stalled. Sudan viewed the process as instrumental in helping to achieve major progress on key issues but only unfortunately stalled due to “the escalation in rhetoric statements from both Egypt and Ethiopia” (MoFARS, 2020a). It expressed its efforts in convincing the other two parties to come back to the negotiation table to resolve a few of the remaining differences standing on the way of a final negotiated settlement. A comprehensive deal involving all the three parties is expressed to be the core interest of Sudan in the trilateral talks.

Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the USA and WB brokered negotiation process, which Egypt claimed to fairly address all fundamental matters of significance to the three parties, is on the ground of its inability to resolve “outstanding difference on matters of fundamental importance that have far-reaching consequence for the interests of Ethiopia and contravening the DoP” (MoFA, 2020a, p. 10). The proposal, from the viewpoint of Ethiopia, severely limits the capacity of the dam to generate electricity by imposing rules that are impractical for filling and operating the dam. Moreover, it curtails the rights of any future efforts of upstream water resources development and undermines its sovereign rights to operate its own dam. This is in line with Egypt’s request to open an office at the GERD site for joint management and insistence to shift all draught time burdens towards Ethiopia by obliging to maintain the water level at High Aswan Dam (HAD) to 165 meters Above Sea Level (ASL). The official communication from Egypt’s side about the completion of the negotiation is blatant disinformation as the negotiation cannot be completed before addressing Ethiopia’s fundamental concerns and no mediation has taken place as no mediator is invited in line with the principles of the DoP (*Ibid.*).

The Role of the USA and WB: Observers or Mediators?

Though the DoP prioritized an internal dispute resolution mechanism, Egypt, has unilaterally called for the international mediation of the USA and WB through its letter to the UNSC on 1st May 2010. Ethiopia stated that it accommodated Egypt’s unilateral move “in good faith and to

show flexibility” and to give a chance to the success of the trilateral talks, though the move is not in line with the DoP (MoFA, 2020a, p. 9).

The USA and WB observership, however, took a different form and came under question after the USA Treasury Department’s official announcement of warning Ethiopia to sign the agreement and not to proceed with the first filling of the dam before reaching an agreement with the other two parties (US Department of Treasury, 2020). This has reiterated Egypt’s stance on the matter and casted doubt on the neutrality of the USA as an ‘observer’ of the trilateral talks. Ethiopia, in line with this, raised its concerns on the legality of the USA’s role stating that “negotiation is not completed and no mediator is invited as the DoP requires” (*Ibid.*, p., iii). In the eyes of Ethiopia, the WB and USA played only an observer role during the negotiation process and would not be in a position to impose a proposal on any of the parties.

The USA has again expressed its position on the matter after the failed video conference trilateral discussions from 9-17th June 2020. A tweet from the United States National Security Council restraining Ethiopia from filling the dam “unequivocally echoes Egyptians interest on the issue and again indicated US’s clear position” (Solomon, 2020, p.11). In line with this, seven former African Affairs Assistant Secretaries, in a letter addressed to the Undersecretary of State Political Affairs of the USA, urged the USA to embrace neutrality in the negotiation process. Any perception on the absence of the US neutrality in the process, according to the letter, will limit its ability to support efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. Any pressure on Ethiopia “would harden position and makes compromise difficult” (Worku, 2020, p. 2). Ethiopia has suggested three major avenues including: discussions between heads of states, the continuation of already started NBI and the AU to find a regional remedy for regional disputes (MoFA, 2020a).

The Video Conference and Ensuing Outcomes

The three parties agreed to resume the trilateral talks through a virtual video conference with Sudan taking the initiative to mediate between Ethiopia and Egypt itself being one of the parties to the ongoing talks. Sudan held a bilateral talk with the other two parties to finally arrange the virtual discussions which were held from 9-17th June 2020. The Republic of South Africa, the European Union (EU) and the USA were invited as observers. The countries, in the first few days, reached understanding on the first stage of filling, the volume of environmental flow, guidelines for first stage of filling and approaches to draught management rules (Kiram, 2020).

Diplomatic discords and conflicting understanding of the negotiation process were being however reflected sooner than expected. Within two days into the negotiation process, Egypt's Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation released an official statement that no fruitful outcome will be expected from the ongoing trilateral negotiation due to Ethiopia's "intransigent position" even though an agreement has to be reached before Ethiopia starts first filling in July 2020. The statement indicates that "consensus is reached on none of the discussion points" and Ethiopia is trying to force Egypt either to sign an agreement of its interest or else it will fill the dam anyways (Egypt Independent, 2020a).

Sudan and Ethiopia have a very different understanding of the negotiation projecting positive and constructive explanation regarding its outcomes. Sudan confirmed that the three countries reached an agreement on 90% of issues related to the GERD except for a few outstanding legal matters (Egypt Independent, 2020b). Ethiopia, on the other hand, criticized Egypt's pessimism on the latest round of talks and expressed that understanding was reached on many important matters and also urged Egypt to stop issuing confusing statements and continuing diplomatic pressure while negotiating (Addis, 2020).

The key issues of disagreement as presented by Ethiopia constitute few major points. This relates in the first place with the annual operation of the dam where the release from the storage during drought years should not impede the operational flexibility of the GERD. Sharing of draught season water shortage burden among the three countries is also the second point of departure. Ethiopia thirdly took a stand not to tie the future water resources development of upstream countries with the GERD negotiation process and the current negotiation process not to contradict the basic tenets of the CFA as a promising basin-wide legal framework. It also took a firm stand on the inseparability of the impoundment of the dam from the construction process as per the DoP (FBC, 2020a).

With these developments, Egypt on 19th June took the matter officially to the UNSC for the second time in less than two months. As per the appeal letter, filling the GERD without a negotiated settlement poses a "clear and present danger to Egypt and threatens international peace and security". It based its request on Article 35 of the UN Charter which allows a member state to alert the Council on any update that threatens international peace and security. Egypt requested the UNSC "to urgently consider the issue under agenda item peace and security in Africa" (Egypt Today, 2020; MoFAARE, 2020b, p. 3).

Ethiopia, similarly, submitted its appeal to the UNSC in a letter addressed on 22nd June 2020. It primarily condemned Egypt's withdrawal from the negotiation process while it was going on. Egypt also bypassed all regional and continental mechanisms of settling disputes by taking the matter to the highest possible institutional mechanism undermining the possibility of finding "African solution to African problem" (MoFA, 2020b). As per Ethiopia's stand, "nothing can be further from the truth" than suggesting that the issue constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The negotiation is only about filling and operation of a single dam and "can't by any means invite invocation of the mandate of the Security Council under article 5 of the charter". Lack of progress in the trilateral talks, for Ethiopia, is due to Egypt's insistence on "historic rights and current use" principles. Ethiopia accommodated Egypt's demand at the expense of the optimal operation of the dam and its own benefits. Ethiopia requested the UN to "reject Egypt's unwarranted demand to ensure the continuity of unequal colonial-era agreement" (*Ibid.*, p. 4).

Sudan, on its part, announced its unreserved diplomatic efforts to convince the other two parties to resume the trilateral negotiations in a letter addressed to the UNSC on 24th June 2020. The virtual negotiations, for Sudan, "succeeded in bridging the divergent views and positions" and progressed towards the major technical matters while fundamental legal issues are yet to be resolved (MoFARS, 2020b, p. 1).

The UNSC, as per the call from Egypt, held a video conference on 22nd June 2020 but failed to agree on an open discussion in the presence of all concerned parties and finally ruled the three parties to continue their trilateral negotiation. Divergent views were reflected in the UNSC where the USA pushed for the open discussion favoring Egypt's stance. China suggested for the principle of subsidiarity recommending on the importance of looking for "African Solution to African problem", while South Africa and Nigeria similarly advocated the resumption of the trilateral talks and the African Union (AU) to play its own role in resolving the matter (EBC, 2020). A strong statement or resolution from the UNSC restraining Ethiopia from filling the dam was in the best interest of the USA aligning with Egypt (Addis Standard, 2020).

The Arab League has also been brought to the diplomatic front by Egypt as an instrument of putting more pressure on Ethiopia and securing Egypt's interest in the trilateral talks, though, Qatar, Somalia and Djibouti failed to support Egypt's proposal to take the matter to the UNSC and restraining from unilaterally filling the dam (FBC, 2020b). Egypt, later on, made a statement that it will be "explicit and clear about its position if the UNSC intervention to resolve

the disputes arising from Ethiopia's GERD is not successful", hinting the possibility of military measure (Middle East Monitor, 2020a).

Coming Back to Africa with the AU Brokered Deal

The idea of finding an "African solution to African problem" has got prominence when the three parties once again resumed the trilateral talks through the mediation of the AU. The extraordinary meeting of the AU Assembly regarding the ongoing trilateral negotiation process among the three parties was held virtually on 26th June 2020. The meeting was convened by Cyril Ramaphosa, President of the Republic of South Africa and Chairman of the African Union Assembly. The leaders of the three states presented on the status of the negotiation process after underscoring the importance of seeking African solution to African problem. Thus, the UNSC requested to take note of the AU seizing the matter (PM Office, 2020).

The heads of states accordingly agreed to reconvene in two weeks' time to report on the outcome of the trilateral talks (African Union, 2020, p.3). A press release from the Office of the Prime Minister clarified that "Ethiopia scheduled to begin filling the dam within two weeks during which the remaining construction work will be done." It is within this period that the three countries are expected to reach an agreement on the pending matters (PM Office, 2020, p. 1).

The three countries' agreement for an AU-led negotiation process was followed by UNSC's open discussion on 29th June 2020 where the three countries forwarded their points of view. Most of the member countries in the UNSC called for a "continued dialogue" under the initiative of South Africa led the AU negotiation process. The UNSC applauded the AU's effort and emphasized the importance of the parties' full commitment and political will for a compromise to reach a final agreement focusing on their remaining differences (Al-Monitor, 2020a; UN News, 2020).

The AU led first-round talks started on 3rd July 2020 and ended after eleven days. Reports came out that the three countries have not been able to resolve their differences reflecting continued disagreements. They have at the end agreed only to submit reports to South Africa regarding the final outcomes of the first round talks and possibly restart the talks to decide on the next steps (Egypt Independent, 2020c). The most persisting matters are still attached to technical and legal disagreements, the amount of water to release during a multiyear drought and future dispute resolution mechanisms. The legally binding nature of the agreement is construed by

Ethiopia as an obstacle to its future development efforts along the Nile Basin (Aljezeera News, 2020).

Ethiopia's announcement of the initial filling of the GERD on 14th July 2020, just after the reported deadlock of the first round talks, invited political outrage and demanding clarification by Egypt and Sudan regarding the validity of the information. The Ethiopian Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Energy stated that construction and filling of the dam are "one and the same" process and filling should not wait for completion and the water level rose from 525 to 560 meters (Middle East Monitor, 2020b). Later on, the information was rephrased by the Ethiopian authorities that "filling had not begun" and the heavy rainfall that led to the huge flow of water to the dam is the major source of confusion. However, in only a week's time, Ethiopia announced the completion of the first round filling of the dam on an official press release on 22nd July by PM Abiy Ahmed. The filling was attributed mainly to highly increasing precipitation leading to an increase in water level overtopping the dam well ahead of the schedule (Ethiopian Herald, 2020).

The PM stated that Ethiopia has no intention of harming Sudan and Egypt in the process of construction and operation of the dam. The dam's first filling is completed without reducing the water flowing to them. This, according to him, shows to the world the soundness of Ethiopia's argument that the dam poses no harm to downstream countries (*Ibid.*). Ethiopia's move faced strong criticism from Egypt and Sudan, which questioned the feasibility of continuing the negotiation process and the possibility of reaching a fair agreement. Sudan expressed it as "a harmful and disturbing precedent in the course of cooperation between the countries concerned" (Al-Monitor, 2020b; Tesfalem, 2020).

The 2nd round of AU-led talks started on 27th July 2020 while Egypt and Sudan were expressing their concern on Ethiopia's first filling of the dam and underlining its official announcement of "not seeking a binding agreement but a guiding agreement that can be modified as needed." Ethiopia's stand is counter to their need to reach a comprehensive agreement seeking assurance to their long-existed water share rights (Al-Monitor, 2020b). The 2nd round of talks, later on, came to a halt on 5th August after Egypt and Sudan announced the suspension of talks due to Ethiopia's new proposal constituting draft guidelines on rules of filling the dam neglecting provisions on operating rules and the legally binding nature of the agreement (Arab News, 2020). The proposal reflected Ethiopia's firm stand of not wanting to sign a legally binding agreement under international law with a capacity to subject its future projects on the Blue Nile

to the consent of Sudan and Egypt. It also took a stand that a sustainable water-sharing agreement should involve the other basin countries (Sudan Tribune, 2020).

Discussion

The theoretical discussion in the review indicated three major scenarios of interactions among countries in a river basin namely: *positive, negative and neutral interactions* (Zeitounae & Mirmachi, 2008). The results implied that the Nile Basin countries in general and three countries involved in the current trilateral talks, in particular, have been exerting efforts to formulate a cooperative basin-wide framework to address their conflicting interest. This shows that they are in the process of transiting from negative interaction characterized by “high conflict and low cooperation” to positive interaction with the ability to accommodate the interest of all the actors ensuring sustained relations at a broader level. However, this all depends on the outcome of the ongoing and upcoming negotiation processes to formulate an all-inclusive benefits packages to interested parties which again all depends on the political will and commitment to accommodate each other’s interests and redefine existed relations and legal frameworks.

The results also indicated that in the Nile Basin, Egypt as a lower riparian country asserts the “prior” or “historical use doctrine” as well as the “no harm” doctrine emphasizing the upper riparian countries should not use the water resources in a way that harms the interests of downstream countries, which takes its stand closer to the *absolute territorial integrity* theory. On the other hand, even though Ethiopia is expected to uphold the principles of *absolute territorial sovereignty* that advocates the unconditional use of the water by an upstream country, in reality, it is involved in benefit sharing and cooperative agreements with the downstream countries. This may demonstrate that Ethiopia as a country, which has never used a river basin to which it contributes a significant share of the water, is trying to renegotiate the *status quo* claiming a fair share of the water resources from the basin. The discussions below also confirm the alignment of the existing scenario among the basin countries with the available theoretical literature.

According to Mbote (2007), co-basin states are highly interdependent and their ability to gain benefits is linked with the hydrological cycle of the river crossing their boundary. In light of this, the Nile Basin countries can achieve sustainable development and regional stability “under a sound legal and institutional framework” inclusive of all parties (*Ibid.*, p. 5). Cooperative water regimes, once formulated among riparian, remain to be resilient over time even when

countries are in conflict due to other issues. Such frameworks help to resolve tensions arising out of the “distributional nature of water conflict” avoiding the scramble for a larger share of water resources from the basin (Zeitoune & Miruachi, 2008, p. 300).

International transboundary water conflicts may be resolved through benefit sharing. The main idea of benefit sharing is that “the riparian states should not seek the water itself, but instead share various benefits from the water itself” and through such agreement “a zero-sum game of water sharing is being replaced by a positive-sum game of benefit-sharing” (Dombrowsky, 2009, p. 125). The discussions best explain the existing conflicts among the Nile co-basin states indicating the importance of basin-wide legal frameworks inclusive of all parties. Transboundary river conflicts are more of an outcome of how water is governed than a scarcity of water (Perlman *et al.*, 2017).

However, the most important issue is how to achieve a cooperative framework of agreeable outcome to all the parties involved. In this regard, countries sharing transboundary river may be convinced in formulating equitable and fair legal framework, but may not agree on the how. Ethiopia’s practical move by starting the construction of the GERD in 2011 is considered by many as a breakthrough and altered the political landscape over the Nile Basin as no such meaningful developmental project has been previously attempted by any of the other upper riparian countries. This is the reason why Egypt and Sudan entered into intensive trilateral talks in order to regulate the filling and operation of the dam. According to Warner and Zawahri (2012), the interest in negotiation and the potential outcome might be influenced by their geographical location along the river and distribution of military and economic power among the riparian countries. Upstream countries tend to use water to gain political control, while their downstream counterparts may use military power to gain more control of the water.

In the current negotiation process, Ethiopia is asserting its right to use a water resource significantly originating from its territory due to its pressing need for achieving development and reducing poverty. Egypt, on the other hand, has been insisting to maintain its historical rights. Hence, the negotiation process is stalling in between maintaining and revising the *status quo*. Zeitoune and Mirumachi (2008) highlighted the nature of transboundary interactions as a political process subject to the whims of power. This is mainly true in the absence of legal constraints and well-defined rights (Benevenisti, 2004).

Regardless of perceived power positions, negotiating parties cannot rule the importance of flexibility and readiness to concede to the needs and demands of others in order to resolve

contradictory views and reach a negotiated settlement of sustainable outcome. Allan and Mirumachi (2007) argue that a successful water management and allocation scheme should take changing circumstances such as intensities of conflict and cooperation and politico-economic dynamics into account. Intensification of conflict over the use and management of the Nile Basin and evolving needs to achieve swift economic development by many upper riparian countries implies the need for new thinking and legal framework than sticking to long existed trends.

The modalities, with which negotiations have to continue, could emerge as a potential area of controversy and source of disagreement among negotiating parties. This has exactly happened in the current trilateral talks among the three parties. The involvement of ‘observers’ such as the USA and WB with an invitation from Egypt but the form of interventions induced by them casting doubt over their neutrality in the eyes of Ethiopia, emerged as a point of hot areas of discussions backsliding the process from achieving a breakthrough. Therefore, dispute resolution mechanisms among the parties now, and in the future, have become another sticky point in the negotiation process. Biswas (2008) provides that negotiating parties on transboundary rivers prefer to resolve their disputes on the basis of bilateral and multilateral forums other than intermediary actors and international organizations.

This could be in line with Ethiopia’s push to exhaust internal dispute resolution mechanisms primarily among the negotiating parties and invite observers of their choice when such avenues have failed. The review, however, reveals Egypt’s continued effort to resolve the matter through external actors such as the USA, WB, and the UNSC and at times through the Arab League to put diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia. For Perlman *et al.* (2017), two sides of power inequalities could be reflected in transboundary water negotiations. One could be inequality in the interactions between riparian countries and the other in terms of relationships with powerful actors outside the region. Some parties might be more important to powerful external actors than others whose involvement might influence the form, directions and possibly also the final outcomes of the negotiation. Third-party involvement in the transboundary water negotiation process is appreciated when it helps to break deadlocks and provides assistance in the form of technical expertise and platforms to host the talks.

There has not been a time when the Nile water resource utilization was not politicized (Zeitoune & Mirumachi, 2008). The review reveals that even during the current trilateral talks, there has been a tendency most often to drift away from scientific and technical aspects of water

management and utilization in the filling and operation of the GERD. Exhaustive discussions at the scientific and technical levels could have helped to find out ways of optimizing positive externalities and minimizing the negative environmental and water scarcity impacts on downstream countries. Politicization has been projected through a stringent emphasis on the legality of existed colonial-era agreements and exaggeration of the negative impacts of GERD from downstream Egypt and Sudan and questioning the fairness and equitable nature of the previous agreements under existing circumstances from upstream Ethiopia.

Benvenisti (2004) opines that upstream and downstream relationships could at times be constrained by the upstream threat to the use of force to protect their water shares while downstream countries may refuse to recognize their duty to share water with their downstream counterparts. He mentioned Egypt as the best instance of issuing military threats against its relatively weaker neighbors to restrain them from interfering in the natural flow of the water. For a fair observer of the matter, the current dispute on the Nile Basin is more of an upstream country trying to assert its right for the utilization of the water resources and a downstream country insisting to maintain its century's old absolute control and use of the water along the basin.

Conflicts over the utilization and co-management of transboundary water resources still persist along several water basins of which the Nile Basin is a prominent one. However, many studies indicate that, in recent decades, states tend to cooperate over shared water resources than entering into military confrontations. Tensions over the utilization of water resources are gradually being replaced by cooperation (Zeitoune & Mirumachi, 2008). The very nature of transboundary water resources entails collective action leading to more beneficial shared regulatory mechanisms providing optimal and sustainable results (Benivenisti, 2004).

Concluding Remarks

The Nile is one of the most controversial River Basins without an inclusive and effective legal framework entirely depending on the old and exclusionary colonial-era agreements favoring the lower riparian countries. This has made management and utilization of water resources along the Basin with the full participation of all riparian countries a very difficult task. Many authors reflect the insufficiency of the colonial era agreements formulated to entertain the aspirations of the then colonial forces and are nowadays becoming an impediment to effective management, utilization and water-sharing schemes that can accommodate the interest of all riparian countries.

Ethiopia's move to construct the GERD in 2011 has altered the political and diplomatic landscape of the Nile Basin. No other upper riparian ever before attempted such a groundbreaking project of high significance to achieve development. The move, however, is to the dismay of lower riparian countries that perceived the dam as a threat to their 'historical rights' and 'existed and current water use security'. That is why the trilateral negotiation process has been going immediately after the launching of the GERD project. The concerns of lower riparian countries are understandable as they depend for the most part on the water resources from the Nile Basin. However, a balance should also be maintained to the socio-economic needs of Ethiopia and its immediate need to uplift more than half of its population from abject poverty. The trilateral talks on the filling and annual operation of the GERD could not lead to a final negotiated settlement due to a lack of flexibility and continued insistence to maintain existing water share. The political will and commitment to follow a revisionist approach basing premises on newly emerging socio-economic realities along the basin could help to break the deadlock. Working towards formulating an all-inclusive and efficient basin-wide legal framework benefiting all riparian countries in a fair and equitable manner according to existing international legal standards may ensure to resolve the matter sustainably.

One effect of over politicization of GERD talks is externalizing the matter and attempting to find solutions through diplomatic and political pressures. Seeking technical and advisory assistance from observers, mediators and negotiators on transboundary water conflicts is normal international practice, but on conditions of consensus among the parties involved. Real political commitment and negotiation in line with the baseline principle of give-and-take could help to address the competing interest of all parties. Externally imposed solutions may not sustainably resolve the matter or may even drag it to already prevailing global power play among competing powerful actors.

Conflict and cooperation go all the way along among co-basin countries sharing transboundary water resources. Empirical evidence shows a rare possibility of full-scale destructive conflicts among such countries. This specifically holds true to the Nile Basin where a significant portion of the water originates from upper riparian Ethiopia, and the lower riparian excessively depends on it for fresh water. Their fates are inextricably intertwined and only a more cooperative scheme would help them to achieve each other's goals. A protracted conflict that could escalate into war would be much more destructive and would severely destabilize the already fragile and unstable region of the Horn of Africa. Therefore, the riparian countries and specifically those with relatively stronger military power should restrain from considering war as an

alternative to resolve the matter. The international community also needs to remain neutral and provide the negotiating parties with genuine support in their efforts to amicably resolve their differences.

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Trends in Contemporary International Migration of Ethiopia

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Abstract

Ethiopia is found in the 'Eastern Africa migration system' known for turbulent population mobility due to a host of social, economic, and political factors. The migration problem of East Africa, in which, a substantial exploration of the complexity and intensity of the migration pattern of Ethiopia has become necessary in the context of social transformation and developmental processes. To this end, this study is designed to provide migratory change and developmental patterns of international migration of Ethiopia in regional and sub-regional perspectives based on long-term macro statistics. The data obtained from the Reports of the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs and World Bank's Development Indicators have been used to describe, analyze and explain long-term patterns of international migration of Ethiopia within the regional contexts. Results show the trend that Ethiopia experienced a continuous increase in its international migrant stock in the last five decades, from less than 400,000 in 1960 to over 1 million in 2015. Refugees and transit migrants constituted the largest number of immigrants, mostly from the neighboring countries, driven by continuous conflicts and political instability. Ethiopia, once dominant in refugee flows in the Horn of Africa due to political conflict, famine, and persecution, experienced a sharp decline in the share of refugees in the Horn of Africa in the last three decades. Economic motives have recently become the prime factors in migration decisions among the Ethiopians as observed with the fact that the USA and the Middle East are the major destinations. The findings revealed that Ethiopian emigration is characterized by the inter-continental flows unlike the Sub-Saharan migration pattern known to have an intra-continental migratory link. Feminization of Ethiopian migration is also evident particularly in core destination countries of the Global North, which indicates the increasing role of females in migration decisions but also disproves the widely held perception about Ethiopians emigration to the Arab World as female-specific. In the final analysis, Ethiopia could be regarded rather as a destination, with over 1.2 million migrants, than as an origin, with just over 800,000 as of 2017, which now make the country a regional migration hub in the Horn of Africa.

Keywords: *Migration, Refugee, Migratory link, Ethiopia, East Africa*

Introduction

Migration is a phenomenon that is as old as the history of humankind. People have been moving from one place to another all through human history (McKeown, 2004). In recent years, accounting to its complexity and intensity, international migration has become a more interesting subject of researches in social sciences as it gets more momentum due to the debated economic pressure immigrants create in hosting countries. According to United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), as of 2017, the number of people

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living in a country other than their place of birth has recently shown a tremendous increase from over 150 million in 1991 to almost 260 million in 2017. While this increase is more evident in developed countries like the USA and Germany, low and middle-income countries also hosted a large number of migrants which are mostly refugees and asylum seekers. One important feature of this increase is the feminization of migration as the number of women migrant population has generally increased in all regions with an annual average growth rate of 1.1 in 1991-1995 to 2.4 in 2010-2015. Although the largest number of international migrants originated from Asia and Europe in the last couple of years (UNDESA, 2017), the growing number of international migrants is a phenomenon that is also evident in Africa, often regarded as a “continent on the move”, which is previously dominated mainly by intra-continental population mobility.

This international population mobility has been facilitated by the development process, social transformation, and of course factors like wage differences, historical relationships, and geographical proximity. New shreds of evidence show that Africans also migrate for family union, work, and/or study (Schoumaker & Beauchemin, 2015). In terms of destination, many studies show that African emigration is not just directed to Europe as it is usually claimed but is mainly directed towards other African countries (Schoumaker & Beauchemin, 2015; Sander & Maimbo, 2003), the Gulf countries, and the Americas (Bakewell & Haas, 2007).

Ethiopia is found in the Horn of Africa, a conflict-ridden area of the world, often labeled in the literature as the “Eastern Africa migration system”, known for the turbulent mobility of people within the region and outside. Scholars posit that the migration problem of East Africa, in which Ethiopia is involved, has always been substantial, and exploring the migration patterns in the region is complex due to the host of social, economic, and political factors. Being one of the poorest, populous, politically unstable, and food-insecure countries in the world, Ethiopia meets all the profile of a country prone to large emigration (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009). The World Bank report has shown that the country has an estimated emigration rate of 0.7% which is lower than other sub-Saharan countries (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009). A survey conducted in Ethiopia by the World Bank in 2010 indicates that nearly 40% of respondents had family members or relatives living in another country. The United Nations has estimated that the number of Ethiopians born abroad has virtually doubled as the migrant stock of 443,926 by 2000 which has grown to be 800,879 in 2017 (UNDESA, 2017). The fact that the share of females in the stock has shown a growth rate of 20% every five years is also worth mentioning in this regard. The point is that Ethiopia, being one of the developing countries, faces the

complex challenges of migration flows beside the recurring problems of food insecurity, drought, political instability, and demographic growth, unemployment and ethnic conflict, *etc.* (Adepoju, 2004). Nonetheless, the studies conducted on the international aspect of population mobility are generally scanty.

One such study worth mentioning is the work of Fransen & Kuschminder (2009) that aimed at providing an overview of migration and development in Ethiopia. While this work could be regarded as one of the first systematic attempts in presenting the discussion of historical and contemporary migration patterns of Ethiopia, it is not exhaustive as it narrowly focuses on the development impact of the Ethiopian Diaspora. Besides, it does not capture the recent fast-paced political and economic changes that Ethiopia is experiencing over the last decade.

A study conducted by Kuschminder *et al.* (2012) provides an account of the general profile of Ethiopian migrants in destination regions, namely: the Global North (North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand), African countries, and the Middle-East. They have found out that the migration pattern of Ethiopia is unique within the African context in that the tremendous migration flow is towards the Middle East, not to other African countries and it is essentially feminized. While the aforementioned study provides a good account of empirical information, the authors have equally indicated that the results cannot be generalized to represent the pattern of Ethiopian migration, and hence the necessity of further researches to understand the national phenomenon in the wider picture of international migration flows and trends, which in the words of Melegh (2013), “form a web around the world”.

In this paper, an attempt is, thus, made to equally pay attention to the inflow aspect of Ethiopian migration, unlike other studies that emphasized only the outflow dimension. According to Melegh (2013), this can fruitfully be done *via* the complex, historical analysis of migratory change and developmental patterns based on longer-term macro statistics. The fact that the Ethiopian migrant population is young makes the studies on migration dynamics even more pervasive particularly in the context of economic growth, lack of properly documented data, and absence of a well-articulated national policy framework.

Theoretical Framework

Migration is a very complicated and dynamic social phenomenon that involves many actors upholding varying interests. It has taken different forms, patterns, or magnitudes at different times. In his contribution to the book titled “The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience”, Massey (1999) argues that modern international migration has

undergone four major phases: (i) the period, extending from the 16th to 19th centuries, dominated by the migration of Europeans to other parts of the world as related to colonization and growth of mercantile capitalism; (ii) the period that starts from early 19th until early 20th century, which featured the migration mainly dominated by Europeans, and this time due to industrialization; (iii) the inter-war period that exhibited lesser movement of people across borders; and (iv) the post-industrial period, from the 1960s onwards, in which international migration was mainly dominated by movements of developing nations to the Global North. By the end of the 20th century, international migration had become truly a global phenomenon (Massey, 1999). In such a global context, it is, thus, imperative to see the patterns of migration and what causes them. Hence, there are two important questions worthy to pose: ‘why does migration occur?’ and ‘why does it still persist?’ These questions help to understand and explain what makes people decide to leave their home country and travel long distances which sometimes prove to be risky and dangerous.

A conventional way of addressing and explaining these questions is a push-pull factor approach. The push-pull factors are described as flip sides of various coins, each coin representing different sets of economic, sociocultural, political, and geographic factors (Schlewitz, 2013). Push factors consist of a set of factors that induce migration while pull factors are conditions in place of destination that attract migrants. The theories of International Migration, explained in the following section, attempt to address the two basic questions posed above.

Neoclassical Theory of Migration

This is one of the popular international migration theories which explain migration at macro and micro levels. It is rooted in the Heckscher-Ohlin model of macroeconomics, and Harris & Todaro (1970), who created a link between internal (rural-urban) migration and economic development. According to this theory, international migration occurs because of the geographic difference in labor demand and supply between countries. People from countries that have a relative surplus of labor but relatively limited capital usually move to countries that have a higher endowment of capital but relatively limited labor. In other words, people migrate from labor rich countries to capital-rich countries as often precipitated by differences in wages (Massey, 1999).

There is a microeconomic analysis of migration coupled with the above macro-level explanation; migration is a decision made by an individual based on a material/monetary cost-

benefit analysis expected from it. However, before reaping the expected benefit, individuals make their investment in the form of the cost incurred to migrate and settle in the new location or investment in human capital (Sjaastad, 1962).

New Economics of Migration

This theory of migration challenges many of the assumptions of Neoclassical Migration Theory. It argues that migration is not the result of the individual decision; rather, it is a decision collectively made at a family or household level not only intended to maximize benefit from migration but also minimize the risk of loss of income (Edward & Stark, 1991). The relative deprivation, the collective reduction of risks that a household feels or faces within its community influences a family's decision to send a family member abroad. Hence, a family might decide to send its member abroad even if the relative gain from migration is insignificant/unchanged and if it expects problems in pulling income and/or improving relative income positions within its community (Massey, 1999). This theory, therefore, assumes that conditions in the home country influence the decision of a family to migrate. Based on their unit of analysis and the framework theories, criticisms on neoclassical and push-pull models can be categorized into the following broad divisions. The historical-structural approach follows the 'global structural change' framework (together with dependency and world system theories) and there are others that follow the 'network' approach (cumulative causation and social capital theories). The first two tried to explain why migration occurs while the last one is mainly about why migration continues.

According to the "structural theories", the criticized models fail to vividly depict why migration occurs. These theories use a *post factum* approach which is, explaining a scenario based on the consequences than trying to find out the root cause leading to the decision for migration. A further critique of the approach is that the conventional push-pull theories assume that the poor and economically disadvantaged parts of a society migrate only because of the global income or economic inequality; thus, the poorest countries should send migrants into the richest countries, while this cannot be demonstrated. Hence, this approach fails to explain why migration does not occur from other equally poor nations (Portes & Borocz, 1989).

World System Theory

This is a historical-structural approach which sees migration as a global phenomenon created and reinforced by the unequal distribution of political power and expansion of global capitalism (Massey, 1999). According to Frank (1969), the force of global capitalisms acted to "develop

underdevelopment” creating a system of dependency dictated by the strong capitalist nations putting the third world countries in a disadvantaged position. The theory further emphasizes the reverse relation between migration and movement of capital to the non- or pre-capitalist society. Migration is a natural consequence of the disruption of the traditional labor structure and dislocations that inevitably occur due to the penetration of capitalism into pre-capitalist societies (Kurekova, 2011). Saskia Sassen, in her explanation about the link between foreign investment and international migration, claims that one key process mediating between the introduction of these modern forms of production and the formation of labor migrations is the disruption of traditional work structures (Sassen, 1988). Therefore, migration is not an individual or family level choice; rather, it is a phenomenon into which people are forced as a result of the existing global structure. However, this theory is also censured for its failure to provide a systematic explanation of migration patterns over a longer period independent of a specific phenomenon which leads to or created a specific migratory link (Melegh, 2013).

Segmented Labor Market Theory

This theory also follows somewhat the line of argument represented by World System Theory, which explains migration as a consequence of global structural change/difference but only from the demand side. Pioneer proponent of this theory, Michael Piore argues that international migration occurs due to the permanent demand of modern industrial societies for unskilled labor force; which Massey also puts it as an unavoidable need for low wage workers due to the problem of wage inflation (Piore, 1979; Massey, 1999). Wages of the lower scale workers cannot be increased as wages above are to be increased in that case; hence, there are always some jobs which are left for migrant labor and are not done by the non-migrants in the advanced economies. Increasing the wage for less attractive jobs will disrupt the whole wage hierarchy leading to crisis; hence, resorting to low de-skilled migrant labor becomes the only viable option. Accordingly, the inherent dualism between labor and capital extends to the labor market as well. Capital is a factor of production that cannot be laid off even if the demand for it falls, but the labor force can be laid off upon fall of demand. Likewise, employers tend to keep workers having firm-specific skills in capital-intensive sectors while they let to go the workers required for labor-intensive sectors creating a segmented labor market (Massey, 1999).

Social Capital Theory

This theory and cumulative causation theory (discussed below) are characterized as a network approach that tries to explain the reasons for the perpetuity of migration (Melegh, 2013). Social

capital basically consists of some aspect of a social structure that facilitates certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be materialized otherwise (Coleman, 1990).

Existing and newly created social ties, kinships, and family memberships play a significant role in creating and sustaining international migration links. It could, thus, be argued that migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin (Massey, 1999). Therefore, the social capital and networks people have reduced the risk and cost of international migrations leading to the decision to migrate. Yet, the network theories are also criticized for their failure to explain the integration of transitional destinations found at the two ends, origin and destination, in bigger migration routes. Moreover, an explanation as to why migratory links become less intensive and eventually dry out is missing in these theoretical accounts (Melegh, 2013).

Cumulative Causation Theory

In an attempt to explain why migration continues to happen, this theory argues that one migration leads to another; in the words of Massey, “causation is cumulative”. When one migration occurs, it changes the social context of the origin in a way that instigates subsequent or additional decisions of migration (Massey, 1999). For instance, people who have friends, family members, or relatives abroad have a relatively lower risk after migration which prompts them to migrate. Of course, the level of the network at the origin needs to reach some threshold.

In this article, either one or an amalgamation of the theories discussed above was utilized to analyze the complex phenomenon that characterizes migration, in general, and the Ethiopian migration in particular.

Materials and Methods

This article is based on an exploratory study design. It is meant to be exploratory research to provide an understanding of the long-term patterns of emigration and immigration of Ethiopia and explaining the same by using one or a combination of the conventional theories of migration. To this end, this study has relied mainly on secondary data collected from literature and utilized the qualitative approach of data analysis. Besides, a substantial effort has been made to incorporate basic macro-level statistical data to describe, analyze, reveal and discuss

the complexity and intensity of the migration pattern of Ethiopia within the context of regional and sub-regional perspectives.

In so doing, the general macro statistics on the international migrant stock, data on refugees, GDP per capita, and GDP growth rates were obtained from the World Bank's Development Indicators (2018). Detailed migration data on origin and destination, gender, and net-migration rates were extracted from reports of the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA, 2003, 2013, 2015, 2017). Results were presented along with a thematized discussion to address the knowledge gap pertinent to the socio-economic and political dynamics of international migration of Ethiopia coherently and exhaustively. Accordingly, explanations and analyses have been undertaken, in the next sections, *via* utilizing a framework drawn from the aforementioned theories by taking into account migratory links (as sending and/or receiving state) that characterize the dynamics of population mobility in which Ethiopia is embedded.

Results and Discussion

General Trends in International Migrant Stock of Ethiopia


UN defines "international migrant stock" as "the number of people born in a country other than that in which they live" (UNDESA, 2003, 2017). In simple words, it refers to the number of foreign-born persons present in a given country. Basically, this number also includes refugees. International migrant stock is estimated for a particular point in time usually from population censuses. When data on the foreign-born population are not available, people who are citizens of a country other than the country in which they reside are used as estimates (UNDESA, 2017; World Bank, 2018).

Looking at the global and regional dynamics of migration, it appears that the international migrant stock as a percentage of the population has steadily increased over the last five decades. This is manifested in the rise of the number of international migrants in the world over the last five decades, from about 72 million in 1960 to over 220 million in 2000 (UNDESA, 2003). The number of international migrants in developed countries as a proportion of the world total migrant stock kept increasing over the last decades. According to UNDESA (2003), by the year 2000, three-fifths of the world's migrants were found in more developed regions. Based on the World Bank estimate, the number of international migrants in OECD countries as a proportion of the world total migrant stock has increased from 42.8% (in 1960) to 53% (in 2015); whereas in the LDCs it has dropped from 9.4% to less than 5% for the same period (World Bank, 2018).

The main point of our concern here is that data on international migration is of paramount importance not only due to the realization of international migration as “an important issue in the modern world where economic globalization has led to the growing interdependence of countries but also for better understanding of causes and consequences of international migration (UNDESA, 2003). For instance, conflicts in many areas of the world have increased the potential for forced migration across national borders.

Ethiopia is in the Horn of Africa, which is one of the most conflict-ridden areas of the world, known for forced migration. It is part of the Eastern Africa migration system in which the migration problem has always been substantial in the past four decades. To this end, exploring the causes of the migration patterns in the region is complex because there are so many agents present at the same time. Understanding the causes of migration formations in the Horn of Africa requires examination of a large number of factors, including ethnic and religious conflicts, irredentist and separatist-inspired violence, the international war between countries in the region, and intervention in domestic conflicts by external powers (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009). The same phenomenon is observed in Figure 1 below that depicts an increase of the international migrant stock of SSA, East Africa, and Ethiopia from 1960 to 2015, except for the last decade of the 20th century (1990-2000).

Figure 1: International Migrant Stock of Ethiopia, East Africa & Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: World Bank, 2018.


The international migrant stock of Ethiopia has grown from 393,260 in 1960 to over 1 million in 2015, in East Africa 1.5 million to about 4.4 million, and in the Sub-Saharan region from

less than 8 million to over 18.5 million for the same period. For all the three regions, it has almost tripled. The overall trend of Ethiopia’s international migrant stock, self-revealing in the above graph, mirrors more or less the general patterns of East Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. In order to show the significant level of immigration, an attempt has been made below to show the share of migrant stock in the total population.

Share of Migrants in the Total Population of Ethiopia, East Africa and SSA

The data on international migration reveals that the percentage share of international migrants has significantly increased in the developed regions of the world, while the situation in the Horn of Africa has proven to be the opposite. The average share of migrant stock as a percentage of the population in the East African countries¹, except Kenya, has shown an enormous decline from 6.78% in 1990 to 2.65% in 2010 despite some increase afterward.

Figure 2: Share of Migrants in the Total Population of Ethiopia & East African Countries



Source: World Bank, 2018.

As indicated in Figure 2 above, the average share of international migrants in East African countries is high compared to Sub-Saharan countries because of the small population size of countries such as Djibouti and Somalia, which in the 1990s were destinations for a large number of migrants from countries with larger demographic size like Ethiopia making the share

¹ The average value of 1990 is calculated for six countries, i.e. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia & Uganda; for 1995, 2000 & 2005, it is seven with the inclusion of Eritrea; and for 2010 & 2015, there are eight countries, with South Sudan coming in.

of migrants as high as 20% in Djibouti in 1990, which eventually declined but remained 12.65% in 2015.

Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda exhibited a similar pattern of general decline till 2010 and an increasing trend afterward that characterizes the sub-regional average. Yet, in some countries, like Eritrea, the share of international migrant stock as a percentage of the population has remained stable. Kenya, however, has shown an increase in the share of international migrant stock from 1.27% in 1990 to 2.36% in 2015 due to the country's stable political system and better economy which made it a migration destination in the Horn of Africa. This clearly confirms the overall regional and global dynamics of migration and development nexus. The high-income countries have seen an increase in the level of share of migrants' stock from 7.7% in 1990 that nearly doubled in 2015, or the OECD members from 6% to 10%, which contrasts the phenomenon in the low-income countries as the share of migrants dropped from 2.72% to 1.47%, or the HIPCs from 3.32% to 1.67%. According to the World Bank, it is well-developed regions such as North America and EU that have the highest shares of migrant stock (15% and 11% respectively in 2015), while regions such as SSA have the lowest share, less than 2% in 2015.

Migrant Stock in Ethiopia by Country of Origin

As far as Ethiopia is concerned, the four major sending countries are countries of East Africa namely: Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and recently South Sudan. Table 1 below presents the migrant stock of Ethiopia by country of origin across years (1990-2015).

Table 1: Migrant Stock in Ethiopia by Country of Origin

S.N.	Origin	Year					
		1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
1.	Djibouti	904	1,901	3,258	2,740	3,025	3,705
2.	Eritrea	69,681	34,949	6,843	5,756	6,354	206,030
3.	Somalia	616,940	459,615	389,419	327,545	361,609	442,910
4.	South Sudan	384,266	235,512	131,405	110,527	122,021	395,202
5.	Sudan	53,857	33,008	18,417	15,491	17,102	39,539
6.	Uganda	103	135	192	161	178	218
7.	Others	29,639	41,784	61,850	52,022	57,431	74,972
Total		1,155,390	806,904	611,384	514,242	567,720	1,162,576

Source: UNDESA, 2017.

Eritrea was a former Northern part of Ethiopia, until its secession after the referendum in 1992. From 1974 until 1991, Ethiopia was ruled by the Socialist military junta called '*Dergue*'. During this period, the Eritrean liberation fronts were in war with the army of the military

government. This period was generally characterized by mass internal migration due to the civil war. Over the last two decades that followed its independence, the Eritrean state has been a migrant-sending nation and the increase of outflow of people is not exceptional to Ethiopia only, rather a common phenomenon observed in other destinations as well. The repressive nature of the regime, economic retardation, and involvement in international conflicts (with Ethiopia, Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti) has contributed to the large and continuous outflow of people from the country. In the post-independence period, the outflow of migration has initially shown a relative decline, from 2010 when it started to rise dramatically as shown in the above Table 1.

The migration stock of Somalia in Ethiopia is considerably high across the years in reference. Since 1991, Somalia has been in a civil war (ICR, 2008). The civil war which began in 1988 in the northwest part of the country, the former British Protectorate of Somaliland, ultimately ousted President Mohamed Siad Barre and brought down the government. The rebel Somali National Movement (SNM) mounted attacks against the government which for its part staged land and air campaigns against towns throughout Somaliland, causing people to flee westward to Ethiopia and northward to Djibouti. By 1990, migration stock was over half a million. Hence, the migration has already started earlier in 1990 and the same is observed on the migration stock in Table 1 above. When there was relative peace in the subsequent years (2000 and 2010), there was a relative decline in the number of migrant stock. However, a civil war between the Federal Government of Somalia supported by the African Union and different militant groups like 'Al Shabaab' broke out again around 2010 which contributed to the relative increase of the stock. Although there is a general declining trend across the years under consideration, Ethiopia continued to receive a large number of migrants from Somalia which was less than half a million in 2017.

South Sudan is the second-largest source of immigrants in Ethiopia due to cultural and ethnic ties with the people by the Southwestern borderline of Ethiopia. After its independence in 2011, a civil war broke out in South Sudan, leading to a huge influx of migrants to Ethiopia. The amount of South Sudanese migrants in Ethiopia almost triples (241.87%) following independence and during the recent civil war.

The migratory link between Ethiopia and Sudan slightly declined with the end of the civil war in Ethiopia in the last decade of the 20th century but also because of the weakening political and diplomatic ties between the countries over the concern of terrorism. Besides, the migration


stock of Sudanese in Ethiopia is partly explained by the formal and informal trade links around the border with Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the factors that determined the migration linkage between the two are essentially political in nature.

International Migrant Stock of Ethiopia by Destination

Destination of Ethiopian Migrants by Continent

The overall outmigration of Ethiopians is not only directed to Africa but also other destinations mainly North America and Asia (particularly the Middle East). If it is seen country-wise, the major destinations of Ethiopian migrants are three: the USA, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. This makes clear the substantial relevance of inter-continental migratory systems than intra-continental migration as typically exemplified by the Indonesian case where the home continent, Asia, appears to be the major destination of its migrants with a significant increase from 1990 to 2013 (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3: Destination of Ethiopian Migrants by Continent



Source: UNDESA, 2017.

For various reasons, be it geographic, socio-economic, and political factors, the African continent used to be significant for Ethiopian migrants before 1990 but has over time lost its significance due to the shift of migration patterns to intercontinental which changed the Ethiopians' destination to be North America, Europe (Western) and Asia (especially the Middle East). Studies reveal that motives to flee have always changed over time. Fransen & Kuschminder (2009) argue that migrants initially fled for political reasons and to escape

conflicts. In later years, the motives of Ethiopian migrants to flee their country shifted to more economic motives (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009). As far as the general profile of the migrants is concerned, it has been found out that people migrating to the Global North are mostly from urban, well-educated and often with better income, while the uneducated and lower-income people tend to choose Africa and the Middle East and they are predominantly undocumented migrants (Kuschminder *et al.*, 2012).

Major Destination Countries for Ethiopian Emigrants

As alluded to, in the above discussion, the emigration of Ethiopians is mainly directed towards Global North and Asia, in general, and North America and the Middle East in particular. Seen in terms of specific countries, it appears that the USA, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are the three most important destinations of migrants originating from Ethiopia (see Table 2 below).

Table 2: Migrant Stock of Ethiopia by Country of Destination

S.N.	Destinations	Year					
		1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
1.	USA	34,805	52,866	71,296	109,858	152,798	210,917
2.	S. Arabia	61,017	62,534	64,252	79,371	102,910	131,493
3.	Israel	40,595	50,287	57,163	67,189	78,029	80,474
4.	Sudan	942,295	502,740	123,478	107,732	70,677	60,734
5.	Kenya	26,695	29,521	20,846	20,917	24,091	36,889
6.	Italy	16,703	11,136	5,569	17,983	30,396	30,401
7.	Canada	13,765	13,822	14,208	18,889	24,535	27,438
8.	Germany	19,612	17,204	14,795	15,936	16,835	17,541
9.	Sweden	9,356	11,103	11,907	11,221	13,100	16,246
10.	Somalia	460,000	18,044	555	1,142	1,882	13,079
11.	Others ²	62,674	51,233	59,857	70,850	108,309	128,029

Source: UNDESA, 2017.

The Ethiopian emigration to the USA has grown incredibly (by 526%) from less than 35,000 in 1990 to nearly 220,000 in 2017. The enacting of the 1965 Immigration Act, the Refugee Act of 1980, and the Diversity Visa Program of the Immigration Act of 1990, contributed to an increased inflow of migrants to the USA to which Ethiopians are not an exception. The Ethiopian migration was further enhanced by famine in 1985-86 and other unfavorable economic conditions, including political unrest and civil wars (Chacko, 2003). The majority of Ethiopian immigrants arrived later in the 1990s, following the change of government and the Ethio–Eritrean War. Immigration to the West, especially to the USA, from Ethiopia since 1991

²UK, Netherlands, S. Sudan, Djibouti, Australia, UAE, France, Norway, Yemen, Switzerland & S. Africa.

rose. Ethiopian Americans have since 1990 established ethnic enclaves in various places in the country, particularly in the Washington D.C, Los Angeles, and California which have also come to be known as “Little Ethiopia”, to describe an enclave of many Ethiopian businesses and restaurants, as well as a significant concentration of residents of Ethiopian and Eritrean ancestry (Ember, 1997). The key factor is, thus, social capital and the strong ethnic enclaves created in the USA. As of 2014, approximately 251,000 Ethiopian immigrants and their children live in the USA constituting United States’ second-largest African immigrant group next to Nigeria (MPI, 2014).

According to Portes & Borocz (1989), the condition of reception at the country of destination facilitates migration. In Washington D.C., ‘Amharic’, the widely spoken official language in Ethiopia, became one of the six non-English languages in the Language Access Act of 2004, which allows access to government services and education in Amharic for Ethiopians. This condition in the USA makes the migration and integration easier encouraging migration by reducing the risk and creating favorable conditions upon arrival in the USA. Apart from the above facts specific to Ethiopia, the USA is a core country that makes it a major destination for migrants from across the globe.

Saudi Arabia is a country that has exhibited the second-largest growth (143.7%), next to the USA, as a country of destination for Ethiopian migrants. Religion and religious pilgrimages have also played a significant role in contributing to the sustained migration from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia. While emigration to Arab countries from Ethiopia can be explained by the push-pull theories and also by the segmented labor market theory, it would be misleading to explain the Ethiopian emigration to the USA solely by one or two migration theories.

Although the official data reveals Ethiopian migrants in Saudi Arabia are less than 150,000, Transparency International’s estimation in 2017 reveals the figure is higher. Accordingly, 5% of the 10 million migrant workers in Saudi Arabia are Ethiopians. The primary motive behind migration is to move out of poverty, improve family life standards through remittances, and secure family business. Migration to Arab countries has intensified due to social networks, expansion of illegal agencies; and the relative fall of migration costs. There was also a shift of labor demand from Asian workers to African labor as Asian domestic workers tend to seek higher wages than the cheaper labor from countries like Ethiopia (Girmachew, 2017). An overwhelming majority of Ethiopians are domestic and farmworkers.

The third major destination of Ethiopian emigrants is Israel. Ethiopia has been home to black Jews. The Jews of Ethiopia had prayed for hundreds of years to return to the land of their forefathers (James, 1992). At the end of May 1991, plane after plane brought 14,310 Ethiopian Jews to Israel within a day and a half in an amazing airlift. The pictures that appeared over and over again on the world's television screens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews, dressed in white traditional costume with exquisite hand-woven embroidery, silently filing into the airplanes to fulfill the dream of their forefathers of immigrating to Zion, remains imprinted in collective memory and yet economic factors have also played a significant role in the continued pattern of migration to Israel.

The head of the military junta, Mengistu Hailemariam, who ruled Ethiopia from 1974-1991 under the socialist regime refused to let the "Falasha" leave Ethiopia when he was requested by the Israeli government. The Israeli government with cooperation from the USA government relocated members of the group in ten thousand from Ethiopia to Israel between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s (Mitchell, nd.). So, during the night, Ethiopian Jews were brought into Sudan, and from there they were airlifted out to Israel by the Mossad operation called 'Operation Solomon'. The high migration stock of Ethiopians in Sudan is, thus, partly attributable to this operation. Apart from this, however, the ruthless regime of Mengistu which killed many young Ethiopians during the "red terror" and the high poverty level of the country has forced many to migrate to the closest and safest places, in which case Sudan was one.

The migration link to Israel can be best explained by a combination of factors and the theory of cumulative causation as a link is established between the migrants who already reached the destination and the new batch aspiring to follow. There was a subsequent operation called 'Operation Moses' by Mossad in which many Ethiopian Jews were also airlifted at the time of the coup d'état that brought the current government to power. Even after that, there are still many remaining Ethiopian Jews who constantly strive to go to Israel. This was further facilitated by the link that was already created by the large Ethiopian Jews community created mainly by the two operations. Religious ties between the two have contributed a lot in further strengthening the migratory link between the two countries. Social capital also explains the sustained migration from Ethiopia to Israel.

Historically, it is Sudan that has been the top recipient of Ethiopian emigrants. It is evident in Table 2 above that Sudan was the most important neighboring state hosting hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian migrants towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, during the

bloody civil war in Ethiopia. However, the migratory link of Ethiopia with Sudan declined sharply with the end of the civil war in the last decade of the 20th century but also because of the weakening political and diplomatic ties between the countries over the concern of terrorism. Yet, the factors that determined the migration linkage between the two are essentially political. The emigration of Ethiopians towards Sudan declined tremendously from 942,295 in 1990 to 71,631 in 2017. From the 1990s onwards, Sudan was also in a continuous civil war which does not make it a migrant attracting destination. Hence, Sudan has become a less important destination for Ethiopians, unlike the past. In recent years, it was only internal push factors within Ethiopia that contributed to the outflow of Ethiopians to Sudan.

Kenya has been one of the top five destination countries mainly since 2000. It is also used as a transit country at which Ethiopian migrants generally spend 1-3 years before immigrating to the Western World. UNHCR's biggest refugee camp in East Africa found in Kenya has contributed to the outflow of Ethiopians to Kenya. Besides, it has to be mentioned that, in this region, the trans-national ethnic groups and communities like Somali (found on the borders of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya) and the Oromo (living on both sides of the Ethio-Kenyan border) make the movement of people to and from Ethiopia very easy by undermining the border. Hence, these borders are the easiest exit options for people fleeing from political persecution.


Similar to Sudan's condition mentioned above, the migration growth to Somalia has seen a substantial decline from less than half a million in 1990 to about 14,000 in 2017; hence by same token Somalia was not a favorable destination for Ethiopians as Somalia was in continuous civil war for the last three decades. Other destinations of Ethiopian emigrants including core immigrant-receiving countries are Germany, Italy, Canada, and Sweden.

International Migrant Stock of Ethiopia by Gender

According to studies, a host of factors have contributed to tremendous changes in numbers and roles of females in international migration flows. Today, women constitute nearly half of all international migrants (UNDESA, 2017; World Bank, 2018). Scholars agree that recent years have seen a "feminization of migration". The term "feminization of migration" is meant to describe a phenomenon of a significant rise in the share of females, sometimes a majority, in the total international migrant stock. Recently, female-specific forms of migration include the commercialization of domestic workers, trafficking of women in the sex industry, and the organization of women for marriage (Kuschminder *et al.*, 2012). While it is true that female

used to be viewed as “passive reactors to males’ migration decisions”, it is now apparent that they have become increasingly “active decision-makers” as labor migrants, particularly in such countries as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines where migration policies are gender-selective, women comprising 62-75% of migrant workers. The figure is only 45% of migrant workers in Asia overall (*Ibid.*). The female migrant stock increased in absolute numbers from over 200,000 in 2000 to nearly double in 2017 with a growth rate of 31.21% for 2010-2017, which is by far greater for the male counterpart considered for the same period. Below, an attempt is made to provide data on the distribution of the international migrant stock of Ethiopia by gender.

Figure 4: Distribution of Ethiopian Emigrants by Gender



Source: UNDESA, 2013, 2017.

The overall share of females in the total Ethiopian migrants has slightly declined from 1990-2000. However, it has steadily increased over the last two decades. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the absolute value of female migrants has considerably increased from 205,629 in 1990 to 373,946 in the year 2017 which is close to double. A significant increase has been observed in countries of the Global North, particularly in some European countries such as the UK, Switzerland, Greece, and France.

Table 3: Share of Female Ethiopian Emigrants in Destination Countries

S.N.	Destination	Year						
		1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
1.	Italy	77.9%	76.2%	71.4%	59.8%	57.7%	58.7%	58.6%
2.	Greece	44.7%	51.9%	63.2%	65.6%	68.0%	71.5%	71.9%
3.	France	60.7%	61.7%	62.6%	57.5%	63.9%	64.4%	64.6%
4.	Austria	58.6%	57.6%	56.8%	58.3%	59.4%	59.0%	59.2%
5.	Switzerland	49.4%	49.5%	49.4%	51.9%	58.1%	54.0%	54.0%
6.	UK	39.5%	50.4%	52.0%	54.5%	55.3%	56.0%	56.3%
7.	Canada	51.3%	51.6%	51.8%	51.9%	51.8%	51.8%	51.8%
8.	New Zealand	51.6%	51.9%	51.3%	51.4%	51.5%	51.6%	51.6%
9.	Israel	49.3%	50.1%	50.2%	50.2%	50.4%	50.6%	50.6%
10.	USA	46.8%	46.3%	46%	45.8%	46.4%	51.1%	51.1%
World		49.4%	48.6%	46.3%	45.8%	45.7%	46.9%	46.7%

Source: Own Computation Based on UNDESA Report, 2017.

A decline in the share of female migrants is only observed in the case of Italy while there is a steady increase in countries having huge Ethiopian migrant stock. On average, the share of female migrants in the above destination countries exceeded that of males across the years under consideration. This is an indication of the feminization of Ethiopian emigration. The reasons for the feminization of Ethiopian migration manifested in the increase of the number of female migrants in core destination countries can be explained by the rising incomes, education, better communication, and transport services which minimize the overall cost of migration (Williams, 2008) and hence, “migration hump” theory. This theory, based on historical and cross-country comparison, upholds that migration initially increases when economic growth and rising income levels enable countries to emerge from the status of a low-income country.³ This correlation between development and migration also applies to sub-Saharan Africa (Martin-Shields *et al.*, 2017). Since 1991, there is a growing recognition of the fact that the poorest countries are not the sending nations. People need resources to migrate, thus, initially developmental policies such as free trade and foreign direct investment enable people to migrate; however, in the long run, the same policies and additional remittances from diaspora empower countries to establish infrastructure to preserve their human capital and even instill return migration (Aggarwal, 2014).

Reports at sub-national levels indicate that the migration of women is further instigated by a high rate of female unemployment⁴ and lack of livelihood alternatives in their home country, the expectation of better pay in the country of destination, legalization of migration agents, and the resultant increase of brokers (Mohammed, 2016). This feminized feature can also be explained in terms of the integration into the global economy that provides a further context for women’s increased mobility due to structural demand of labor inherent in the destination countries which have high levels of manufacturing and service sectors and hence, world systems and segmented labor theories (Raharto, 2007).

It has to be underscored here that the feminization of migration is highly observed in the countries of the North than common destination countries for Ethiopians in the Middle East. Below is a table showing the percentage share of females in the selected destination of Middle East countries with a higher share of Ethiopian migrants’ stock. Contrary to the generally

³ According to migration hump theory, a decrease in international migration is anticipated only when the status of upper middle-income country is achieved (Martin-Shields *et al.*, 2017).

⁴ For instance, in 2012, urban female unemployment rate is 24% as opposed to 11.4 % of the urban male unemployment (Kuschminder *et al.*, 2012).

accepted perception about the number of female Ethiopian migrants in the Middle East, the data reveals that the average share of female migrants is lower than the average share of female computed for all destination countries, as shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Share of Female Ethiopian Emigrants in the Middle East Destinations

S.N.	Destination	Year						
		1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
1.	Egypt	59.9%	59.6%	59.2%	55.5%	57.7%	65.2%	68.6%
2.	Yemen	41.9%	41.9%	41.9%	37.3%	44.7%	46.9%	46.9%
3.	Libya	59.6%	53.3%	44.0%	36.1%	35.7%	36.2%	36.1%
4.	Kuwait	39.4%	36.3%	32.4%	34.0%	34.8%	39.6%	37.2%
5.	Saudi Arabia	33.5%	33.3%	33.2%	31.3%	29.9%	30.4%	31.2%
6.	Bahrain	28.6%	29.6%	30.9%	32.0%	32.6%	33.0%	32.9%
7.	UAE	28.8%	28.4%	28.4%	30.8%	29.9%	29.9%	29.9%
8.	Qatar	27.1%	25.4%	23.7%	26.1%	19.8%	18.5%	18.5%

Source: Own Computation Based on UNDESA Report, 2017.

The share of females in the international migration of Africa is increasing across years as shown in the table below. While some African countries like Kenya have exhibited more than 50% of female emigrants numerically exceeding male migrants, Ethiopian share has slightly increased from 2005 onwards and has become nearly equal to the African average (47%).

Table 5: Share of Female Emigrants of Ethiopia Compared to East African Countries

S.N.	Origin	Year						
		1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
1.	Djibouti	45.5%	43.9%	42.6%	47.2%	47.9%	48.5%	48.7%
2.	Eritrea	47.5%	49.4%	50.1%	48.9%	47.9%	47.9%	47.7%
3.	Ethiopia	49.4%	48.6%	46.3%	45.8%	45.7%	46.9%	46.7%
4.	Kenya	51.0%	51.6%	51.7%	52.2%	52.4%	52.6%	53.0%
5.	Somalia	47.1%	47.7%	48.6%	46.2%	46.9%	47.8%	47.9%
6.	South Sudan	48.2%	46.6%	44.5%	44.9%	47.4%	51.1%	51.7%
7.	Sudan	42.6%	43.2%	43.1%	44.7%	42.5%	45.1%	44.9%
8.	Uganda	49.3%	49.9%	50.8%	50.2%	51.8%	51.3%	51.4%
Africa Total		45.6%	45.9%	45.7%	45.2%	44.9%	46.1%	46.6%
World Total		49.2%	49.4%	49.3%	48.9%	48.4%	48.5%	48.4%

Source: Own Computation Based on UNDESA Report, 2017.


The Role of Ethiopia as a Source and Destination of Refugees in East Africa

Refugees are people who have humanitarian status and provided temporary protection in another country in accordance with UNHCR statute as well as other international conventions where asylum seekers are excluded (World Bank, 2018). As the number of refugees continues

to grow at an alarming rate in conflict-ridden regions such as the African Horn, it becomes crucial to have a look at the data of refugees to understand the regional dynamics and put the role of countries in the context of regional or sub-regional migration systems.

Historically, Ethiopia was one of the largest sources of migrants, mostly refugees, in Africa, escaping political conflict, famine, and persecution, often by their government (Adepoju, 2004). However, the movement of Ethiopian civilians substantially rose in the late 1960s and 1970s (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009). Literature shows that Ethiopia was dominant in refugee flows in the Horn of Africa too as it witnessed an increase from 55,000 in 1972 to over a million in 1982 (Adepoju, 2004; Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009). After the 1974 revolution, a large flow of refugees described by some as “a mass of fleeing individuals” aimed at quickly arriving at safer neighboring countries (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009). With the end of the cold war, which marked the overthrow of the *Dergue* socialist military regime and the end of the bloody civil war that ravaged the country for three decades, the share of Ethiopian refugees in the Horn of Africa sharply declined from 99% in 1982 to 45% in 1992 (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009).

Figure 5: Refugee Population of Selected East African States by Country of Origin




Source: World Bank, 2018.

Self-evident in Figure 5 above, the refugee population of Ethiopia continued to fall until the mid-1990s when it became a little above 100,000 (in 1995). After 2000, however, the magnitude of refugee population originating from Ethiopia has remained relatively stable even since 2010 when the sub-regional average of East Africa experienced a significant increase due to the rising number of refugees from Somalia (from 395,553 in 2005 to 112,3156 in 2015),

Eritrea (144,066 in 2005 to 459,390 in 2016), Sudan (387,288 in 2010 to 627,087 in 2015) and South Sudan (778,718 in 2015 to 1,436,667 in 2016). In 2016 alone, these four countries produced about 97% of the total refugees in eight East African countries. The state collapse and intensification of civil war in Somalia, repressive political regime in Eritrea, the conflict in the southern part of Sudan (until 2011) and in Darfur (Western) region, and the outbreak of civil war in the youngest nation of the world, *i.e.* South Sudan, are all the major factors that contributed to the huge influx of refugees in the region. Hence, this phenomenon in the region over the last five decades could be explained by the notion of the ‘context of origin’ is well-articulated by Portes & Borocz (1989).

In terms of destination, Sudan was the major recipient of refugees in East Africa until 2000 hosting more than one million refugees in 1990 but eventually declined as other nations such as Kenya and Uganda (more recently) rose since 2005 to replace the role that Sudan played in the last decade of 20th century.


Figure 6: Ethiopia as Destination of Refugees Compared to East African Countries



Source: World Bank, 2018.

Kenya’s share in the region has increased from less than 1% of the total refugees in 1990 to 45% in 2010; while Uganda’s share from about 6% in 1990 to 20% in 2010, and in 2016 assuming the first rank in East Africa with less than a million refugees that amounts to 33% of the total refugees in the region. Ethiopia, the second major recipient of refugees in the region, hosting 773,764 refugees in 1990, witnessed a constant decline till 2005 when it got closer to the average of East Africa nations.

Figure 7: Refugees of Ethiopian Origin and Destination Across Years



Source: World Bank, 2018.


Since 2016, Ethiopia finds itself in a situation of migration crisis hosting more nearly 800,000 asylum seekers, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea (BBC, 2017). With the recently proposed plan, for which some have regarded Ethiopia as a model to support poorer countries housing large numbers of migrants as it aims for creating jobs that are meant to offer employment rights to 30,000 refugees, the migration crisis is by no means coming to an end.

The Patterns of Net-migration of Ethiopia in the Regional and Continental Contexts

Considering the continental level net migration starting from 1950, Africa as a continent has consistently remained as net emigrant continent. The continent has been a source of migrants due to a bundle of reasons including drought, famine, flood, and arbitrary demarcation of boundaries which mainly resulted in conflicts, post decolonization accounting for the return of the colonization settlers and inter-guerrilla warfare, as well as a flight from recruitment into the military or guerrilla forces, *etc.* (Melegh, 2013). Except for the period between 1990 to 1995, the net migration rates remained more or less unchanged in the intervening time.

The same pattern is observed in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Africa sub-categories. The net migration rate of Africa was -0.5 in 1950 and it has not changed (significantly) over the years till 2015. From 1950 to 2015 on average the net migration rate of Africa was -0.6 for every 10,000 people in this continent during 1950-2015, 6 more had moved out by the end of every year on average (see Figure 8 below).

Figure 8: Net-migration Rates of Ethiopia, East Africa & Africa



Source: UNDESA, 2015.


In Eastern Africa, although the net migration rate picture as a whole remained unchanged, there were significant differences in rates across periods. More precisely, starting from the 1970s, there was a huge increase in the outflow of Eastern African people up until the mid-1980s. During this time, the sub-regions' average net migration was -1.0. The fact that net migration rates varied considerably across a certain period in Eastern Africa could partly be explained by the difficult history of the sub-region that is characterized by frequent conflict, coup d'état, riots, dictatorship, and war.

As Figure 8 (above) shows, Ethiopia has been a sending country with a negative net migration rate with a drastic increase in negative net migration that reached 12 persons per one thousand in the year between 1970 to 1985. In 1981, there were 1.74 million refugees and 2.4 million of the internally displaced persons in Africa were from Ethiopia which was in just six years after the Ethiopian Revolution (CIMADE, 1986). For the most part, Ethiopian political instability, starvation, and fear of persecution by their government forced them to flee from their country (Meron, 2015). But in later years, Ethiopian migrants flee from their country mainly as a result of economic motives (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2009), mobility which has been facilitated by the social capital established by earlier migrants. However, in 1980-1990, Ethiopian migrants repatriated from Sudan and Somalia accompanied by a high number of migrants from Somalia as a result of the Somali civil war (Bariagaber, 1999), which is depicted by the positive net migration in Figure 8 above.

Overall, Ethiopia with one of the lowest GDP per capita has always been on the negative side except in the period between 1985-95 which, according to Fransen & Kuschminder (2009), could be accounted for by immigrants from neighboring countries with political instability and civil wars and Ethiopian repatriation from Somalia. The GDP per capita of Ethiopia has declined in the 1980s, a time often referred to as the lost decade of Africa economically, from 227.8 USD in 1980 to 190USD in 1985 and then to 208 USD in 1989. The economic performance of the country was the worst of its kind compared to the economic conditions of other countries in the region, such as Kenya that exhibited an increase in their economic performance from 897 USD in 1981 to 923 USD in 1989 (World Bank, 2018).

For the same decade, the economic performance for SSA countries has undergone a decline from over 1400 USD in 1981 to 1245USD towards the end of the decade, while the world average is 6285 USD to 7172 USD in 1980& 1990 respectively. This period was a time when a huge outflow of people was reversed as between 1980-1985 and Ethiopia was a net immigrant nation thereafter until 1995. The net migration between 1985-1995 was positive while the country was in an internal crisis, and, it could rather be attributable to the high death rate due to famine and civil war within. The net migration rate of Ethiopia has reached 5.5 for 1990-1995. This period marked the coming of another new government, the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front. Since 1995, the political atmosphere was relatively “stable”; as a result, the net migration rate remained at an average rate of -0.15. In general, the decade covering 1990-2000 witnessed the return of migration, which led to a drop by three quarters in absolute terms – below is a figure describing the economic condition as indicated by GDP per capita of the country in comparative view with Kenya, the other regional migration hub, and Sub-Saharan Africa.


Figure 9: GDP Per Capita (in Const. 2010 USD) of Ethiopia, Kenya & SSA, 1990-2016



Source: World Bank, 2018.

The economic performance of Ethiopia and Kenya has experienced a similar pattern of increase for more than two and a half decades. The time from 2000 onwards is referred to as a time of economic boom for Ethiopia and was also a time of increased in outmigration.


Figure 10: GDP Growth Rate of Ethiopia in the Context of East Africa and SSA



Source: World Bank, 2018.

The growth of the economy was exceptionally high especially for Ethiopia in 1992-1998 and after 2002. Although the growth rate of emigrants of the country has shown an eventual decline over the last couple of years, 40.47% (for 2000-10), 20.8% (for 2010-15), and 6.32% (for 2015-17), it could be argued that it has generally increased to nearly double as it rose from 443,926 (in the year 2000) to 800,879 (in 2017) with the overall growth of 80.41%. It also appears that the male migrant stock increased from 238,297 (in 2000) to 426,933 (in 2017) with a growth of 26.10% during 2010-2017, while the female migrant stock increased from 205,629 (in 2000) to 373,946 (in 2017) with greater growth of 31.21% in 2010-2017.

Figure 11: Migrant Stock of Ethiopia as Origin and Destination (1990-2017)



Source: UNDESA, 2017.

The overall trend shows that Ethiopia is a destination country than a country of origin. In recent decades, Ethiopia has evolved into a regional migration hub in the Horn of Africa and is concurrently a country of origin, transit, and destination for large numbers of regular and irregular migrants.

Summary and Conclusion

In this paper, an attempt was made to provide the general profile of Ethiopian migration by paying equal attention to the inflow and outflow dimensions of the country's migration. In so doing, countries that have migratory links as sending and/or receiving are taken to analyze the dynamics of population mobility patterns in which Ethiopia is embedded. Gender dimension was also included to show gender differentials in international migration from and to Ethiopia. Results reveal that Ethiopia has been on sending and receiving ends of migration as a country which is in one of the conflict-ridden areas of the world. Along with this, the Horn of Africa is known for the turbulent mobility of people within the region and outside. Refugees and people who use Ethiopia as a transit account for the largest number of immigrants to the country.

For the last five decades, the international migrant stock of SSA, EA, and Ethiopia has always shown an increase. More or less, Ethiopia reflects the same pattern in international migrant stock as both East Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the average share of migrant stock as a percentage of the population in the East African countries has shown an enormous decline for some years while some experienced an increase or stable percentage. It is found out that the migrants moving to Ethiopia were mostly from the neighboring countries because of continuous conflict and political instability. The majority of Ethiopians migrate mainly to North America and Asia; particularly the USA and the Middle East which go beyond Africa even though African countries are used as a transit. The migration to the USA was the dominant one which is facilitated by factors like social capital and the strong ethnic enclaves created in the USA. Moreover, reception at the country of destination cannot be denied its encouragement to facilitate migration.

Besides religion and religious journeys, the economic factors were elaborated by neoclassical and segmented labor market theories that explain the sustained migration from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Middle East. The migration to Israel, apart from economic reasons, can be best elucidated by the cumulative causation theory, which was an attempt to bring the Ethiopian Israeli to their forefathers' land, which clearly resulted in a

continuous migration in which religious ties also played a great role. Besides this, the Ethiopians mainly migrated to the neighboring countries due to political reasons.

Feminization of migration has been the features of both international and Ethiopian migration which showed a shift in the motives from previous family reunification to labor migrants and female-specific forms of migration. The overall share of females in the total Ethiopian emigrants has slightly declined in some years to only show a steady increase over the last two decades. The recent increase in the number of female migrants in core destination countries of the Global North, Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand, can be explained by the rising incomes, level of education, and urban origin which enhanced their mobility. It could also be mainly attributable to the increase in the role of females as active decision-makers to migrate, which is an important feature of the feminization phenomenon (Kuschminder *et al.*, 2012). Feminization of migration is highly observed in the countries of the North than common destination countries for Ethiopians in the Middle East in contrary to the generally accepted perception.

Ethiopia, which was one of the dominant countries in refugee flows in the Horn of Africa as people were fleeing to escape political conflict, famine, and persecution experienced a sharp decline in its share of refugees in the Horn of Africa in the last three decades. The size of the refuge population originating from Ethiopia has remained relatively stable in recent years while the sub-regional average of East Africa experienced a significant increase due to the rising number of refugees. Contrarily, Sudan was the major recipient of refugees in East Africa until 2000 but eventually declined as the number of refugees in other nations such as Kenya and Uganda more recently rose.

In general, Africa as a continent has constantly remained as a net emigrant continent where Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Africa sub-categories experienced the same pattern with some significant alteration in the rates across time for the Eastern Africa sub-region. Ethiopia has also undergone a drastic increase in negative net migration for some period in the last 65 years. Ethiopians in recent years leave their country mainly due to economic motives as opposed to their previous reasons like political instability. In the final analysis, despite its negative net migration rates at the beginning of the 21st century due to high population growth rates, Ethiopia still continues to be a country of origin, transit, and destination for regular and irregular migrants as it is a regional migration hub in the Horn of Africa.

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The Role of Media in Social Development: The Case of South Radio and Television Agency, Bonga Branch in Decha Woreda, Southern Ethiopia

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Abstract

This study investigates the role of media in the social development of the community in South Radio and Television Agency Bonga Branch Radio (BBR) in Decha woreda, Kafa Zone, Southern Ethiopia. The study addresses the contribution of media in changing the audience's knowledge, attitude, and practices in the community's social activities. To address the objectives, the researcher applied mixed research approaches and descriptive design. Both primary and secondary data were used in the study and analyzed through qualitative and quantitative methods. The data were collected through questionnaires, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions. To determine the sample size for the study, a multi-stage sampling technique was employed. Three Kebeles were selected purposively and 106 respondents participated in the study. The findings show that Bonga branch radio station is contributing to social development through influencing the behavior (attitude, knowledge, and practice) of the community. The study also reveals that the acceptance of the role of radio in the community is high since it transmits its different programs and news content in the ethnic language of the community in which the members can easily understand. Even though the media is playing its role in the community's social development, different challenges have been observed in the branch radio station. Based on the finding, recommendation has been forwarded that the local government bodies should change their outlook towards the media organization. The media management should take the improving measures, such as the journalists and technician capacity building, the transmission coverage of the radio station, and revision of the news and program content format that will enable the media to meet the satisfaction of the audience.

Keywords: *Bonga, Ethnic Language, Media, Radio Broadcast, Social Development*

Introduction

The role of media in development lies in their capacity and capability to teach, manipulate, sensitize, and mobilize people through information dissemination. The media also chart a course for the public in line with the agenda-setting theory, thereby creating in the minds of the people, issues that should be viewed as a priority, including development programs. The media lead to the formation of behavioral change through establishing values for the society or nation and thereby building a climate of change in the society or nation. This involves the dissemination of news and information in response to a basic human need, which is the "right to know" (Lang, 2001, p.171). Better-informed citizens are more empowered, which in turn encourages politicians to be responsive. Besides, media provide mechanisms for feedback from the citizens on matters that affect them. Community participation in a development activity

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with full knowledge of its purpose will allow the community members to grow individually and as a community (Park, 2014, p.39).

For development to be just and sustainable, citizens must productively participate in the decisions that shape their lives. Participation requires an informed citizenry. A free and independent media supply timely and relevant information to citizens allowing them to change their behavior and to demand higher social standards for society. Access to information helps citizens hold their governments accountable by providing easy access to information to users of public services; the media empower citizens to demand quality and accountability from their governments (Lang, 2001, p. 99).

Media catalyze positive changes in society by providing information that influences public opinion. Media lead to an increase in awareness, and they change the behavior across social issues. Numerous studies over the last 40 years from around the world have provided evidence of the catalytic role played by the media in providing information that influences public opinion leading to social change. The impacts can be seen across social issues such as education, public health (including maternal health and child behavior), and climate change. Well-executed media campaigns reach audiences *via* a medium they pay attention to, leading to increased knowledge and changes in behavior. If information access is linked positively with the target population there will be a probability of higher participation and awareness creation for environmental degradation (levels of literacy, information access, and equality, *etc.*) (Lang, 2001, p.101).

The establishment of media especially radio in Ethiopia started during the imperial period. As an information source of local and national events, the Ethiopian national radio serves the people, and the establishment of the radio station in *Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region* (SNNPR) is a recent phenomenon. To serve the SNNPR, the first radio station FM 100.2 opened in 1998 (Ethiopian Calendar) at the regional level. Currently, different radio stations with a variety of ethnic languages are serving through educating, entertaining, and informing the people of the region. South Radio and Television Agency is a media that belongs to the public with ten branches around the region and Bonga branch is one of the local media which is serving the study area's community in their ethnic language (SRTA, 2016).

As far as the impact of media on the development is concerned, different studies have been conducted (Serawit, 2017; Tadese, 2017; Mesfin, 2014), and most of them have attempted to emphasize the assessment of radio and developmental journalism. However, no study was

conducted on the role of this branch radio station on the community's social development since the broadcasting of this media through the ethnic language is a recent phenomenon. Besides, there are complaints from different sources on the media specifically, those which cover their transmission in the ethnic language in the society established by the government for propagating purposes. The conceptions are also that the branch media serves the local government machinery than the community. Hence, it was argued that there was an immense need to study the branch media broadcasting in the ethnic language especially the radio to analyze its actual impacts on people's access and dissemination of information in the community. So, this gap initiates the researcher to study the issue to analyze the role of Bonga branch radio on the social development of the community.

Therefore, this article is intended to assess the role of Bonga branch radio station in the social development of the community in influencing the attitude, knowledge, and practice through the information of the social content programs that it transmits in the community's ethnic language. Based on this, the specific objectives are: (i) analyzing the social content programs of Bonga branch radio transmission in the community's ethnic language, (ii) examining the contribution of the social content of radio programs in the community's behavioral (knowledge, attitude, and practice) change, and (iii) assessing the challenges of the branch radio station while serving the community.

Review of Literature

The Definitions of Basic Concepts

The Concept of 'Development'

Though the term development usually refers to economic progress, it can apply to political, social, and technological progress as well. These various sectors are so intertwined that it is difficult to separate them. It can be broadly defined in a manner applicable to all societies at all historical periods as an upward ascending movement featuring greater levels of energy, efficiency, quality, productivity, complexity, comprehension, creativity, mastery, enjoyment, and accomplishment. Development is governed by many factors that influence the results of developmental efforts. There must be a motive that drives the change and essential preconditions for that change to occur. The motive must be powerful enough to overcome obstructions that impede that change from occurring. Development also requires resources such as capital, technology, and supporting infrastructure (World Bank, 2013).

Development is the result of society's capacity to organize human energies and productive resources to meet challenges and opportunities. Society passes through well-defined stages in the course of its development. There are nomadic hunting and gathering, rural-agrarian, urban, commercial, industrial, and post-industrial societies. Pioneers introduce new ideas, practices, and habits that conservative elements initially resist. At a later stage, innovations are accepted, imitated, organized, and used by other members of the community (*Ibid.*). Organizational improvements introduced to support the innovations can take place simultaneously at four different levels: physical, social, mental, and psychological. Moreover, four different types of resources are involved in promoting development. Of these four, physical resources are most visible, but least capable of expansion. The productivity of resources increases enormously as the quality of organization and level of knowledge inputs rise. Developmental pace and scope vary according to the stage the society is in. The three main stages are physical, vital (vital refers to the dynamic and numerous social energies of humanity that propel individuals to accomplish), and mental (Servaes, 2008, p.38).

Today, mental resources are the primary determinants of development. Where people drove a simple bullock cart, they now design ships and aircraft that carry huge loads across immense distances. Humanity has tamed rivers, cleared jungles, and even turned arid desert lands into cultivable through irrigation. By using intelligence, society has turned sand into powerful silicon chips that carry huge amounts of information and form the basis of computers. Since there is no inherent limit to the expansion of mental resources, the notion of limits to growth cannot be ultimately binding (*Ibid*, p.41).

The Notion of 'Social Development'

Social development or social change is the phrase that refers to the alteration of social order within a society. It may also refer to the notion of socio-cultural evolution or 'social progress'. This is the philosophical idea that society always moves forward by dialectical or evolutionary means. It is about an attempt to qualitative changes in the structure and framework of society that helps to better realize its aims and objectives (Servas, 2008, p.46). Social development could, thus, be regarded as a process of social change, not merely a set of policies and programs instituted for some specific results. This process has been going on since the dawn of history. But during the last five centuries, it has picked up in speed and intensity and has witnessed a marked surge in acceleration. The basic mechanism driving social change is increasing awareness leading to better organization. Life evolves by consciousness and consciousness in

turn progresses by the organization. When society senses new and better opportunities for progress, it develops new forms of organization to exploit these new openings successfully. The new forms of organization are better able to harness the available social energies and skills and resources to use the opportunities to get the intended results (*Ibid.*).

The Media

The media has been variously defined by scholars of mass communication among which one of the commonly accepted definitions is that it is referred to as a collective means of communication by which the general public or populace is kept informed about the day to day happenings in the society. It is also said to be an aggregation of all communication channels that use techniques of making a lot of direct personal communication between the communicator and the public. While talking of mass media, however, the word “mass” means a large number of people or a collection, and “media” means organs or channels. Hence, mass media is a collection of organs of communication and information dissemination that reaches out to a large number of people. The information circulation is not only confined within members of the public but the media also serves to coordinate the information flow between government and the public and vice versa. More importantly, the media is also referred to, as “the fourth realm of the state”, *i.e.* the fourth pillar in support of the essential tripod of government; the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary (Catalan, 2011, p. 198).

Mass media is any media that is intended for a large audience. It either takes broadcast or print media forms. Broadcast form of Media is also referred to as electronic media and is peculiar to radio and television technology. Print media, on the other hand, operates in the form of newspapers, magazines, journals, and other print materials. The *internet* is the most recent form of mass media. Mass media has become a huge industry in the world market on which many people around the world rely on information, news, and entertainment (*Ibid.*).

The Role of Media in Development

Development refers to a change process geared at improving or making better, the life and environment of man. Seers (1985), cited by Subba (2017), posited that development involves the creation of opportunities for the realization of human potentialities. The media comes in the development process through what is called “development communication”. This is the type of communication that is consciously packaged by the sender such that the message content or the information sent could persuade, encourage or convince the receiver or target audience to adopt an attitude and participate in actualizing a development plan or goal. In

certain instances, the message sent aims at making the target audience adopt a positive attitudinal change towards development (Park, 2014).

The influence of mass media on human behavior has been a subject of research over the last 50 years. Over time, the sociological capability of media has gone beyond the primary cardinal functions of information, education, and entertainment. The role of mass media has assumed the creation of the environment for solving socio-cultural, socio-economic, and socio-political issues that have provided fertile grounds for the debate on media use (*Ibid.*). In fact, the media is described as performing three functions or roles of information, education, and entertainment. These are the conventional social functions the media render to the public, but which is equally applicable in a broader sense in national development pursuit. It could be said that through educating, informing, and entertaining, the media thereby makes the society, and its members, or the nation as well as the leadership of the very society, aware of the importance and need to undertake certain processes of national development. Also attached to these three basic roles of media is another role of persuasion, where media is seen as virile tools of applying persuasive efforts to influence people's actions towards a particular direction. The mass media are, therefore, seen for their role in furnishing the public with the necessary information to achieve development or change goals (Chowdhury, 2004, p.28).


Radio and Community Development

Through its information and awareness dissemination capability, radio has demonstrated excellent efficiency in mobilizing and empowering community members towards their civil duties. In certain quarters, radio has been used as a tool for giving voice to the isolated and marginalized groups as well as bringing their needs and aspirations to the notice of the government. In many countries, community radio has become an integral part of national development (Peter, 2004).

Moreover, the development of frequency modulation (FM) transmitting technology has given radio an edge over other forms such as TV and the internet. With more effective audience coverage, radio is capable of meeting the socio-economic and socio-cultural needs of its audience. Hence, this unique feature has made radio more useful in grass root development. Through its widespread coverage, radio has contributed much more effectively to both rural and urban development. The potential impact of radio includes but is not limited to helping to identify the community's needs and interests. This helps development workers to design an appropriate need assessment plan and to come up with the right approach and strategy for

effective socio-economic intervention. Over the years, radio has served as the most trusted agent of change. It has played a very vital role in building vibrant communities, and sensitizing group action (Peter, 2004). In general, independent media improves the social and economic status of the people by providing quality information with which they make sound decisions in everyday life. Among different types of mass media, radio has become the medium of choice as it is less expensive and more accessible for the community (David, 2004, p.169).

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



Source: Own Sketch, 2019.

Materials and Methods

The study employed a mixed research approach with a descriptive design. The quantitative method was used to measure the information which applied to quantity/numerical information collected through a questionnaire. The qualitative research method was employed to analyze, narrate, and discuss the qualitative information, which was collected through key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Accordingly, the analysis of the data result was done by using both the explanatory and statistical methods. To do so, the study has relied on primary and secondary data. While secondary data were gathered by reviewing relevant documents, journal articles, books, and internet sources, primary data were collected using questionnaires, key informants interview, and focus group discussions.

As mentioned above, the study is meant to assess the role of the South Radio and Television

Agency in the social development of the community, specifically Bonga branch radio broadcasting in ethnic languages in *Decha woreda* of Kafa Zone, SNNPR. *Decha woreda*, found in Kafa Zone of SNNPR at about 467 km to the south-west of Addis Ababa, was selected purposively because it accommodates three indigenous ethnic people called Kafa, Chara, and Na’o. These ethnic languages are among the five ethnic languages broadcasting in the branch radio station. Unlike other *woredas*, this *woreda* is very wide and divided into one municipal town and 57 rural *kebeles* (ZCTO, 2016) out of which 3 were selected for the purpose of this study. However, to ensure the representativeness of the sample respondents, the researcher applied a systematic random sampling. In so doing, Yamane (1967) formula [$n=N/1+N(\alpha)^2$] was employed to determine the sample size at a 91% level of confidence (where ‘n’ is the required sample size, ‘N’ represents the total household population, and $\alpha=0.09$ is the margin of error). There are 775 households in three *Kebeles* and out of which 298 households are in *Erimo*, 251 in *Oggeya*, and 226 in *Shashi Kebeles*. By using the indicated formula and then distributing the same proportionally, a total sample of 106 households constituted the sample size.

Table 1: Summary of the Sample Size Distribution

S.N.	Sample <i>Kebeles</i>	Total Population (N)	Sample Size (n)
1	Erimo(K1)	298	41
2	Oggeya(K2)	251	34
3	Shashi(K3)	226	31
	Total	775	106

Source: Own Computation, 2019.

The key informant interview of semi-structured nature was also employed to collect relevant information from eight members of the selected branch radio station. The key informants included: one manager, two case managers (program and news archive), two editors (program and news archive), and three journalists (one from each of three ethnic language department). Besides, three key informants from public institutions (one from each - Health, Education, Women Affairs) and one from NGO (Action Aid Ethiopia) making the total key informants twelve.

Moreover, 5 FGDs were undertaken, each group consisting of ten discussants selected randomly out of the radio listening groups created by both Action Aid Ethiopia and the branch radio station in the study area. The group members were heterogynous as they comprised of different sex, age, and ethnic background. This instrument also helped the researcher to triangulate the data generated through the individual respondent.

Results and Discussion

This section will address the social content programs of Bonga branch radio station which is transmitting its programs in the ethnic languages and analysis will be made in line with the objectives of the study by covering the formats of the programs followed by discussions and interpretations.

Health Program

Among different social issues, health issues are the most important ones in any society. To develop either socially or individually, one should stay healthy; otherwise, individual development will remain meaningless. A healthy population can contribute a lot to its wellbeing and social development. Concerning this, the media shoulders responsibility in helping the community to live a healthy life. According to Lang (2001, p.8), media broadcasting should provide a means for the solution of more serious problems of social life. Radio personnel should develop methods of communicating with their audiences on issues of urgent or general concern related to health. According to the household respondents and key informants, concerning the above-noted issues, Bonga branch radio is working closely with different governmental and non-governmental organizations that are working on health-related issues in the community. Specifically, the *Kafinoonoo* language program of BBR has a program called '*NOO'TWOO*' that transmits every Wednesday from 8:07 pm-8:19 pm and every Tuesday from 7:10 am-7:22 am. In *Na'o* language the program is called '*PAYKIN*' and in the *Chara* language, it is called '*HATSA*' which can be translated in English as 'our health'. The program broadcasts every Tuesday from 9:34 am-9:46 am in *Na'o* language and in the case of *Chara*, every Friday from 9:30 am-9:40 am. The data in Table 2 below show the response of the household respondents about the branch radio station role in the community's health and related issues.

Table 2: Household Responses on Health Program

The Role of Radio Station in Health Issues	Programs Broadcasted									
	HP		EP		WP		CP		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Social program more interesting and influencing listeners attitude	30	28.3	19	17.9	26	24.5	31	29.2	106	100
Social program more interesting and influencing the audience's knowledge	29	27.3	20	18.8	27	25.4	30	28.3	106	100

HP= Health program, EP=Education program, WP=Women program, CP=Culture program

Source: Own Survey, 2019.

As summarized in Table 2 above, for the question raised to the household respondents, “Among the social content programs of the radio, which program is more interesting and influencing the listeners' attitude?”, 30(28.3%) replied that as audiences of Bonga branch radio, the health program is interesting and influencing their attitude. Another question raised by the researcher as to “which type of the radio program is more interesting and influencing the knowledge as an audience?” 29(27.3%) of the respondents agreed that the health program of Bonga branch radio is more interesting and influencing their knowledge.

To sum up about the reaction of the household respondents in Table 2 above, out of the total household respondents who have been asked by the researcher, 59(55.66%) of them answered that, among the social content programs of the radio station, the health program transmitted in the ethnic language is more interesting and influencing their attitude and knowledge.

In this program, different role models in different health issues like family planning, service delivery in health institutions, environmental sanitation, etc. who have received recognition along with their name and fame have been called by BBR to talk and to discuss on the issue and their achievements so that others can learn from their experience. Also different health-related issues like the service delivery of hospitals and health centers, epidemic breaking, etc. are covered through this program. To this, one of the study participants explained in her words:

I like the health program of the branch radio. I especially like the way people with health-related experience narrate their stories, which motivate others to follow and to succeed like them. I have been informed about how to care about the sanitation of our environment and my family's health focusing on preventive mechanisms. In addition to this, I understand the benefit of using family planning programs and delivery care services at the health center. My family members got information about the health-related issues from the health program of the BBR. This is because we are a regular listener to the radio program which transmits all its programs in the language we understand.

The key informants from the media reveal that when the journalists of the branch radio traveled to the communities to collect data to prepare programs and news, the community informed them about the benefit of changing the behavior because of the health program of BBR. This is due to transmitting the information while interviewing experts who are regarded as role models in domestic and environmental sanitation activities. Most of the participants of FGD indicated that the listeners have been given chance to share their experience and practice in their day-to-day activities to further motivate other listeners of the community.

The use of radio has been tested in various community development projects. According to Mark & Warnock (2007), radio is the most viable medium for community development

intervention. Radio, he argues, is more accessible and cost-effective than other forms of media. One of the advantages of radio over most other forms of media is its ability to communicate more effectively to an audience without a barrier in distance, level of literacy, or language diversity. From the above household response, key informant interview, and the focus group conversation, it can be concluded that the branch radio station's health program is contributing to influencing the audience's attitude and behavior. It can be observed from the data that health-related information from the media by their native language has the power in bringing change in the community.

Educational Program

Education is an important cure for ignorance and poverty. Educated citizens contribute much to a given society. Empowering community members through education and training is the central part to fight illiteracy in the community. Encouraging youths and children to give due attention to their academic development is the important role the media should play. According to the program format of the BBR, there is a program that is related to educational activities. The program is called '*DOOYOO*', in *Kafinoonoo*, and the program is aired every Tuesday from 7:55 am-8:15 am and every Friday from 7:50 pm-8:05 pm.

Similarly, the *Na'o* language program of the radio has a program called '*XUSU*' which can be translated as an "educational program". The program is aired every Saturday from 10:32 am-10:42 am. It is aimed at transmitting different educational issues that can encourage children and youth to attend their education properly. It also informs the community to give due attention to educational matters.

The data by the individual household respondents in Table 3 below shows responses given to the questions raised by the researcher as "In which educational activities the branch radio's educational program is contributing?" According to the response of 32(30.2%) of the household, it is contributing to increasing educational quality. Yet, for 47(44.3%) of the respondents, it is contributing to minimizing school drop-out, and for the remaining 27(25.4%), it improves students' performance.

Table 3: Household Response on Educational Program

The Role of Radio Station in Education	Indicators	Frequency	Percent
The branch's contribution to education	Increasing educational quality	32	30.2
	Minimizing school dropout	47	44.3
	Improving student's performance	27	25.5
		106	100
The social content of programs that influences listeners' attitude	Education program	19	17.9
	Health program	30	28.3
	Women program	26	24.5
	Culture program	31	29.3
	106	100	
The social content of program that influences the listeners' knowledge	Education program	20	18.9
	Health program	29	27.3
	Women program	27	25.5
	Culture program	30	28.3
	106	100	

Source: Own Survey, 2019.

Among the social content programs transmitted in Bonga branch radio station, the question “which type of social program of the radio is more interesting and influencing the audience’s attitude?” is raised to the respondents. The reaction to the question implies that for 19(17.9%) of household respondents, the educational program of BBR is interesting and influencing their attitude. However, for the question raised as “what type of radio program is more interesting and influencing their knowledge?”, 20(18.8%) of the household respondents agreed that among the social content programs of the radio station, the educational program is more interesting and influencing their knowledge.

To generalize the household’s reaction related to the raised issue in Table 3 above, it has been confirmed by all 106(100%) of the household respondents that the educational program transmitted in the radio station is contributing to increasing educational quality, in minimizing school drop-out and improving students’ performance. In addition to this, 39(36.7%) of the household respondents believed that this social content program (education) is contributing to changing the community’s behavior by influencing their attitude and knowledge as can be observed in Table 3 above. Based on the above explanation of the household respondents, one of the radio journalists who participated in the individual in-depth interview comments:

The media is striving to bring down the rate of illiteracy which is a serious factor for poverty and backwardness. The branch radio station prepares and transmits programs in ethnic languages that inform the community members about the importance of

sending their children to school and helping them to motivate. Also, the media teaches youths and children by emphasizing the advantages of attending school actively and regularly. This is because the issue of education is a serious concern for community development.

As mentioned by focus group discussants, when the local government bodies move to the communities to mobilize about the educational issues like school-dropout, student's ethics, student's participation in education, and related activities, they found that the communities were aware of their agenda. This is due to the information given by the radio station. This shows that the media is effectively mobilizing the community on its developmental agenda.

The above illustration of the household, key informant interview, and focus group discussion presents the evidence which enables the conclusion that media play a critical role in improving governance and community integration, increasing communication efficiency and stability, and creating positive social and environmental change. Hence, the media provide information to actors throughout society allowing them to participate in the decisions and debates that shape their lives. It also plays an important monitoring role in democratic participation that enables citizens to hold their government's officials to be accountable in leading to better policies and service implementation. This is also evidenced by the data presented above; the branch radio is playing its role in changing the community's behavior.

Women's Program

Among the world population, the majority of the poor are women and most of them are illiterate. This is also true in Ethiopia that all social activities were male-dominated; females were neglected economically, politically, and socially. However, due attention has been given to gender equality although the practice still faces challenges. According to Mocria *et al.* (2003), when women are supported and empowered, all of the society at large benefits because they are the burden carriers of the family in the community's day-to-day activities. Empowering women is very important to make them bring change to social stability. Radio plays a role in ensuring gender equality by producing awareness-raising programs and empowering them to be a role player in the development of a given community. In this regard, BBR is producing programs for women. Among the programs, "KUPHEBOT MACHENA'OT" translated as 'women's program' is aired every Thursday from 7:55 am-8:10 am and every Wednesday from 8:20 pm-8:35 pm. The objective of the program is to enable females to engage in social and economic activities that can help them to lead their lives and their families and to be active citizens.

Table 4: Household Response on Women Program

The Contribution of the Radio Station to Women Issues	Indicators	Frequency	Percent
Effective social activities of the GO's and NGO's due to the radio station	Women Empowerment	32	30.2
	Educational Improvement	17	16.1
	Health Improvement	22	20.7
	Cultural Development	35	33
		106	100
The branch radio station contribution to women empowerment	Income Generating	31	29.2
	Decision Making	29	27.4
	Participating in Public Issues	25	23.6
	Land ownership	21	19.8
		106	100

Source: Own Survey, 2019.

According to the data in Table 4 above, the question raised as “Because of BBR, which effective social activities of both the governmental and non-governmental organizations are observed in the community?” Out of the total respondents, about 32(30.2%) answered that the women empowerment related activities improved due to the branch radio contribution. In addition to this, for the questions raised as “In which issues the branch radio's women's program is contributing about the women empowerment?”, 31(29.2%) replied that the program contributes to generating the income of women. On the other hand, 29(27%) of the respondents reported that it contributes to empowering the women to be decision-makers, and 25(23.6%) indicated that it contributes to empowering the women to participate in public issues. Finally, out of the total household respondents, 21(19.8%) responded that it empowers them in offering an opportunity of women’s land ownership on their own.

The aggregate result of the data in Table 4 above shows that, among the social content programs of the branch radio station, the women empowerment program is contributing to women’s development. This is evidenced in the household respondent’s reaction indicated above, in which totally, all of 106(100%) respondents’ response assures the contribution of the radio’s program that focuses on women empowerment activities such as; generating their income, empowering them as a decision-maker on their issue, participating in public issues, and land ownership.

In the women program on the radio, the program producers invite successful women to share their experience of success to the audience. The audiences are given opportunities to ask different questions related to the issue and the secrets behind these successful women. From the shared experiences and offered pieces of advice, the audiences would get a chance to draw

lessons that may help to improve their own lives. The above explanation can be supported by the narration of the focus group discussion participant below:

As an audience of the Bonga branch radio, I have learned a lot from the program. I like listening to the women's empowerment program. This is because the program allows listening to other women's secrets of success. Based on the information from the radio, women in the community are involving in the activities that enable them to improve their domestic life. As an example, women in the community form a group with the neighbors and offered land from the kebele to cultivate vegetables. Earlier, they were not well informed in engaging and making income from such kind of activities. After they have listened to other's experiences from the Bonga branch radio station women program, the women were motivated and benefited from the information.

According to the participants, the outputs of the local radio are also bringing behavioral change in minimizing domestic violence and mistreatment against the women. They explained that the radio under the study is producing valuable awareness creation programs on gender equality, and the community is responding well to the issues. In general, as explained above, both the household respondents and focus group discussion participants agreed that BBR is discharging its responsibility in bringing positive changes in the women's development.

Cultural Program

Due to globalization, which refers to the socio-cultural process of influence, *i.e.*, bringing people in the contemporary world closer and closer, despite geo-linguistic barriers, the indigenous culture of the developing countries like Ethiopia is becoming affected by the powerful western cultures. To protect this cultural domination, the role of community radio is worthy to mention. The promotion of local culture and language is the major area where the media can bring change. Culture lies at the basis of a society's existence, and it is the center of their everyday activities. In protecting indigenous culture from western cultural influence, radio plays a great role in articulating their stories, music, festivity, etc.

All BBR transmitting languages have programs that promote the culture and the language of the community. The program is aimed at promoting the local culture, values, and language of the local community. The *Kafinoonoo* language program of the radio under the study has a program called '*NOOQOCO*', which means 'our culture'. This program is aired every Monday from 8:30 pm-8:45 pm and every Tuesday from 7:55 pm-8:25 pm.

Similarly, in *Na'o* and *Chara* languages, there is also a program called '*BAHILA*' which can be translated as 'culture'. The program is aired every Saturday from 10:43 am-10:53 am in *Na'o* language and every Wednesday from 9:15 am-9:30 am in *Chara* language. In the program, the

producer invites guests in the studio who are culturally well versed in the community. These guests explain various local communities’ cultures in a well-articulated and attractive manner for the audiences. In addition to this, the program introduces the audience to various cultural sites found in all *woredas* of Kafa and Sheka zones. Through listening to this program, the audience can easily know different tourist sites and cultural areas found in towns, rural areas, etc.

According to one key informant who belongs to the *Na'o* ethnic group, the radio station is striving to promote the valuable cultural elements of the community and to prevent harmful traditional practices. Including him, nobody expects that their language could be a media language. This is because they knew from their grandparent’s perception that ‘if somebody speaks through the radio, the language can break the radio.’ But in reality, the language does not break the radio; rather, it enables them to listen and share both their own and others’ culture, lifestyle, and current situation of their country and their environment without any interpretation by the other.

Table 5: Household Responses on Cultural Program

The Role of Radio Station in Cultural Issues	S.A.		Agree		Undecided		D.A.		S.D.A.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
The broadcasting of the branch radio in ethnic language helped for the cultural development of the community	43	40.5	50	47.2	8	7.5	5	4.8	-	-	106	100
The branch radio has impact on community’s cultural transformation	29	27.3	53	50	14	13.2	10	9.5	-	-	106	100

S.A.=Strongly Agree; D.A.= Disagree; S.D.A.= Strongly Disagree

Source: Own Survey, 2019.

As depicted in Table 5 above, there is an item which says “the broadcasting of the branch radio in the ethnic language is contributing to the cultural development of the study area’s community”. According to the responses to this item, about 43(40.5%) of the household respondents strongly agreed and 50(47.2%) agreed that the branch radio’s ‘culture program’ is contributing to the community’s cultural development. Hence, the household respondent's response of about 93 (87.7%) shows that the cultural program of Bonga branch radio station in the ethnic languages is contributing to the community’s cultural development.

The culture program brought cultural transformation for the community. Different cultures which had been forgotten by the community were told by the elders on the radio, the new

generation is being acquainted with knowledge about their own culture and it is an opportunity. According to this, among BBR transmitting languages, one ethnic language journalist informed:

As a journalist at the branch radio station, when the radio program started with the ethnic language, there was no so much music played in the same ethnic language. But today, a lot of the community's ethnic language singers emerged and the communities are listening to the songs not only in audio but they are also watching their music and related culture through video clips.

In supporting the above expression, the focus group participants generalized that the radio station has played a great role in the cultural change in the community. The community's attitudes have been changed in combating harmful traditional practices like women's genital mutilation, abduction, traditional midwifery, etc. Besides, before the radio program transmission started in ethnic languages, the only option to get information was through the national radio station. The national radio program's transmission language is Amharic and those who did not listen to Amharic have no opportunity to get information. If one wants to know about what the radio is talking about, it was possible only through interpretation or translation by others and this is the recent phenomenon they knew in their life.

While giving the central importance to the information from media transmitted in a local/vernacular language, the report affirms that it plays a significant role in sustainable social development (Park, 2014). The report further highlighted how information empowers people to determine their development path. "At its heart, development – if it is to be sustainable – must be a process that allows people to be their agents of change: to act individually and collectively, using their ingenuity and accessing ideas, practices, and knowledge in the search for ways to fulfill their potential." The only way to make development sustainable is to increase the level of participation and to create a situation based on their culture, language, and shared experience. From the above data, it can be concluded that the cultural program of BBR is informing and creating awareness in the community, such as in combating harmful traditional practices which affect the social life. On the other hand, it is promoting the culture of the communities; hence, leading to cultural development.

The Challenges of Bonga Branch Radio Station

While doing any activity to achieve a given organization's objective, different challenges may occur in different directions either internally or externally. During such a situation, the actions taken by the organizations depend on their structure and the culture of their management. The

actions taken to overcome the challenges within the organization may even vary from one management to another. As discussed in detail, under each social content program of the radio station, the branch radio station is striving to serve the community. While doing this activity, the branch radio station is facing different challenges. Among those challenges, as it has been explained by the branch radio station manager; the branch radio station is not serving the whole community of two zones of Kafa and Sheka because the transmission coverage of the radio station needs the new and specialized satellite receiver in each area. It requires a greater amount of investment for infrastructure and purchasing the materials. The key informant also indicated the non-availability of the materials in the domestic market. The materials need to be imported and this needs financial capacity.

Another key informant revealed the challenges of maintaining neutrality in journalism in the branch radio station. Sometimes, this tackles the media journalists having sufficient and balanced information for both news and program. While maintaining neutrality, journalists sometimes get into the challenge to search the appropriate information, data, or piece of evidence to report the malfunctioning or weak performance of the sectors.

The radio station is confronted with another challenge of lack of sufficient training and capacity building program. The key informant confirmed that since the establishment of the media, capacity-building activities either long or short training are not available. Finally, the key informant pointed out that the news and program formats are not updated and revised. The current formats of the programs need to fit the current interest and needs of the audiences. Such problems of the revised version of the program are found both in the urban and rural.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The result of this study shows that the communities use the radio station as a primary source of information since its transmission is in their respective languages. The radio station in the communities is perceived as the voice of the communities and this is evidenced in all of the participants of the study as household respondents, key informants, and focus group discussion participants. According to the findings, different social programs of the radio station helped the communities to transform their attitude, knowledge and to apply the information they got from the news and program formats in their day-to-day life activities. The transmission of programs in ethnic languages has a positive impact on getting the communities' interest in BBR's programs and subsequently changing their behavior to learn, exchange, and enrich the experiences of each other.

As far as developmental communication is concerned, different theories have been developed and among those theories, the findings of this study are consistent with the diffusion of innovation theory. The theory was developed by Everett Rogers. According to this theory, diffusion is a special type of communication. It deals with the innovation process spread among the social system. It is concerned with new ideas in communication. It has defined modernization as transforming individuals from the traditional way of life to the modern. An innovation is communicated by certain media to a large member of social groups to persuade them to accept and practice innovations for the betterment of their future life (Salvatore, 2002, p.22). According to this model, development is a type of social change in which ideas are introduced into a social system and these introduced ideas improve culture, health, education, and politics in the community. In relation to this, it can be concluded that the operation of Bonga branch radio in ethnic language favors the community to find updated information through news and the program formats that have a significant impact on everybody's life and the effects have been evidenced by the participants.

Finally, it can be concluded that BBR is assisting the development of the community by transmitting health, educational, cultural, and women's programs in order to mobilize the whole community for the realization of the community's social development by changing their attitude, knowledge, and practice. In the final analysis, the results indicated that the role of media, specifically the Bonga branch radio station that is transmitting its news and programs in different ethnic languages in the study area, is positively correlated to social development. However, based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are forwarded:

- ☞ The independence of the media should be realized in the study area.
- ☞ To make the branch radio station more functional and successful, the local government should support the media and should work together in which both the media organization and the local government should collaborate on the activities which may result in the community's development.
- ☞ For effective and efficient service delivery of the media, journalists and technical workers' capacity should be built and updated. According to BBR staff members, they lack sufficient short/long training, if given it could help them to serve more efficiently to serve the community by using their potential.
- ☞ The program formats should be updated and revised to meet the rising demands of the audience from rural and urban areas.
- ☞ There is a need for coordination with the concerning institution such as Bonga

University which is found near the media organization to produce professionals in the areas of journalism and technical workers to enhance the capacity of BBR and for efficient service delivery to achieve the target of the organization.

- ☞ It is strongly recommended that to serve the whole community of Kafa and Sheka zones should equally be served in the transmission by improving the required infrastructure to expand the coverage through the coordination of concerning bodies.

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The Role of Blessing and Cursing in Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanism among the Hadiya People, Southern Ethiopia

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Abstract

Hadiya people have maintained their indigenous mechanisms of governance system known as “Seera”. This article addresses the role of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution among the Hadiya people. To achieve this objective, a qualitative method with an exploratory study design was employed. A total of 25, purposively selected, key informants have taken part as a primary source for this study. Besides, secondary sources have been used to substantiate data obtained from the primary sources. The major findings were that Hadiya traditional institutions have been playing a significant role to solve different local conflicts where the practices of blessing and cursing are very important enforcing tools that elders use to easily approach the individuals or groups in conflict, to investigate crimes which are committed in the absence of eye witness. Speaking truth is an essential principle that is expected from the disputants and the elders who manage the resolution process to save oneself from the curse. Men and women have a significant role and mostly every meeting begins and ends with blessing and cursing. Cursing is implicit in every day but it takes place on the last day if the suspect does not reveal the truth about the case. Concerning the link, the FDRE constitution recognized the preservation of cultures and practices of each society within its indigenous institutions. The similarity between the formal and informal is also found as in both institutions the witness begins by swearing an oath which is a part of the cursing on oneself if he or she lies or tries to falsify the truth related to the case. Lastly, the practices of blessing and cursing have been affected by different factors like individual differences over the decisions of elders or negative attitudes towards the value of the practice; sometimes the corrupt behavior of some elders. Awareness creations for youth concerning elders’ honor and value, and their roles in conflict resolution and for elders, on the other, about the importance of their work and the disadvantages of malpractices are part of the recommendation.

Keywords: *Blessing, Conflicts, Cursing, Hadiya, Traditional Resolutions*

Introduction

In any society, conflict is one of the major factors negatively affecting development (Singer, 1990). It diverts resources that could have otherwise been used productively and is regarded as undesirable in many societies. In its violent form, it claims the lives of many people, destroys property, and diverts human as well as financial resources away from development. Concerning conflict resolution, conflict can be managed through strategies as per the nature and function of institutions (*Ibid.*). The conflict management process through strategies encompasses reconciliation, adjudication, and alimention; these strategies demand the conflicting parties’ commitment to reconciling with one another and their commitment to accept the decision of

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the third parties. The ultimate objectives of these strategies are to handle and minimize conflict among parties who have different demands (Roberchek, 1990).

Nebiyu (2011) stated that every society has its mechanisms of handling disputes/conflicts. Ethiopia is a country in which various ethnic groups live together for a long period. As conflict is inevitable, these ethnic groups have experienced conflicts of various types at different times. Alula and Getachew (2008) pointed out that customary conflict resolution mechanisms are prevalent throughout the country at the local level and it is the dominant justice system in the country. Ethiopia is one of the countries characterized by multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multicultural societies. Ethnically, diverse societies are living in Ethiopia (Merera, 2003). As to Mellese (2008), conflict is inevitable, each ethnic group has experienced conflicts of various types at different times and each has developed its own respective of indigenous resolution mechanism when dealing with different conflicts. Southern Ethiopia is the home of many multilingual and multicultural societies, and Hadiya is one of them. Hadiya society has its history, culture, traditional institutions, and way of life which directly and indirectly contribute to the survival of the community. Within the traditional institutions, one is their indigenous conflict resolution mechanism which is broadly called “*Seera*” (Alebachew & Samuel, 2010). In the Hadiya conflict resolution mechanism, different practices contribute to making the process of conflict resolution easy. From the practices, this article mainly intends to assess the role of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution among this society.

Rationale and Objectives of the Study

Conflict is manifested through adversarial social action, involving two or more actors with the expression of differences often accompanied by intense hostilities. The conditions of scarcity, for instance, caused by soil degradation or depletion of water in river basins or lakes and value incompatibilities can become a continuing source of contention. Most significantly, protracted conflict arises from the failure to manage antagonistic relationships (Ho-Won, 2010).

Accordingly, there are different types of conflicts in the study area in particular, as well as in various parts of Ethiopia in general. Each conflict, if it is not properly handled, could result in destruction. The biggest challenge confronting human nature is not about the occurrence of conflict, but how conflicts are fully resolved whenever they occur to prevent them from further escalation (Bukari, 2013). In this regard, Ahmad (2011) noted that humans have sought, as long as there has been conflicting, to handle it effectively, by containing or reducing its negative consequences. Alula and Getachew (2008) also argued that the resolution of the

conflict is crucial for day-to-day coexistence as humans are in constant search of resolution mechanisms of conflicts. According to Alula and Getachew (2008), indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms are prevalent throughout the country at the local level and it is the dominant justice system in the country. Indigenous conflict resolution mechanism emanates from the custom of the people as practiced over a long period, accepted by the community as governing principle, and hence binds the society, a breach of which entails social reaction and even punishment (Dagne & Bapu, 2013).

Hadiya people have an indigenous conflict resolution institution called *Seera* which has been served as a basis for the political administration, social interaction, and means of conflict resolution (Alebachew & Samuel 2010). Accordingly, few scholars have tried to discuss the traditional conflict resolution mechanism of the Hadiya people. For example, Braukamper (2012), in his study about the *Fandano* religion of the Hadiya people, attempted to explain the role of this religion in the politics and socio-cultural affairs of Hadiya society (*cited in*, Ethiopia in Broader Perspective, 1997). Ersido (2007) is one of the native researchers who attempted to show a general overview of the politics of the Hadiya people in his study. Abbink (2000) who has been cited by Worku (2019) stated that it is well understood in recent years that adequate research has not been recorded about the societies in the Southern Regions, including the Hadiya. To this end, this study is meant to explore the role of blessing and cursing in the traditional mechanism of conflict resolution. In so doing, it especially aims at: i) describing the processes and procedures followed during the practice of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution, ii) identifying the advantages of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution, iii) assessing the challenges facing the blessing and cursing practices in conflict resolution, iv) exploring the role of women in ‘blessing’ and ‘cursing’ as conflict resolution in the study area, and v) examining the relationship between the tradition of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution with the formal state judicial framework.

Literature Review

There are different ways of explaining the concept of conflict in academic literature. The word ‘conflict’ is derived from the Latin word ‘*confligere*’, which means, to strike together ‘or to clash, engage in a fight’ (Schmid, 2002). Accordingly, conflict happens when different opposing groups compete to achieve their intended goals. In other words, it refers to a confrontation between individuals or groups, resulting from opposite or incompatible ends or means. Conflict is not a new phenomenon that takes place at different levels of human

interaction and relationships. It may occur most frequently at individual, family, neighborhood, and community, group, national, regional, and international levels. It always exists as long as human beings live together and it is an inevitable part of human experience or existence (Francis, 2006). Yet, the types, causes, actors, intensity, frequency, and scope of conflicts vary.

According to Zartman (2000), a competition for resources, among others, is a major cause for conflicts that may arise between/among individuals and nations at large. The conflict has sometimes a devastating effect when it is particularly violent. It is undeniable fact that violent conflict kills quite a mass of people arbitrarily. Again, it destroys property and diverts human as well as financial resources away from development (Singer, 1990).

Conflict management takes into account implementing strategies to confine the negative factors of conflict and to increase the positive factors of conflict. Furthermore, conflict management aims to enhance learning and group outcomes (effectiveness or performance in an organizational setting). It is not referred to as eradicating all conflict or avoiding conflict. Conflict can be valuable to groups and organizations. It has been proven to increase group outcomes when managed properly (Rahim, 2002).

As the name implies, conflict resolution involves the diminution, elimination, or termination of all forms and types of conflict. In practice, when people talk about conflict resolution, they tend to use terms like negotiation, bargaining (good deal), mediation, or arbitration. To simplify the concept, conflict management does not necessarily imply conflict resolution. “Conflict management involves designing effective macro-level strategies to minimize the dysfunctions of conflict and enhancing the constructive functions of conflict to enhance learning and effectiveness in an organization” (Rahim, 2002).

Lederach (2003) stated two approaches to conflict management: constructive and destructive approaches. In the *destructive approach*, partners engage in warfare and violent conflicts. The objective of the disputing group is to score the victory over its counterparts. And for conflict resolution, the approach focuses on “peace by force” in which one of the conflicting parties will be the victim/loser (win-lose relationship). Conversely, the *constructive approach* predicts conflict as an ecology that is relationally dynamic with ebb (conflict de-escalation to pursue constructive change) and flow (conflict escalation to pursue constructive change). As Francis (2006) argued, in conflict transformation, violence, not conflict, is the problem, and the goal is to pursue non-violent social change, or, in other words, to transform destructive conflicts into constructive ones. In a constructive approach of conflict resolution, disputing parties focus on

the mutual benefit and social value after de-escalation of conflicts (win-win output for both groups).

Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms comprise social, economic, cultural, and religious-spiritual dimensions following the entirety of traditions, customs, and world views of society within the different spheres of societal life. The methods involve negotiations, mediations, and reconciliation based on the knowledge, customs, and history of the community (Nwolise, 2005). According to Pkalya, *et al.* (2004), traditional social entities such as chiefs, elders of the community, extended families, lineages, clans, tribes, religious brotherhood, local institutions, and ethnolinguistic groups remain important in the resolution process of conflicts. Brock-Utne (2001) indicated that indigenous conflict resolution enhances harmony through the active involvement of all the stakeholders involved in the disputes. The main aim is the transformation of conflict in which both parties are satisfied and willing to “let go their pain and forgive each other.” In congruence, Ndumbe (2001) pointed out that, indigenous conflict resolution strategy is not only a healing of the wound and psychological trauma but also a product of consensus building, integration of ex-combatants back into the society, and an avenue for promoting community development.

Africans, like other people elsewhere, have developed their unique system of administration and governance for a long time. As part of their strong and viable system, they had also and remained to have, effective and practically workable conflict resolution mechanisms that sustained and solidified them together within their respective communities. As Francis (2006) put, Africa is the cradle of humanity. It, therefore, makes sense that Africa had from time immemorial, evolved its own mechanisms and institutions for managing and resolving disputes and conflicts in ways that preserved the fabric of society, and encouraged peaceful co-existence.

According to Bahru (2002), Ethiopia is “the museum of peoples”. It is a country of diversity harboring varieties of languages, different religions, and faiths as well as quite many nations and nationalities with their philosophical perspectives and unique cultural practices. Indeed, many Ethiopian ethnic groups as their African counterparts have traditionally age-old and time-tested administrative and conflict resolution institutions at the grass root levels. For instance, Hamdesa (2000) and Assefa (2005) have written that *Gada* is an effective institutional system to manage any source of conflicts among the Oromo so that harmony, peaceful co-existence, and smooth relations would be maintained in the society.

There is also another such similar multipurpose institution of the Hadiya. This traditional institution as to Alebachew and Samuel (2010) is known as *Seera*. *Seera* is everything to the Hadiya society. It serves as a basis for the political administration, social interaction, and means of conflict resolution within the territory of the society. The territorial or tribal councilors function according to their respective *Seera*. Love affairs, marriage and family relations, peer group association, work, and entertainment parties, games and sports, hunting bands, etc. are all bound by *Seera* relevant to the specific activity. Elders in this regard, according to the rule of *Seera*, are considered to have the most esteemed and graceful status. It is believed that it is with the lifelong experiences and accumulated knowledge of the elders because of which *Seera* would appropriately function (Alebachew & Samuel, 2010). Again as Worku (2019) explained, in principle, the village council leaders are assumed to be wise, oratory, and patient. As a part of indigenous conflict resolution, the mechanisms of blessing and cursing are very important instruments to investigate hidden truth when the elders handle the case of conflict in Hadiya people. Therefore, this study focuses on appraising the role of blessing and cursing in line with the conflict resolution mechanism among the Hadiya people.

Materials and Methods

This study is based on an exploratory research design along with a qualitative research approach. The reason for the selection of the qualitative approach is that it helps the researchers to investigate the role of blessing and cursing in the traditional mechanism of conflict resolution among the Hadiya people. The researchers used both primary and secondary sources. Secondary data were obtained *via* a review of articles, books, proclamations, reports, and other documented sources. In-depth interviews and observation were the tools used to obtain primary data. Purposive sampling technique was employed to explore in-depth qualitative information from relevant respondents who are well-versed in empirical knowledge about the conflicts in the study area. Accordingly, 25 (twenty-five) informants; 18 men and 7 women elders were purposively selected on the basis of their experience and age (see the appendix at the end of this article). The data collected through interviews, observations, and literature review were critically analyzed by using narration, explanation, and interpretation. Wherever the direct quotations are used in this article, personal names are not mentioned for ethical reasons.

Results and Discussion

The Processes of Blessing and Cursing in Conflict Resolution

Different communities have various traditional or informal institutions to manage disputes that may arise within the same or between groups of distinct societies. Hadiya society also has its

own indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms. As Alebachew and Samuel (2010) stated, Hadiya has a traditional institution known as *Seera*, which is everything to the society. *Seera* has six institutions in the hierarchy from bottom to top: i) *Minee* (family), ii) *Nafara* (members are from Hadiya and Non-Hadiya mainly from neighbors), iii) *Mollo* (a combination of two or more *Minee*), iv) *Sullo* (comprised of two or more *Mollo*), v) *Giichcho* (comprised of two or more *Sullo*) and, vi) *Giiraa* (the highest institution in the hierarchy). Each institution is assigned to perform the specific task according to the nature and severity of the cases. It is essential to define briefly the specific role of each institution before dealing with the mechanisms of blessing and cursing under *Seera*. The following information is derived from the interviewees, researchers' knowledge of the study area, and secondary sources.

***Minee* Institution**

Minee is the smallest local institution among the Hadiya community. It constitutes members of a close lineage. Head at *Minee* level cannot be assigned through election; rather, it is through age. Here, the eldest of the *Minee* member can be the head. The head of *Minee* is usually of the male member. If the head of *Minee* cannot lead the institution due to old age or death, the second eldest member will take the authority.

Minee deals with various forms of disputes which occur among the members. These include managing disputes which arise between husband and wife, and neighboring individuals. There is a provision of counseling and advice for individuals who do not have knowledge of *Seera*, or who violate the rules of *Seera*.

***Nafara* Institution**

According to the structure of the local institutions of Hadiya, *Nafara* is an institution that comes in the next higher-order above *Minee*. *Nafara* is formed from two or more *Minee*, also known as *Minuwwa*, and other neighboring non-Hadiya groups. *Nafara* is different from the rest of the institutions by the following characteristics.

The first is that it is an inclusive institution *i.e.* its members are not only from the Hadiya community; rather it includes the minorities and outsiders. Secondly, the elders that constitute the institution should not be necessarily from the Hadiya ethnic group/clan. Instead, they consist of a mixture of Hadiya and non-Hadiya groups and can be from the ethnic-minorities or other groups of the Woreda. Thirdly, the heads are not necessarily from elders; rather, any individual who can manage problems, administer and guide the members can be head of

Nafara. Besides, the institution has many sub-institutions under it. These include *Idir* or locally *Idiro*, and *Equb* or *Huquba*. Therefore, the institution is identified as an inclusive that brought together the Hadiya and the non-Hadiya groups.

***Mollo* Institution**

Mollo is situated in the third place. It is formed from the combination of two or more *Minee* (*Minuwwa*). Among the Hadiya people, there are multiple numbers of *Mollos* or *Molluwa*. They are led by their respective heads locally named as *Moll-Daanuwwa* or singular form, *Moll-Daana*. The head of *Mollo* must be male and elected by the general consent of the members. To be the head of *Mollo*, he should have deep knowledge of the Hadiya community and *Seera* in general and that of *Mollo* in particular. He should have the skill of managing conflicts and administering the members, etc.

Mollo can perform various tasks for the communities. These include handling the issues of very serious nature including land conflicts (involving severe wound or murder), burned houses, collection of money for the victims, or other compensation, etc.

***Sullo* Institution**

Sullo is formed from two or more *Mollo/Molluwwa*. In the hierarchy of structure of *Seera* and its role in conflict management, *Sullo* comes to the next higher-order above *Mollo*. Like its predecessors, the head of *Sullo* should be male. He will be elected from the members of a given *Sullo* based on the will of the whole *Sullo* members. The head of *Sullo* is could be referred to as *Sull-Daana*, *Woshaaba*, *Daadicho*, *Masaalicho* or *Magaaba* (Alebachew & Samuel, 2010, p. 149).

The *Sullo* elders and members undertake several important tasks, which include: mediating and resolving disputes which may arise among community members over land right; investigating and deciding on referred issues from *Mollo*; and mediating issues of murder and serious conflicts among the members, and make a decision and resolve land-related disputes.

***Giichcho* Institution**

Giichcho is formed from two or more *Sullo*. Among the institutions which are found in Hadiya, *Giichcho* is one and an influential institution. According to the *Seera* structure of Hadiya, *Giichcho* comes at the next higher order above the *Sullo* institution. *Giichcho* has its own procedures in the administration, the election of authorities, and decision making. The

individual who is going to be elected as ‘head’ (locally known as *Anjaancho*, *Abaagada*, *Daana*, and *Garaadaa*) of *Giichcho* should fulfill the following formalities (Alebachew and Samuel, 2010). These are: having critical understanding, analysis, and evaluation of situations that will happen among the communities; being able to predict the consequence, understand analyze and evaluate things; being wealthy enough and having vast lands and big houses; being able to predict the future (locally known as *Hiraagaa*) and translate it to the community, etc.

The functions of *Giichcho* are mainly determined at the general assembly of *Giichcho*. Issues related to the boundary demarcation are discussed, and if the disputants are ready to accept the decision of *Giichcho*, new boundary demarcation will be made. The boundary is locally called as *Gabala*, which is demarcated by planting local trees, immovable stones, and grasses. Decisions that have been made at the level of *Giichcho* are very serious/strong (based on the level of dispute). If one of the disputing groups is identified as a criminal or a violator of the border, the punishment will be very high when compared with the cases of lower institutions. After payment of punishment cost for violating the boundary demarcation, both conflicting groups are ordered to stand in front of the judges who are highly respected elders. It is mainly done to show the end of the conflict between the two disputing groups and finally to end with the blessing of elders.

***Giiraa* Institution**

In the hierarchy of *Seera* structure, *Giiraa* is the supreme institution that incorporates the whole Hadiya ethnic group (*Hadiyyi-Minaadaba*). This institution may not perform daily tasks/small scale disputes; rather, it calls for the whole members in the heavy challenges like war, massive drought, and the like to defend the whole Hadiya together. This institution did not have an elected head; rather, it is led by highly respected clan/*Giichcho* elderly/senior heads locally named as *Immama*, *Adilla*, and *Garaada* (Alebachew & Samuel, 2010, p. 152).

As far as the roles of the *Giiraa* tribunal in managing land-related conflicts among and between the communities are concerned, the institution does not involve in such cases. It is because any form of conflict including land is managed by its predecessors. But if the conflict is at the macro-level and if the dispute is with the neighboring ethnic groups, the institution has a high responsibility to manage the conflict. Accordingly, *Giiraa* can wage the war or agree with the neighboring ethnic groups.

The behaviors of trickery, fraudulence, and deception are highly rejected by the elders at all levels of the *Seera* structures. A disputant in the process of investigation has to swear by saying: ‘*I fore waa’i, I maara uulli aa’one*’ which means “Let my soul and body will not be received by God and Earth respectively if I tell a lie.” This indicates that blessing and cursing are the mechanisms applied by the elders at each level of hierarchy in *Seera*.

According to one of the respondents, blessing and cursing are important tools that elders use to easily approach the individuals or groups in conflict in *Seera* governance system. The respondent indicated that the elders who gather to resolve conflicts begin by saying: “We bless you if you speak the truth but if you hide what your heart knows and try to trouble us in search of truth and to upset the elders’ spirit, it is not good for your future life” (Respondent M3).

From the above admonition, what we understand is that there is a belief in the society of Hadiya that there will be something good (bless) if the suspect confesses the truth and if he/she refuses to tell the truth, he/she will face something bad in the future (curse). Concerning the procedure of blessing and cursing, as most respondents said, it begins when conflict occurs and the victims call the elders for help. As the respondents explained that for the elders to run the meeting, there is no fixed place to sit. For this purpose, the sitting arrangement is made, most of the time, in front of the elders’ house. According to Worku (2019), the traditional council offices (*dummichcha*) are inherited from ancestors. As the writer said, the offices do not have a physical house assigned for this purpose. However, the elder’s house and his compound (*nafara*) serve as a reference point in Hadiya. Accordingly, one of the respondents informed: “Before the selected elders begin the case to investigate, they ask some amount of money from the individuals or parties in conflict. The very reason to do so is to control them during dialogue and not to allow them to speak without a given turn or to punish if they interfere” (Respondent M2).

It could be argued that the respondents have similar understanding of the situation as to how blessing and cursing take place. They indicated that meetings begin and end with the blessings of the eldest person/persons. In the process, mostly blessing is explicit and cursing is implicit. For example, an elder says that “let God give you and your family health and wealth because you have not troubled and tired us during the investigation of the case” and therefore, “let your life be free from any trouble” (Respondents M9). This time, people gathered there feared that the suspect who failed to reveal the truth under investigation will be cursed (Respondents M6,7,9,12 & 15, and F2, 4, & 6).

From the researchers' critical observation, blessing takes place by the elders at every step of conflict resolution as a motivation or enforcement to raise the expectation of the conflicting parties to reach on convention or agreement without going long procedure. At the same time, cursing becomes the last resort to the elders when the parties in conflict hide the facts and make the case complex which, of course, takes a long procedure and consumes much of the time of the elders. The cursing is not mostly done by elders but the suspect him/herself will be made speak bad words on him/her while taking an oath.

As the respondents revealed, the most important aspect of the elders' work is that the offender is publicly held responsible for his or her wrong-doing; thus, signaling such behavior is unacceptable. At the same time, the offender is treated with respect and is given assurance by the elders as: "You are one of us and we accept you back among us". In this way, the damage caused by the wrongdoing is repaired and the offender is reintegrated into the community. Based on the response from the interview, if the situations in conflict are serious, the end will be in two different ways.

The first is part of blessing when solutions are being found to resolve the conflict. During this time, a public ceremony is being organized by the conflicting parties to signify the end of the conflict and resumption of peace. As part of the peace-process, conflicting parties will be drinking and eating together, singing and dancing together, and breaking spears and arrows. These activities express the commitment and trust of conflicting parties not to turn back to the same situation in the future.

The second is part of cursing when a solution to resume the peace is not achieved because of the refusal of either of the conflicting parties. As the respondents said, in such a situation, oath takes place in different ways;

- i) Swearing (*Hidiro*): The suspected person is enforced to swear an oath by saying, '*Moo'umoyyo, i ill qooqe' Macceesumoyyo, imaccgawwe*'. That is, he or she wishes blindness and deafness if he or she did wrong.
- ii) Touching black animal/thing (*Heemahchca amadimm*): It is a method of touching stone or killing a black animal with a spear. This method is believed to be very dangerous not only for a person who did wrong or crime but also for his close relatives and next generations.

The Advantages of Blessing and Cursing in Conflict Resolution

The informal system of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms through the use of blessing and cursing has become more capable of replicating the role of the formal court. As Worku (2019) noted, the people of Hadiya assume that they receive a blessing (*maaso*) and cursing (*duunchcha*) from ancestors: the former for their good deeds and the latter because of their bad deeds. Without the two concepts, the entire village traditional council becomes irrelevant to the Hadiya people. Most of the respondents agree that serious disputes related to issues such as domestic violence, divorce, inheritance, and marriage are normally settled among the disputants themselves and/or within the family.

Most people here resolve their disputes through the elders. In fact, conflict resolution through the practice of blessing and cursing helps us and the local people a great deal by doing the jobs that courts in the woreda are unable to do because the elders' decisions are enforced by the community through social pressure (Respondent M4).

Based on observation, the conflict resolution services provided by elders in Hadiya generally follow the principle of restorative justice. This justice aimed at rebuilding relationships among people and enabling them to continue the existing friendly relation within their local communities. It ends enmity through apology or forgiveness. Another advantage that the researchers observed is that elders who practice in these conflict resolution mechanisms do not take any formal training on conflict resolution skills but they develop through experience. They bless people to agree and put them in fear of curse using wise locutions or proverbs. This helps to reduce the cost of training and the work burden of the formal justice institutions. Another important factor for the conflict resolution through this way to be taken into account is ending conflict without punishing the offender through imprisonment which also punishes the entire household. The chance of distortion in the process of delivering justice is reduced because it is run by the elders who know the local population and conflict situation.

The Challenges of Blessing and Cursing in Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution practices by elders in Hadiya have been facing different challenges. As one of the respondents said:

Conflict resolution by elders in our society is traditionally considered as the primary function of community elders with great motivation and other participants who attend the mediation process between the conflicting parties used to give high value and honor. However, such motivations (from the elders' side), value, and respect (from society side) are now at risk. The resolution practices are being affected by corruption though it is petty (Respondent M6).

The above response indicates that conflicting parties may have the power to reject any settlement that they are not happy particularly if they lack trust in elders' decisions because of the informed corrupt behavior. Hence, conflict resolution is based on voluntary consensus and agreement and it will be real when parties in conflict express their goodwill with trust in elders. Respondents revealed that the trust of the society towards blessing and cursing in conflict resolution differs from one another. This is the challenge in the situation where all do not have equal faith in the decision of the elders. In the wave of modernization and increment in the urban way of life, such institutions are losing their relevance besides lack of purity in the indigenous justice system. Based on researchers' empirical knowledge of the study area, no power structure provided authority to community dispute resolution and that approved the decisions made by the elders. Because of this, the case which already got its end sometimes tends to rise again in the formal justice system or court. This further erodes elders' authority or limits elders' ability to enforce a resolution.

The Role of Women in Traditional Conflict Resolution in Hadiya

Women do not have an equal position with their counterparts, but it does not mean that they have no roles to play in society. According to the data obtained from one of the respondents:

Women among Hadiya society are subjected to discrimination in dispute resolution activities. They are considered inferior or have less ability in handling conflict. They have no right to hear cases, negotiate conflicting parties, and give a political decision, and it is strictly forbidden for women to sit with men in any type of social gatherings. Furthermore, men use different negative connotations that can reflect their supremacy or that discourage the participation of women in conflict resolving affairs. No women have been elected as a traditional judge for the best knowledge in our community in particular and in the Hadiya society in general (Respondent M7).

However, as some respondents have said which is also corroborated by the observation of researchers that women have their own strong traditional institution which is called *Heffichcho*, where all adult women gather to pray or to speak the words of blessing for the well-being of the community and the country or to curse evil. Women have been contributing and playing a significant role in conflict resolution by gathering together in this institution.

The role of women in this institution begins from home or family. For example, women have a cultural right to protect themselves from violations. If a wife usually experiences a harsh punishment from her husband, her age-mates arrange a meeting and command the husband to abstain from this act. They also have the right to punish this kind of individual if such behaviors are repeated in the future. The nature of punishment is mostly in kind, such as ordering to

slaughtering the cattle. Then, finally, peace is resumed in the family and chances are less to reoccur.

Out of the family, when there is a much escalated ethnic or tribal conflict between the community, women get in between the conflicting parties and beg them in the name of *Heffichcho* by making their *elelta* (ululation) very loud. They bring a very long stick and stand between the conflicting parties. By so doing, most of the time, the intensity of conflict calms down to pave the way for further communications in realizing peace.

Furthermore, when evil things happen in the community, women in the *Heffichcho* curse, and when there is a lack of rainfall and drought begins, they pray. When there is a sickness in the household, or if the community is confronted with different social problems, the society members come to *Heffichcho* for prayer and to receive the blessings. Even those women who are married and are unable to have offspring, they also used to come to *Heffichcho* for blessings.

The Relationship between the Blessing and Cursing and the Formal Judicial Framework

There are several relations between the tradition of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution in Hadiya society with the formal/modern-state judicial framework. According to the constitution of the FDRE and the regional constitution of the SNNPRS, Article 39 sub-article 2, the nations, nationalities, and peoples have the right to preserve, promote, and develop their culture. So, blessing and cursing in conflict resolution as part of the culture of the society has recognition by the constitution. Some similarities are observed when elders in the tradition of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution in Hadiya society and the Judges in the formal judicial framework use the same procedure of taking an oath to investigate the crime. In line with this, some of the respondents agreed that, in both systems, in order to identify the innocent and the criminal, the eyewitnesses are expected to speak the truth and they will be asked to swear an oath in front of the elders and judges before they give their testimony (Respondent M1, M8, and F7).

Concerning the relation of the practice of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution with the formal judicial framework, Worku (2019) said that the ruling government does not interfere with the traditional authority as such because the role of elder members of indigenous institutions does not have a clandestine function of holding or checking a political system. So, the above discussion tells us that both systems work cooperatively in the process of conflict resolution. However, the fundamental difference is found at the point of binding or

implementing its decisions upon the conflicting parties. If the parties in conflict are not satisfied with the decision of the elders, they have the right to move to the formal institution to seek justice.

Based on the analysis, the following are major findings of the study. Blessing and cursing are very important enforcing tools that elders use to easily approach the individuals or groups in conflict to investigate crimes that are committed by the parties in conflict and to reach an agreement. Speaking truth is an essential principle that is expected from the disputants and the elders who hold the case in order to be saved from the curse. On the other hand, men and women have their respective roles and they run the practice of blessing and cursing in different situations. Mostly, every meeting begins and ends by blessing whereas the cursing is implicit every day but it becomes explicit only on the last day if the suspect does not produce real evidence or lies to the elders. Regarding the dynamicity, the practices of blessing and cursing have been challenged by individual differences such as attitude towards the value of the practice, lack of coercive force for elders to support their decisions, and corrupt behaviors of some elders which reduce the trust that the society has on them. Lastly, there is a link between the traditional conflict resolution in general and the practice of blessing and cursing in particular. For instance, to ask the witness, the systems begin by the oath which is part of the cursing on oneself if he or she tells a lie. Again, the government recognized the cultures of each society and motivates that practice.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study identified the role of blessing and cursing in the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms among the Hadiya people. Thereby, the major findings show that Hadiya traditional institutions have been playing a significant role to solve different local conflicts and the practices of blessing and cursing are very important enforcing tools that elders use to easily approach the individuals or groups in conflict, to investigate crimes which are committed in the absence of eye witness, and reach on an agreement. Speaking truth is an essential principle that is expected from the disputants and the elders who hold the case in order to save oneself from the curse. Men and women have their respective roles and they run the practice of blessing and cursing in different situations. The constitution recognized the cultures of each society and motivates that practice. The practices of blessing and cursing have been challenged by individual differences like the attitude towards the value of the practice. They also lack coercive force in the hands of elders to implement their decisions effectively which must be binding

upon the conflicting parties. Furthermore, because of the corrupt behavior of some elders, the trust of society is declining. However, the role of blessing and cursing under the different institutions of *Seera* is still prevalent and of high significance in the conflict transformation of Hadiya society. The mechanisms adopted by the elders can best be suited to 'constructive' (*i.e.* nonviolent) approach to conflict.

Based on the findings, the following recommendations were drawn:

- Concerning the importance of elders' honor, value, and their roles in conflict resolution by using the enforcing tools of blessing and cursing, there has to be an awareness creation program by elders themselves with the help of other stakeholders for the youth in the society because it has been challenged by diversified views or even the acceptance level of the disputants from the side of the society.
- Hadiya's traditional conflict resolution mechanism in general and the role of blessing and cursing in conflict resolution, in particular, should be included in *Hadiyyisa* textbook curriculum to create awareness among the students of the school throughout the zone.
- Elders who work in such affairs need some awareness-raising training from the concerning bodies particularly from the side of the government against corrupt behavior. This behavior is against the values of the society and does not teach a good lesson to the youth because it is against the law as the judges in the formal court even are expected to only obey the law and to use their moral conscience in search of justice.
- The local government and Hadiya people should encourage and preserve indigenous knowledge and value of blessing and cursing as one of the social capitals of Hadiya society.

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Appendix: List of Informants

S.N.	Respondent's Code	Age & Gender	Date of Interview	Place of Interview
1.	Respondent M1	62, Male	28/11/2019	Hossana, Ethiopia
2.	Respondent M2	55, Male	28/11/2029	Hossana, Ethiopia
3.	Respondent M3	63, Male	28/11/2019	Hossana, Ethiopia
4.	Respondent M4	62, Male	30/11/2019	Hossana, Ethiopia
5.	Respondent M5	65, Male	30/11/2019	Hossana, Ethiopia
6.	Respondent M6	56, Male	6/11/2019	Homecho, Ethiopia
7.	Respondent M7	53, Male	6/12/2019	Homecho Ethiopia
8.	Respondent M8	47, Male	6/12/2019	Homecho Ethiopia
9.	Respondent M9	58, Male	7/12/2019	Homecho Ethiopia
10.	Respondent M10	50, Male	10/12/2019	Ginbichu Ethiopia
11.	Respondent M11	70, Male	10/12/2019	Ginbichu Ethiopia
12.	Respondent M12	46, Male	10/12/2019	Ginbichu Ethiopia
13.	Respondent M13	65, Male	11/12/2019	Ginbichu Ethiopia
14.	Respondent M14	68, Male	11/12/2019	Ginbichu Ethiopia
15.	Respondent M15	62, Male	15/12/2019	Lemo, Ethiopia
16.	Respondent M16	58, Male	15/12/2019	Lemo, Ethiopia
17.	Respondent M17	50, Male	18/12/2019	Lemo, Ethiopia
18.	Respondent M18	70, Male	18/12/2019	Lemo, Ethiopia
19.	Respondent F1	65, Female	30/11/2019	Hossana, Ethiopia
20.	Respondent F2	68, Female	30/11/2019	Hossana, Ethiopia
21.	Respondent F3	62, Female	7/12/ 2019	Homecho Ethiopia
22.	Respondent F4	46, Female	7/12/2019	Homecho Ethiopia
23.	Respondent F5	58, Female	11/12/2019	Ginbichu Ethiopia
24.	Respondent F6	44, Female	18/12/2019	Lemo, Ethiopia
25.	Respondent F7	48, Female	18/12/2019	Lemo, Ethiopia

The Social Market Economy Model in Africa: A Policy Lesson in the Pursuit of an Inclusive Development

Mesfin M. Woldegiorgis*

Abstract

A contextually rethought coexistence of capitalism and socialism, particularly, the 'Third-Way' politico-economic framework is a contemporary dominion in the pursuit of prosperous and inclusive development. Regarding the third-way position, however, there is a dearth of theoretical framework in African studies. Hence, this article aimed at exploring the theoretical significance of ordoliberalism and its social market economy model that is often praised as the secret(s) in the wake of the 'Wirtschaftswunder', meaning the 'economic miracle', of Germany. In so doing, the article has sought the common conceptual ground between the notions of the social market economy and inclusive development through the extensive review of theoretical evidence available in the secondary sources of data. The review of literature has revealed that unlike the German experience, the policy choice among the African countries, in the post-colonial era, was never consistent with ordoliberalism or social market economy. However, the post-2000 economic trajectory of Africa has shown the coexistence of the welfare state and coordinated market thereby creating a convenient condition to implement the lessons learned from the development path of Germany. Besides, the prevalent socio-economic problems in most of the Sub-Saharan African countries including demographic bulge, abject poverty, high levels of income inequality, extractive/rent-seeking institutions of governance, brain-drain, and aid/loan dependency syndrome are the major factors that underline the urgency for policy reforms geared towards an Afro-centric social market economy. Yet, the levels of economic development, historical, cultural, and geopolitical differences need to be taken into account to effectively implement the policy instruments of the social market economy in Africa.

Keywords: *Ordoliberalism, Freiburg School, Welfare State, Coordinated Market, Third-Way*

Introduction

Following the waning of the communist ideological camp globally, the western socialism (Marxist-Leninist) and Pan-African socialism¹ could not sustain their ideological hegemony in their original version in Africa especially after the 1980s. Consequently, as the first generation of African leaders, after liberation, had a shortage of finance and capital, the African governments had to approach the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1980s (Heidhues & Obare, 2011; Stein & Nissanke, 1999; Hope, 1997). The neoliberal institutions, on their side, came up with a policy remedy in the form of the structural adjustment program (SAP). Subsequently, there emerged scholastic critic asserting that the reform profoundly wrecked the state instruments swiftly (*Ibid.*). The following critics are, *inter alia*, a few. The Guardian (2003)

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¹According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, African socialism is composed of socialist doctrines adopted by several African leaders in 1950s and '60s to free themselves from colonialism and revitalize African Traditions at state level (Source: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/African-socialism>)

released the summary of the United Nation's report about the SAP failure stating that "they were promised a brighter future, but in the 1990s the world's poor fell further behind." There are also robust claims that the 1990s was the "African's lost decade". In this article, the author claims, however, that Sub-Saharan Africa's lost decades were from 1980 to 2000 (see pieces of evidence presented in Figures 4 and 5 below). Then, it is legitimate to argue that *laissez-faire* capitalism and communism are "dead ends" in the continent. The World Bank argues that the failure of SAP was due to lack of good governance in the continent but the role of the state is deliberately reduced as per the policy proposal (Kingston, 2011; Mkadawire & Soludo, 1998; World Bank, 1994).

Thus, there are apparently robust claims evident in the post-cold war literature that contextually applicable "third-way" polity is indispensable (Giddens, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999). Accordingly, the question should be where exactly across the continuum? Middle way? Middle left? Middle right? Or elsewhere in between? This appears open for the context and political philosophy of policymakers. As political positions are the guiding philosophies of diverse development policies and other institutions, the issue is less discussed in the African context. Subsequently, there are inconsistencies of policy choices (Mkadawire & Soludo, 1998).

There are also other critical apprehensions claiming that the economic growth in Africa has not yet created enough economic dividends to ensure inclusive development for all. For instance, Beegle *et al.* (2016) argue that the share of Africans who were poor, shrunk from 56% in 1990 to 43% in 2012, but due to population growth, there are more poor people today than in 1990, two in five adults are still illiterate, and violence is on the rise. Furthermore, by 2030, if the current trends continue, Sub-Saharan Africa will be the home to 90% of the world's children living under the poverty line (Watkins & Quattri, 2016). Beegle *et al.* (2016) further note that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living in extreme poverty has grown substantially since 1990. On top of that, according to the World Bank database, the share of export of goods and services to GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa declined from 30.03% in 1980 to 25.37% in 2017 which caused the depreciation of local currencies and triggered rampant inflation.

Corresponding to the above figures, the non-monetary welfare indicators are weaker in resource-rich countries of Africa. The assertion resembles the typical allegation in African studies *viz.* "a natural resource has been a curse not a bless" (Mkadawire & Soludo, 1998). Consequently, without a consistent and viable development path, Africa may face more profound challenges of inclusiveness in the next decades which may leave a significant

proportion of its population behind. Thus, to resolve the challenges sustainably, a coordinated market, more human, egalitarian, and consistent long-term development path is imperative (Mulwa & Mariara, 2016; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012). In sum, the presence of severe inclusiveness and policy consistency challenges in Africa inspired this article.

In this article, therefore, the SME model is presented as it has a ‘ready meal’ from its consistent track record in the pursuit of inclusive development in the post-WWII period in Germany and West Europe. Prudence must, however, be taken from the very outset that the article is not meant for transplanting a development policy to Africa nor is intended to prove how the policy affects inclusive development statistically.² Instead, the body of knowledge around SME, along with the discussions supported by the empirical facts and figures, is organized and presented due to its theoretical significance for inclusive development, which overall makes this work rather a review article.

Rationale and Objectives of the Study

Given the robust economic growth in the recent two decades, Africans have been demanding political-economic reforms in pursuit of inclusive development. For instance, as ignited in Tunisia in 2010, there have been vigorous political uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. Since then, the revolution has viciously³ spread to Sub-Saharan Africa. It resulted in a series of coup trials on the continent. The consolidated data compiled by Bennett *et al.* (2019) shows that, between 2010 and 2019, there were about 28 coup attempts in 20 countries of Africa (Bennett *et al.*, 2019). Besides, the fragility of the African economy is often associated with a paucity of long-term coherent development path, and inclusiveness bottlenecks (Mesfin, 2020; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Osaghae, 2007).

Accordingly, the extractive institutions are, *inter alia*, mainly responsible for the weak achievement in inclusive development. For the economically dependent countries of Africa, following a consistent long-term path and policy have not been easier, for the fact that “he who pays the piper calls the tune”. This depicts external challenges and internal ones as best dealt with in the Buckminster Fuller’s excerpt “you never change things by fighting the existing

² For further readings on the econometric regressions study relating to inclusive development and institutional quality in Africa, see Mesfin, 2020.

³ The term ‘vicious’ might be controversial because, on the one hand, the coups, humanitarian and political crises and the consequences thereof, might be bad signals for the sustainability of the economic growth. On the other hand, denouncing the misguided kleptocrats, robust demand for democratization and inclusive development might be a good start for a positive change in the continent.

reality” and “to change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete”. In successful countries, the post-WWII witnessed the long-term development path that is well-defined and the role of state and market is clearly delineated. For instance, in Germany (social market economy), Japan (state capitalism), China (China Model or “Beijing Consensus”), North Europe (Nordic welfare state), and United Kingdom (“third-way”) are a handful of cases. In this regard, the question remains: what are the policy choices of Africa and its member states?

Without Afro-pessimism or Afro-euphoria, at this moment, it can be argued that in African development studies, the third-way literature is almost missing and, yet, practically almost all member states mix the state and market instruments in “their ways”. Consequently, the functions of the state are almost everywhere across sectors but not always efficiently. Inclusive development strategies like social securities have been overlooked and markets are overregulated or under-regulated which resulted in, *inter alia*, vast informal market, fiscal inefficiency, and extractive institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Giddens, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999). Without comparing with the other third-way models, the German SME is the mainstay of this article, for a series of literature about the content of the model, are accessible. To this effect, this article is basically intended to trigger further discourses about the SME as a policy path to inclusive development in Africa. In so doing, however, it also aims at exploring the historical trajectory of policy inconsistency and consequences in Africa, analyzing the theoretical significance of the SME for inclusive development, and scrutinizing the potential merits and hurdles of adopting the SME model to African countries.

Materials and Methods

This work is a review article; hence, theoretical where a sophisticated statistical analysis is not of much interest. A description of the German SME model and lessons to be learned as a policy option is the bastion of this article. Even if there is diverse literature about the model in various countries like the USA, UK, Canada, Japan, China, and Sweden, the Germany SME scenario is found to be appropriate to start with due to its originality, clarity of the idea, success story, well-documented literature but most importantly due to its content relevance to inclusive development notion. Accordingly, to establish the theoretical and philosophical foundation, the literature related to the Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism, Social Market Economy, welfare economics, and the new institutional economics is particularly consulted. Supplementary facts and figures are amassed from the United Nations, World Economic Forum, African

Development Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and policies of the leading political parties in the selected 21 African countries. The selection of the countries is not subjective in the sense that all the countries are those for which the World Economic Forum produced an inclusive development index in 2017 that are considered in the study. However, any policy recommendation at the continental level might be too hasty while 54 independent African states have their “own-way” of policy choice. Thus, the selected 21 countries scenario cannot depict the full picture of Africa. Nevertheless, as a benchmark, the significance of this article is enormous.

Results and Discussion

Post-colonial Policy Choices and Inconsistencies in Africa *vis.* the ‘Third-Way’

The ‘third-way’ is a political-economic position which is a third alternative to right-wing and left-wing politics. The centrist, center-right, and center-left are common examples of the third-way position containing different degrees of the coordinated market⁴ and social policies of a state. As Giddens puts it, “the overall aim of third-way politics should be to help citizens pilot their way through the major revolutions of our time: globalization, transformations in personal life and our relationship to nature” (1998, p. 64).

On the contrary, African countries, in the post-colonial period, have adopted various ideologies such as feudalism, Marxist communism, African socialism, and even two decades of *laissez-faire* capitalism during the structural adjustment program (SAP). In the post-2000, however, the North and Southeast Asian ‘developmental state’ model has been attracting the attention of many politicians in Africa (Maphunye, 2011; Mkandawire, 2001; Noorbakhsh & Paloni, 1999). Later, international cooperation, through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), has played a significant role in the local and global governance coordination (Durokifa & Ijeoma, 2018; Noorbakhsh & Paloni, 1999). Apart from the exogenous and endogenous factors, the discrepancy among policy choices extends from the stages of development to the contentious stages of history. For instance, Karl Marx identified five consecutive stages of history, namely: the Primitive Communism, Slavery, Feudalism, Capitalism, and Socialism (Konstan, 1975). In Africa, it appears that African socialism is pseudo socialism that evolved before capitalism. Moreover, the prevailing extractive institutions and political positions are having backward linkages to the history of feudalism,

⁴ In the earlier literature, it is common to come across “free market”, whereas in recent literature a “coordinated market” has received more attention.

slavery, and colonization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Mkandawire, 2001). Some of these extractive institutions in Africa have taken the following forms.

Feudalist Institutions in Africa

Feudalism was one of the extractive (not inclusive) political ideologies against peasants. Under feudalism, peasants do not own the land, whereas landlords own it. In countries where the land is still owned by the state, numerous citizens remained landless. The following are some countries that passed through feudalism in the post-colonial period. These were monarchical states of Uganda, Burundi, Central African Empire, Congo, Egypt, Libya, Rwanda, Tunisia, Zanzibar, Ethiopia, Namibia, Chad, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Morocco and Lesotho (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Mkandawire, 2001).

Socialist Institutions in Africa

During the independence in the 1960s, most of the newly formed governments adopted the Afro-centric socialist economic model by rejecting the western capitalism (Kofi, 1981). Only a handful of them adopted the western communist model, but there are still different states in Africa that are guided by ‘democratic socialism’ such as in Zambia, Tanzania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia, Congo, and Angola. Algeria (Arab Socialism) and Namibia have also preferred socialist regimes. In the past, Somalia, Cape Verde, Sudan, Seychelles, and Madagascar also passed through different socialist regimes (Akyeampong, 2018).

Capitalist Institutions in Africa

There are still African capitalists, and capitalism has also been a leading political ideology for two decades. In the 1980s and 1990s, thirty-seven Sub-Saharan African countries adopted a *laissez-faire* capitalism in the form of structural adjustment program (SAP) (Noorbakhsh & Paloni, 1999). This is meant to replenish the economically rigged countries during colonialism, and the African liberators needed capital from the advanced countries. The two Bretton Woods Institutions, however, came up with prerequisites for loans. The programs principally urged, *inter alia*, deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, avoiding trade barriers, and cutting government budget in the social sectors. Accordingly, the austerity stuck the economic growth especially pro-poor public financing. As stated above, the time between 1990 and 2000 is referred to as “Africa’s lost decade”. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the time between 1980 and 2000 could be named “Sub-Sahara’s lost decades” because there was the stagnation of economic

growth, aggravation of poverty, failure of the social sector, and disruption of politics. The New York Times magazine, in its issue of June 1994, with the headline “Lost Decade Drains Africa’s Vitality,” clearly stated that “you don’t have to be a detective to spot the decline in living standards in Africa.” Therefore, the *laissez-faire* policies adversely affected inclusive development at least during the initial years (Lensink, 1996; White, 1996).

Developmental State Institutions

There are governments like in Botswana, Mauritius, and Ethiopia that have officially adopted the developmental state model. However, there are critics if the states were truly in line with the model. The central idea is that the state is supposed to coordinate the market, select development priority, and benevolently guide the development process. As the approach is the “third-way”, it is quite relevant to acquaint with it from an inclusive development point of view.

The foundational literature of the East Asian developmental state (DS) model emanates from the four pioneer books contributed by Johnson (1982), Deyo (1987), Amsden (1989), and Wade (1990). They are often categorized as “institutionalists” (Öniş, 1991). Among them, Chalmers Johnson is the pioneer. Johnson drew up four policy priority areas that came to be named as the “developmental state”. These are: i) the presence of a small but professional and efficient state bureaucracy; ii) a political setting where the “bureaucracy has enough space to operate” and take policy initiatives independent of overly pushy interventions by vested interests; iii) the crafting of methods of state intervention in the economy without sabotaging the market principle, *i.e.* the concept of “market conforming” approach and iv) having a pilot organization such as MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) in Japan (Johnson, 1982, pp. 38-39). Johnson further contends that:

[...] the legislative’s and judicial’s more important function is to fend off the numerous interest groups in the society, which if catered would distort the priorities of developmental state. In case of interests that cannot be ignored, deflected or satisfied in symbolic ways –or upon which the perpetuation of the political system depends the political leaders must compel the bureaucracy to serve and manipulate them (parenthesis added) (1982, pp. 315-316).

As it could be understood from the excerpt, in Japan the political space was narrow especially in engaging the civil society organizations (CSO). The narrowness was deliberate to create a wider playing field for the government not to be interrupted in selecting mega capital projects and choosing a policy priority particularly in transitional time (*Ibid.*). However, given the triumph, due to weak CSOs and authoritarian state, corruption and scandals had plagued Japan

for a half-century and, as a result, the problems of Japanese democracy have deepened. As the middle class had been created, political disruptions had emerged and challenged the existing political order in Japan. In the process, social activism had broadened in the 1980s and this activism forced the government to encompass citizen-based pluralism (Hirata, 2004). Johnson (1982) claims that state authoritarianism has benefited the Japanese though this may not work for others.

As stated above, the middle class claimed not only economic gains but also democracy, so the government opened the political space for competition in the 1980s (Hirata, 2004; Öniş, 1991). However, the adherents of the East Asian model in Africa wrongly justify everlasting authoritarianism mentioning the Japanese and East Asian success as a showcase. Recently, Omneh (2012) claimed the democratic version of the developmental state may encompass six policy priorities: i) state autonomy, ii) social embeddedness, iii) consensual autonomy, iv) institutional coherence, v) authoritative penetration, and vi) inclusive embeddedness (Meyns & Musamba, 2010). However, what he claimed to be democratic looks rather still autocratic.

The Model: Ordoliberalism - Social Market Economy - Inclusive Development

Nexus

Ordoliberalism - Institutionalism Nexus

To comprehend the notion of ‘ordoliberalism’, which is praised together with SME to be the secret behind the “German Economic Miracle”⁵ (German: Wirtschaftswunder), a swift reflection on the connotation of an “order” is worthwhile. The term ordoliberalism is composed of two words; order (German: “Ordnung”) and liberalism. The Cambridge Dictionary defines an *order* as a social or political system in which everything is arranged in the state of working suitably. According to the business dictionary, an order can be a system of commerce (*e.g.* legally binding contract and transaction), banking (*e.g.* an agency or organization), law (*e.g.* an authoritative mandate), and finance (*e.g.* currency). In sum, an order is a complex set of laws and rules by which one is governed in a society or community (*e.g.* “the democratic order” and

⁵ The German economic miracle is usually described as a rapid reconstruction and sustainable development of the German economy in the aftermath of World War II. The resilient feature of the economy was also revealed during the financial and economic crisis in 2009. Apart from the consistent social security, stable labour market even during the financial crisis is part of the story (Rinne & Zimmermann, 2011). The export surpluses and successful crisis management during COVID-19 could also be considered as part of the success as the word miracle is controversial.

“the constitutional order”). It is a condition in which one is governed by the norms and laws of a society or institution and a system of living by which things are ordered.

Similarly, according to the Wordhippo dictionary, the Latin word “Institutum” includes institute, institution, custom, purpose, plan, established law, habit, mode of life, settlement, and principle. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) also incorporates a theory of institutions such as laws, rules, customs, and norms into economics (Agboola, 2015; North, 1991).

From the above definitions of an “order” and “institution”, one can intuitively comprehend that the term “order” and “institution” have a lot of resemblances if they are not identical. This leads to an important inference that the new institutional economics and the German ordoliberalism (Ordnungspolitik) have inherent interfaces because in both cases, the roles of orders (institutions) are revitalized.

The Theory of Ordoliberalism

Ordoliberalism is a third-way political theory in the classical state-market nexus discourse. Ordoliberalism emerged initially in 1937 in the “Ordnung der Wirtschaft”.⁶ According to Eucken, adhering to market principles, a state should offer a conducive political framework and legal setting for a competitive market to function in an efficient and socially desirable path (Ptak, 2009). Economists such as Walter Eucken, Adolf Lampe, and Friedrich Lutz and lawyers such as Franz Böhm and Hans Großmann-Doerth established the so-called Freiburg Circles (Vanberg, 2012; Ptak, 2009). The various contributions to SME are summarised later (see Table 3 below).

Eucken argued that a *laissez-faire* approach gives rise to cartels and an undue concentration of monopoly power unless coordinated by the state. In coordination of the market, it is aimed at limiting the indefinite economic aggression of individuals, companies, cartels, and monopolies for the interest of social benefit. As Suntum *et al.* (2011) noted, such social benefits are materialized through constitutive and regulatory institutional frameworks (see Figure 1 below).

The Classical Social Market Economy

As explained above, the German word ‘Ordnung’, meaning ‘order’ used to refer to institution (“rule of the game”) upon which economic systems are based (Vanberg, 2004a, 2004b).

⁶ Since the year 1948, ORDO has been published as a peer-reviewed yearly published academic journal of order, economy and society journal in the Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism as initiated by Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm and Hans Großmann-Doerth.

Accordingly, ‘Ordnungspolitik’ is a German version of institutional economics. As ‘ordoliberal’ is the political philosophy, which is a foundation for the creation of the post-World War II German social market economic (SME) system, is considered as a socioeconomic model under the political theory of Ordoliberalism. The model has been ostensibly implemented in Western Germany by the political party called the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) since the government administration of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. His Minister of Economy, Ludwig Erhard is regarded as the “father of social market economy” (Ptak, 2015; Vanberg, 2004a, 2004b, 2012; Exenberger, 1997).

Although the Ordoliberalism and social market economy models are contemplated as the post-WWII, their origins lie in the 1860s as a form of revolutionary socialism associated with orthodox Marxism (Bookchin, 1999). By the 1920s, social democracy became the dominant political tendency along with communism within the international socialist movement (Newman, 2005, p.5). While communist parties advocated radical or revolutionary socialism, the labor parties that advocated for SME were evolutionists (*Ibid.*).

By the 1910s, social democracy had to spread worldwide. Social democrats who opposed the Bolsheviks later renamed themselves as democratic socialists because they believe in a liberal democracy. This concept has been promoted by the Freiburg School of ordoliberalism (Goldschmidt & Rauchenschwandtner, 2013). The SME model, therefore, combines free market capitalism alongside social policies. In other words, the SME is a third-way between *laissez-faire* economic liberalism (Rhine capitalism) and state socialism (Abelshauser *et al.*, 2004). As the Director of the Economic Administration of the “Combined Economic Area”, Müller-Armack, declared the end of the controlled economy against the opposition from the occupying powers, the social market economy, since then, has proved to be a model for success in Germany. According to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, the social market economy is the “foundation of a liberal, open and democratic society” in Germany. The main idea behind the social market economy, therefore, is free competition-based prosperity and social security (Exenberger, 1997).

As indicated above, among others, Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm are primarily regarded as the founders of Ordoliberalism and the Freiburg School because they advocated for a strong role for the state in creating a proper legal environment for the economy and maintain a healthy level of competition especially in coordination with market and distribution of economic dividend through measures that adhere to market principles (*Ibid.*). Due to the foundational


belief in the market, therefore, Ordoliberalism is also sometimes referred to as “German neoliberalism”. However, others regard it as a “liberal market economy” and “coordinated market economy” to distinguish neoliberalism and ordoliberalism respectively (Pühringer, 2016).

As Berger *et al.* (2013) claim, in Germany, the SME triumphed for more than 70 years. It is also argued that Germany is the birthplace of the Social Market Economy as originally advocated by notably the Freiburg Ordoliberalism School. The inner meaning is set as follows.

The social market economy seeks a middle path between socialism and economic liberalism (i.e. a mixed economy) combining private enterprise with government regulation to establish fair competition, maintaining a balance between a high rate of economic growth, low inflation, low levels of unemployment, good working conditions, social welfare, and public services by using state intervention. The idea underlying the social market economy is that the free market efficiently produces a quantity of goods and would distribute them in a certain pattern among the economic agents who produced it, but that this distribution can be made morally and practically better by making it more ‘social’ (Ibid., p.21).

In the social market economy, the German state abides by free competition, when it is necessary, it is also ironically benevolent enough to subsidize some sectors. In this regard, Hasse *et al.* (2008) posit that, in certain cases, the state does protect the privileges of, for example, specific industries such as agriculture and coal mining, and the owners of jobs and housing, endangering the state under the rule of law and the market economy through short-term legislation and interventions which do not conform with the system. It is due to these consistent social market economy-oriented policies that the German economy was rehabilitated from the WWII crisis, and in the long-run, has become the leading gigantic economy in Europe and the fourth-largest economy in the world. It is worth noting here that Germany, during the “Euro crisis”, was able to lower its unemployment rate which is literally known as “Jobwunder” or “Job Miracle”. In general, it is a widely held claim that the secret behind the “German Economic Miracle” is the SME. However, the major argument for further revitalization of the social market is that the classical Eucken’s principles of the social market neglected the “social inclusion”. According to Empter & Shupe, “Eucken emphasized the importance of a competitive economy, but he did not give enough attention to social inclusion” (2012, p.7). On contrary, they also emphasized that in 1946 the first economist to use the phrase “Social Market Economy” was Alfred Müller-Armack, who arguably “placed a significantly stronger focus on social policy” (*Ibid.*).

Figure1: The Classical Principles of Social Market Economy




Source: Sketched by the Author Based on Suntum *et al.*, 2011, p.7.

N.B.: The Hexagons represent the constitutive (K) principles, whereas the rectangles epitomize the regulatory (R) principles as Eucken (1952) originally articulated.

The Modern Social Market Economy Model - Inclusive Development Nexus


Governance institutions (orders) determine inclusive development (Mesfin 2020; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North, 1991). The inclusive development approach is a pro-poor development economics and political economy approach for not only economic growth, but also social welfare are crucial constituents. Amartya Sen (1981), for instance, argues that every human being deserves entitlement as the basis for social justice. The mainstay of the social market economy is, therefore, not only augmenting economic growth through market instruments but also social securities for all which directly connects to an inclusive development approach. The importance of orders (institutions) is that the social market economy model is a long-term and institutionalized development path contrary to the Keynesian short-term and discretionary state intervention (*Ibid.*).

Figure 2: Key National Performance Indicators of Inclusive Growth and Development



Source: Adapted from the World Economic Forum (2017).

Figure 3: The Modern Principles of the Social Market Economy



Source: Empter & Shupe, 2012, p. 8.

In this article, as inclusive development and institutional quality are thematized, the new social market economy model is found to be particularly pertinent. This is because it gives critical attention to social inclusion and environmental sustainability compared to the classical SME model (see Figure 1 & 3).

Table 1: The Modern Principles of the Social Market Economy

Principles		Description	Indicators
Competitive and Efficient Markets	Open Markets	An open market is an economic system with no obstructions to free-market activity including factor and product mobility. The state facilitates competition, efficiency, and equity	Open Markets
			Controls on Capital Movement
	Efficient Price System	Distribution of goods, services, and factors of production are based on market forces. The state protects consumers from artificial distortions and unnecessary predation but not by setting the price.	Freedom of Migration
			Barriers to Market Entry
			Product Market Regulation (OECD)
	Competition	The market price is not obstructed by state intervention	Price Control (Fraser Institute)
Efficient Property Right	Property Rights	The state protects the ownership entitlements and facilitates transactions.	Administrative vs. Market Prices (World Bank)
			Patent Protection (Park Index of Patent Rights)
			Intellectual Property Rights (World Economic Forum)
	Freedom of Contract	Contracts are based on mutual agreement of market agents without the intervention of the state	Occupational Choice
			Market Transparency and Consumer Protection
			Judicial Review (Sustainable Governance Indicators)
	Liability	The state intervenes if there is an undue contract	Subsidies and Other Transfers (% of expenses, OECD)
			Media Pluralism (Sustainable Governance Indicators)
			Competition Oversight Authority (Global Competition Review)
Economic and Ecological Sustainability	Financial Stability	Apart from the precautions, during economic shocks in the key financial markets the state addresses with effective financial instruments and institutions	Investor Protection (World Bank)
			Central Bank Independence
			Patent Protection (Park Index of Patent Rights)
			Depth of Credit Information Index (World Bank)
			Public and Private Credit Registry Coverage (World Bank)
			Prevention of Too-Big-to-Fail
	Consistency of Economic Policy	Policy consistency means compatibility and uniformity of course of actions from top to bottom level stakeholders so that it can be correctly & efficiently followed by all of them without creating a conflict & consistency in the development path	Bank Capital to Assets Ratio (World Bank)
			Equity Ratio of Companies
			Control of Financial Consolidation (OECD)
	Efficient Environmental Protection	The state regulates environmental protection and works with work together with corporations	The extent of Staff Training (World Economic Forum)
			Pension Systems Linked with Life Expectancy (OECD)
			Social Security Spending (OECD)
Social Inclusion	Effective Labor Markets	The state has policies for employment creation vocational training, assistance in the job search, wage subsidies or public works programs, and support to micro-entrepreneurs or independent workers, and protection of employees right	R & D Spending (OECD)
			Market Economy Instruments
			Employment Protection Legislation (OECD)
			Prevention of Duality
			Employer-Employee Parity
	Social Mobility	The state recognizes and facilitates social mobility i.e. the movement of individuals, families, households, or others in society.	Effective Labor Market Programs
			Social Inclusion (Sustainable Governance Indicators)
			Non-Discrimination (Sustainable Gov'ce Indicators)
			Public Spending on Childcare & Early Edu'n (OECD)
			Education Structures
			Compulsory Unemployment Insurance (OECD)
			Guaranteed Minimum Social Security
			Income Taxation and Incentives to Work

Source: Compiled and Adopted from Different Sources including Empter & Shupe, 2012.

Table 2: Pragmatic Lessons from Germany’s Inclusive Development Trajectory via SME

Politics	Economy	Social
Ordoliberal/Rhine capitalism! school is “third-way” between <i>laissez-faire</i> economic liberalism and socialist economics. As an antithesis for the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, the state has social programs as argued by Alfred Müller-Armack, and as a synthesis state sets the order for the free market as claimed by Eucken and Erhard. Then Konrad Adenauer considered both the free market and social responsibility	There is self-regulating (unhampered) market competition (<i>viz.</i> constitutive orders) and a strong state coordinates market and ensures economic justice (<i>viz.</i> regulatory institutions)	universal social insurance programs: universal healthcare, compulsory education, sickness insurance, accident insurance, disability insurance, and a retirement pension. Right to self-determination, liberty, due process of law, freedom of movement, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and freedom of association are basic assumptions
Regional economic integration	Strong international supply chain	strong civil society organizations and delicately chosen civil servants
Rejects the socialist ideas of replacing private property	Fiscal decentralization	education-industry linkage (demand-based education)
Strong regulatory orders (e.g. property right protection, contract administration, data protection, digital identity)	Macroeconomic stability and independent central bank	non-discriminating (privilege-free) social insurance, mandatory private bank accounts
Democracy, republicanism, social responsibility, and federalism, individual freedom, human dignity, and the subsidiarity of societal organization are key components of the Basic Law	state coordination of labor market, training, unemployment benefit, regulation against exploitation, and free mobility	reading culture and rule binding society. Social integration and volunteerism, coordinated civil society, formal income, and expense of sacred income in religious institutions
Strong regulations against rent-seeking behavior. State and corporate-financed research, multiparty democracy (but major two large parties)	Export-oriented economy and grown multinational companies, coordinated producers and service providers	Family-based social system, secure social peace, economic humanism, least cost housing for those who are left behind in the development
inspired by Ordoliberalism, social-democratic reformism, and the political ideology of Christian democracy (ethics),	capital market & financial institutions diversification	Subsidy for socially important industries, equal opportunity, and protection of old-age, disability, or unemployment

Source: Compiled from Diverse Sources including Goldschmidt & Rauchenschwandtner (2013).

Table 3: Thinkers that Contributed to the Evolution of the Social Market Economy

Contributors	Selected Contribution to The Social Market Economy
Böhm, Franz (1895-1977)	Interested in antitrust law
Briefs, Goetz A. (1889 -1974)	Opposes the structural weaknesses and interested in the Christian view of 'Man and Society'
Dietze, C. von (1891–1973)	Advocates every economic order to be based on specific political and moral principles
Einaudi, Luigi (1874–1961)	Claims no need for private monopolies nor state control moral and political freedom without economic freedom is impossible
Engels, Wolfram (1933–1995)	Advocates the social market economy and its principles upholds the principle of individual freedom over state-controlled economies
Erhard, L. W. (1897-1977)	Contributed to the reengineering of the German economic system and the birth of the 'economic miracle' and known for 'prosperity for all' slogan
Eucken, W. K. H. (1891–1950)	Articulates the concept of institutional order which adhere to the principle of competition, and opposed interventionism in the economic process
Frickhöffer, Wolfgang (1921-91)	Defended ideological enemies of the social market economy and was known as the 'watchdog of the social market economy'
Hayek, Friedrich (1899–1992)	Fights for the 'neo-liberalism' in the war generation. In 1974 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for his comprehensive work on economics and social philosophy.
Höffner, Joseph Kardinal (1906–1987)	Advocates for the religious institutions' transition from romanticism to social reform and active participation in society.
Kamitz, Reinhard (1907-1993)	Introduces the concept and the principles of the 'social market economy' in Austria after 1945 believing in the indispensability of economic, political, and cultural liberties.
Karrenberg, F. (1904-1966)	Advocates the social market economy in church circles
Lutz, Friedrich August (1901-1975)	Iterates for necessary regulations to be incorporated into the monetary and currency system during flexible exchange rates
Meyer, Fritz W. (1907-1980)	Particularly interested in international trade relations, labor, and development policies as well as currency problems
Miksch, Leonhard Born (1901 – 1950)	Promotes competition with responsibility and influenced the currency reform by providing a framework of institutional order
Müller-Armack, Alfred 1901 – 1978	Coined the term social market economy and regarded the implementation of a liberal and humane political system
Nell-Breuning, Oswald von (1890 – 1991)	Argues that apart from market competition, social justice, love, 'genuine' regulatory principle, conditional reconciliation are vital in a society
Nipperdey, Hans Carl (1896 – 1968)	Promotes that the basic law to include basic economic, constitutional, and legal principles to guarantee the system of the social market economy.
Röpke, Wilhelm (1899 – 1966)	Claims that justice generates a 'concept of liberty', affirming solidarity as a basic value in 'economic humanism' or the 'third-way'. Humanity is 'beyond supply and demand'
Rueff, Jacques (1896 -1978)	Influenced the French monetary and economic policy, property rights, battled against inflation, the gold standard in foreign exchange, suggested stability policies
Rüstow, Alexander (1885 -1963)	Has a deep conviction in freedom and individual responsibility saying 'If you need a helping hand, first look for it at the end of your right arm.
Schiller, Karl (1911 – 1994)	Advocates for 'Competition as far as possible, planning as far as necessary'. 'Liberal and social elements in modern economic policy'.
Schleyer, H. (1915 -1977)	Opposes an interference with the market economy which is not inherent in the system
Schmölders, Günter (1903-1991)	Criticizes state as the 'benevolent dictator' & influenced the contemporary economic theory where market failure is criticized more frequently than government failure.
Schreiber, Wilfrid (1904 – 1975)	Promotes Catholic social doctrines, family burden compensation, social security, income distribution to children and adolescents not yet capable of gainful employment
Stoltenberg, G. (1928 – 2001)	Promotes financial & economic policy based on social & ethical principles along institutional order
Stützel, Wolfgang (1925 1987)	Focuses on legal issues and questions of business management and claims 'paying and receiving market prices means protecting one's freedom and dignity'
Thielicke, Helmut (1908 – 1986)	Endorses neither the <i>laissez-faire</i> capitalist economy nor communism. 'It is our responsibility to organize the material aspects of the way we live'.
Veit, Otto (1898-1984)	Contributed to the implementation of a stable financial and monetary constitutional framework and helped to make the concept of the social market economy a reality.

Source: Compiled from Various Sources especially Hasse *et al.*, 2008, pp 27-77.

Potential Challenges of Applicability of the Social Market Economy in African Context


The German SME model has lessons that might be applied to fundamentally reengineer the political and economic thoughts in Africa. However, the reform can by no means be easier. For instance, due to the stage of development, historical, cultural, and geopolitical settings, a policy having a success story somewhere might not always keep fit in another social setting.

The following challenges might hinder the adoption of the German SME model in Africa. First, the SME successes have been gradual, whereas the urgent demand for inclusion in Africa may need more swift reform models like from recently emerged countries. Secondly, the SME was implemented in Germany and other western Europe, where corporatism and industrialization are already well established long ago, but in Africa, they are still underdeveloped and, hence, may limit the pertinence of the model. Thirdly, the governments must generate sufficient revenue to allocate funds to the acclaimed welfare programs in SME, whereas most governments in Africa may not afford it. The fourth problem may arise due to the mainstream tribal politics, totalitarianism, rent-seeking behavior in the market, and state, the African countries might not meaningfully espouse the commended policy instruments. In addition, the SME model may encounter challenges if implemented through debt or credit financing. With the prevailing minimal labor productivity and trifling demographic dividend, the welfare programs may also promote further dependency and inefficiency. Moreover, a social market economy can only truly work in the context of fiscal management where public finances are managed competently, efficiently, and transparently, whereas Africa has not yet drilled them. It is the case, as well that, historically, the liberal political economy in the transitional economies has a wide range of challenges. Finally, the policy dependency of African countries may face a severe constraint in having the SME as a viable and consistent long-term inclusive development path.

Comparison of Inclusiveness in Different Policy Choices

In the post-colonial period, most of the African countries have passed through Pan-African socialism (1960-1980), capitalism (1980-2000), and the coexistence of capitalism and socialism (since 2000).


Figure 4: Trend of Real Per Capita Income in Sub-Saharan Income



Source: Sketched Based on Extracts from the World Bank Database, 2020.

As it could be noticed from Figure 4 above, the per capita income during the pan-African socialist regimes in the 1960s and 1970s was increasing though the performance was not uniform in different states. However, between 1981 and 2001, where the structural adjustment program (SAP) *viz. laissez-faire* capitalism principles were introduced, the real per capita income ended with dwindling which witnessed the lost decades in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the post-2000, however, where Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals were introduced, the Sub-Saharan African real per capita income had been increasing till 2014.

Figure 5: Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa




Source: Sketched Based on Extracts from the World Bank Database, 2020.

Figure 5 reveals an over-indebtedness of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during SAP where the region exercised *laissez-faire* capitalism (in the 1980s and 90s). Moreover, it can be noticed

that in the time where capitalism and socialism coexisted since 2000, the SSA economy is recovering.


Figure 6: Social Inclusion Index in Percentage



Source: Adopted from Mesfin, 2020.


As Figure 6 above shows, the social inclusion index in the sample countries is minimal mostly less than 50%. South Africa, Namibia, Tunisia, Ghana, and Algeria are relatively better than the rest.

Figure 7: Economic Inclusion Index in Percentage



Source: Adopted from Mesfin, 2020.

Figure 8: Political Inclusion Index in Percentage



Source: Adopted from Mesfin, 2020.

The above Figures (6-8) show that the countries with better political inclusion, economic and social inclusion are also better and vice versa. The direction of correlation is not the scope of this article. Answering the question of whether “development” yields “better institutions” or “better institutions” yield “better development” is like the classical “egg or hen comes first” dilemma.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this review article, an attempt was made to briefly present the basic tenets of the ordoliberal social market economic ideology as a third-way political position that combines the free market competition-based prosperity and social justice through the welfare state. It has been noted, in this article, that, contrary to the Keynesian short-term and discretionary state intervention, the SME model is a long-term and institutionalized development path due to its consistency in terms of orders (institutions). And, the German economy significantly recovered from the WWII crisis due mainly to these consistent ordoliberal SME-oriented policies that, in the long-run, made the country Europe’s leading gigantic economy and the fourth-largest economy in the world. The central argument is that the ordoliberal SME has not only augmented the economic growth that was termed the “German Economic Miracle” through market instruments but also helped the realization of social justice which constitutes the inclusive development approach.

The vigorous conceptual linkages between the inclusive development and SME model prevails in the fundamental principles behind the model such as the constitutional and regulatory orders for a coordinated market, social insurance programs comprising universal healthcare,

compulsory education, social insurance, and labor market orders. The terms “order” and “institution” have a lot of resemblances if they are not identical. This may lead to an important inference that the new institutional economics and the German ordoliberalism have strong inherent interfaces than with neoliberalism because in both cases, the roles of orders (institutions) are revitalized. In Germany, since the 1950s, SME has been consistently followed and constitutionally proclaimed. Regardless of the programs of political parties, Article 20 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) declares ‘social democracy’ as the state policy.

Contrary to Germany’s path, the African countries experienced different political ideologies in the aftermath of colonialism, which proves that there was no policy consistency. However, the post-2000 economic trajectory of Africa has shown the coexistence of the welfare state and coordinated market that has already laid the ground to implement the lessons from the German SME. Yet, given the potential challenges of implementing SME policy instruments in Africa related to the stage of development, historical, cultural, and geo-political settings, there are the most important factors to take into account and paramount lessons to learn from. To this end, the following recommendations could be forwarded.

- The *laissez-faire* policies adversely affected inclusive development in Sub-Saharan Africa especially during the initial implementation years. The communist ideologies have also failure stories. Therefore, African countries need a consistent “third-way” political position and development path which promotes market forces that equally value social justice, thereby inclusive development.
- Open market, efficient pricing system, promotion of healthy market competition, ensuring property right, freedom of contract, liability, financial stability, consistency of policy, efficient environmental protection, efficient labor market and social mobility, security, and investment are the major policy instruments and principles of the SME which could be benchmarked in devising an Afro-centric SME model.
- Apart from the above principles, adherence to the SME principles has tremendous benefits to African nations at least for the following reasons. Embracing competitive and coordinated input and product market, family-oriented social system, a few political parties, dialogic democracy, and the welfare state are, *inter alia*, a few lessons for Africa to be learned from the German SME model.

- Direct transplantation of the German SME is impractical and not prudent for Africa. The lesson can, however, serve as a benchmark to devise a viable Afro-centric SME model where the African traditions, context, and aspirations are considered.
- A significant part of the African market is not only shallow, but it needs to leverage the private sector in a more humane way.
- Given the growing interest in the SME among the major political parties of the USA, UK, Europe, and other donors such as China and Japan, it would be easier to mobilize resources for policy implementation if African countries shift their political choice towards SME.
- There are local challenges in Africa that need urgent reform. For instance, the latency for a demographic dividend due to a youthful population might be the justification to reform the labor market as per the SME. Likewise, rampant poverty, the high-income gap between the poor and rich, infant industry, rent-seeking governance, brain-drain, and aid-dependence are also ground realities that necessitate urgent reform geared towards SME. Furthermore, following a consistent Afro-centric SME model may boost business confidence, predictability, learning by doing, research, and inclusion.

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Acknowledgement

The author sincerely acknowledges the benevolent financial donation of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) and the scientific advisory of Prof. Dr. Andreas Freytag during the research tenor.

The New Reality of Bangladesh: A Critical Analysis of New Normal Challenges and Opportunities

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Abstract

The post-COVID-19 new normal will arise as a game-changer in the policy-making of the world states. Accordingly, this article highlights the post-pandemic Bangladesh that should integrate biology affirmatively in the policy development procedures to reshape the new normal challenges as opportunities. The grounded theory method is adopted as a quantitative analysis tool relying on the secondary sources of data to portray the significance of biopolitics as political rationality in new norm Bangladesh. The researcher has used the neo-realism approach to develop the 'Biopolitical Rationale Theory', which uncovers how evolving neo-realist security demands the prioritization of biopolitics in every sphere of decision making for governing the post-pandemic new standard of existence. The 2020 corona outbreak proved that human life and the environment are the ultimate means of survival rather than the traditional security arrangements and extreme economic growth which are inhumane (rationality of death and militarization), unhygienic, and destructive to the environment (exploitation of nature is profitable). The article recommends some alternative new normal policies such as non-discriminative health policy, bordering in line with International Health Regulations (IHR), digitalization with better cybersecurity, virtualization of the tourist industry (application of Extended Reality), application of Career Resilience (CR), and Strategic Flexibility Analysis tools in the re-employment and career development, greening the economy, special arrangements for emergency health crisis and undertaking actions considering the environment as a remedy rather than a crisis. The review research concludes that the inclusion of biopolitics in the Bangladesh governance system can redesign the challenges of new normal as new opportunities. But the reshaping of such a new reality will itself prevail as a considerable challenge for Bangladesh.

Keywords: Bangladesh, Post-Pandemic, New Normal, Biopolitics, Biopolitical Rationale Theory

Introduction

Post-pandemic normalization of life will be very challenging for third world countries like Bangladesh. The world people will never go back to the norm rather than a new norm normal in the post-pandemic era. The World Health Organization (WHO) recognized the COVID-19 as a global pandemic on March 11, 2020, and declared it earlier as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30, 2020. The 2019-nCoV acute respiratory disease was first identified in December 2019 in the city of Wuhan in China and has emerged as an ongoing pandemic.

On 8th March, COVID-19 affected patients identified for the first time in Bangladesh which now holds the 17th disastrous corona occupied country in the world (UNB, 2020). The infection

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rate is currently 20.30 percent (3,04,583); the recovery rate is 63.52 percent (1,93,458), and the death rate stands at 1.35 percent (4,127), according to the official statement of the Institute of Epidemiology Disease Control and Research (IDCR) till 28th August (Covid-19: 45 dies, 2020). The average dealing of Bangladesh with the pandemic lacked the ‘whole-of-nation’ collaboration, maintained a culture of information secrecy, and corrupted the biopolitical measures. The new normal reconstruction and securitization process will be very challenging for Bangladesh because the global pandemic conditioned the world system to reshape the policy priorities by taking the biopolitics as primary rationality.

Substantial contemporary research works highlight the importance of biology as a political rationality for humankind’s survival from the 20th century. Concurrent pandemic stressed the significance of biopolitics by uncovering the failure of ill-structured political and economic systems of countries. Researchers extended biology to the environment and climate for ensuring the ecological, mental, and physical well-being of humanity (Spash, 2020). The present study develops the Biopolitical Rationale Theory to explore the recommended policy strategy needed for the reconstruction of COVID-19 devastations based on Neorealism. The theory was formulated using the grounded theory methodology. The present analysis applied the hypothesis of Bangladesh’s post-pandemic normalization challenges. The overall aim of the study was to portray the necessity of the incorporation of affirmative biological politics in the decision-making process of Bangladesh to overcome the difficult challenges of the upcoming normal.

Materials and Methods

The qualitative research aimed to illustrate the prioritization of biopolitics as a new norm of the post-pandemic era by using the flexible methodological strategies of grounded theory. The idea is grounded in actual data, and it involves the collection and systematic analysis of data. And the central idea stands as the grounded theory which consists of data collection and analysis, coding of the data into concepts and categories, formulating a thematic framework through interpretative analysis, memoing, and integrating the categories and subcategories. Using the neorealism approach of international relations as a qualitative analytic tool, the researcher tried to look into the Biopolitical Rationale Theory. The view demonstrates the new expected survival of humanity, domestic and international politics, and the economy vested in the biopolitical policy strategy. The study applied the idea to the new normal challenges of Bangladesh.

Grounded theory is a research method used to disclose social processes (social relationships and behaviors of groups). Theoretical sensitivity is a fundamental part of this research instrument, which concerns the researcher's ability to convey meaning to the collected data, understand what the data indicates, and the proficiency to compare which information is convenient and which is not. All of the policies of the post-pandemic age are termed as new normal policies. The 'new normal' concept refers to a condition in which economy, politics, and the entire society following a crisis or pandemic or war and the normal differ from the earlier normality of life. New changes and challenges require innovative policy scheme. So, the researcher used the grounded theory mechanism to disclose a unique and useful theoretical framework of policy implementation after the COVID-19 era. The neorealism approach stands for the standard of the self-interest of the states and practical problems of world politics in a specific period. According to the neorealists, new normal demands a visionary change in the traditional security of the international system. Using the approach, the researcher proposed the theory of the Biopolitical Rationale. The hypothesis recommends biology as the central political rationality in the reshaping mechanism of state policies. Biopolitics represents a significant methodological means for the supportive researchers of the affirmative biology involving in governmental actions and plans. This type of rationality makes human life, and its mechanisms enter into the estimation of the government. The analysis depicts the Bangladesh scenario through the lenses of the Biopolitical Rationale Theory. The study leaned on secondary data collections from the statements of governmental agencies and non-governmental research organizations, newspapers, books, relevant journals, reports of different international and domestic organizations.

Theoretical Framework: Biopolitical Rationale Theory

Glaser and Strauss (1967) first developed the idea of grounded theory in California, USA (Noble & Mitchell, 2016). Grounded theory is a research instrument which requires formal procedures for data review and assists the researchers to search for and conceptualize the hidden social structures and formations (Noble & Mitchell, 2016). New normal is the core category in sampling the Biopolitical Rationale Theory and the primary phenomena around the present theoretical view. The developed idea provides policy redefining in Bangladesh to deal with the upcoming new normal challenges. International relation's neorealism approach is also used to develop the Biopolitical Rationale Theory to uncover new standpoints on the decision-making of Bangladesh.

The New Normal

The normalization of life after a crisis, pandemic or war is defined as 'new normal'. The idea emerges to indicate an unavoidable acceptance of a new situation (Booij, 2020). Nowadays, the situation refers to the worldwide post-pandemic change in normalness which is generated by the new social contact norms (Booij, 2020). The media effect is making the concept immensely popular. But the concept of new normal was used by Sandman and Lanard (2005) as a public attitude manipulation tool. The idea has been adopted following the 2007-2008 economic crisis, post-global depression of 2008-2014, and recently the global epidemic COVID-19.

Since 2008, American new lifestyle and changed behavior during the great recession were known as 'new normal' in America (Etzioni, 2011). The recession-era reframed the meaning of 'good life' for Americans. According to Schor (2011), many Americans reduced their consumption and its environmental consequences at the same time. So, the then 'new normal' showed a positive attitudinal change towards ecology. A survey of Euro RSCG Worldwide (2010) portrayed that 67 percent of American people expressed the economic depression served to remind people of "what matters in life." The survey (2010) also revealed 48 percent of Americans were trying to find out "what makes them happy." 78 percent were attempting to improve "how they live" and to enhance themselves as an individual (Euro RSCG Worldwide, 2010). Adams gave prominence to the idea that materialism is not central to the American Dream. He acknowledged that the American new normal Dream after the great recession of 2008: "We cannot become a great democracy by giving ourselves up as individuals to selfishness, physical comfort, and cheap amusement" (Best, 2011).

In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping magnified the theory of new normal by announcing the incorporation of new normal policies in the Chinese economy in the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Beijing. According to President Xi's speech, the concept referred to an economic shifting. The new normal is nothing new—the California-based bond fund famous Pacific Investment Management Co. first popularized it to indicate the decline in the average growth after the global crisis. The concept attained ground when in China when President Xi announced the new normal adaptation strategy: "A new normal of China's economy has emerged with several notable features."

The same term was used to define climate transformation and adaptation in 2015. The scientific literature used this terminology to demonstrate the climatological circumstances which focused

on realizing the contemporary extreme climate events (Lewis *et al.*, 2017). During the 2020 coronavirus outbreak, media is using the term to explore a new set of social contact norms, such as social and physical distancing. And all these norms are termed as new normal norms. Booij (2020) remarks that these are new standards indicated for coping with a new reality.

The Neorealism Approach of International Relations

The leading neorealist intellectual Kenneth Waltz aspires to explain how the power transition and newly emerged challenges can alter the international system. His Theory of International Politics (1979) provides scientific explanations and the normative concerns of the global political system (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010).

The ‘anarchy’ and ‘structure’ are the two interlinked ideas of the approach. The structure of the international system is anarchistic. In this anarchic structure, states need a ‘self-help system’ to defend themselves as they struggle all-time against potential attacks from each other (Didek, 2012). States exist in perpetual risk. States are equal to the power of sovereignty. Other major functions of the states are the same. States vary only in their capabilities and strategies to respond to significant challenges and changes in the system. Waltz terms the capabilities as ‘relative capabilities’ and which is posed by every state. Capabilities are the means of survival of the states. Survival refers to obtain relative gains and ensure national interests.

Uncertainties occur when international change occurs. The international transition emerges when the balance of power shifts followed by the rise and fall and the great powers. And global pandemics, crises, wars, or different uncertain situations cause this power transition.

Waltz does not convey any exact policy guidelines to the state leaders to deal with the emerging problems. Waltz clarifies the policies which cover the necessities to provide the best protection of states’ interests and their success (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010). Only the situation or condition in which the governments discover or found themselves is the rationale preference rather than any political interest or economic growth.

Neorealism dictates biopolitical policies as a new normal norm because the rational calculation to survive supports life and its mechanisms in the post-pandemic age. The current pandemic showed the states which can ensure the health security of their population effectively and can manage to survive well. The researcher used the approach to highlight a dramatic shift in capabilities, survival, the balance of power, and policymaking for the reason of biology.

The Biopolitical Rationale Theory

Biology conveys a long history in politics. The center of all political conflicts is rooted in the relationship between politics and biology (Peters & Besley, 2020). Now, biology is extended to 'environment' and 'climate'. As humans are part of the environment, they live in it, from it, and within it. The environment is a major part of the human immunity system. So, the environment is biology.

'Biopolitics' is the concept first explained by Foucault in his publication *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault, 1978). Foucault discussed 'biopower' as a double-edged technology, which consisted of two apparatuses: anatomopolitics and biopolitics (Foucault, 1978). Anatomopolitics displays the format of the human body as a productive instrument (Filipe, 2014). According to Filipe (2014), biopolitics refers to the strategies and actions targeting the human body considering longevity, natality, mortality, morbidity, health, and hygiene, etc. Amagben (1998) summarized biopolitics as "the growing inclusion of man's natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of power." Political and international scholars like Duffield (2007) illustrated the growth of global biopolitics targeting health, demographics, territory, and power with the formation of the international agenda of human development and protection.

The theory of the Biopolitical Rationale is developed based on the Neorealism approach of IR. The theory exhibits the idea of incorporating the life of the population and environment in every aspect of policymaking and implementation will be the perfectly rational preference in the post-COVID-19 age. COVID-19 is a potential threat to international society and individual nations. The danger predominantly posed on global public health and ultimately extended to the worldwide economy and politics. Human life should be included in the political and economic system rather than the violence and exploitation of humanity. Biopolitical discourses and practices will work as a fundamental transformation of human life (Filipe, 2014). The transformation of human life and bio-history is the vital rationale for existence after the global epidemic, according to the present study's formulated theory. According to the hypothesis, if the problems are embedded in biology, we need to find solutions in biology. And the ultimate solution will be biopolitics.

A global emergency like the SARS-COV2 outbreak highlights the importance of affirmative biopolitics for the survival of the international system. So, the remedy and the ultimate rationality revolve around the maintenance of good public health, hygiene, birth rate, death

rate, life expectancy, race, etc. (Peters & Besley, 2020). Bangladesh can undertake a biopolitical policy agenda as the new normal reconstruction and securitization process.

Results and Discussion

The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19, a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) earlier in March before it is appearing as a 'global pandemic'. But almost all the countries of the world in general and Bangladesh, in particular, lacked any pre-preparedness for this emerging health crisis. The potential spread of 'community transmission' eventually affected every sector of the country. Every income sector (garments, immigration, the tourist industry, businesses, employment, overconsumption, and exploitation of nature) got collapsed to consider public health security. The over-density and extreme poverty played a double game with the Bangladeshi population's life. Corruption accelerated the damages of the global pandemic, and it was resulted in lacking all types of collaboration. Many reasonable attempts of the government proved as ineffective and unsuitable to the local societies for lack of cooperation and proper planning. With the incursion of the corona crisis, Bangladesh is struggling as the most climate change affected country.

Bangladesh has been encountering a severe effect of COVID-19 on its political, economic, social, cultural standards, and health sector. Policy reset based on the life of the public and their good health is remarkably needed. The COVID-19 scenario will make the new normal the most challenging time. The outbreak exhibited that as a state is made of its people not only with the land/territory, so the government should work for upgrading the human life standard, not for economic or political ends. Including Bangladesh, every country should take lessons and step forward to reset their policies. Sarasin (2020) terms governments considering "health" as the means of survival as "a biopolitical dream" (Peters & Besley, 2020). For instance, every country guaranteed 'quarantine' and 'stay at home' initiative to ensure social distancing and containment of the virus as ordinary political rationality. So, Bangladesh has to strengthen its biotechnological investigation and biosafety level to contain the next epidemics and bioterrorism.

Transformation of Discriminative Health Policy

Bangladesh faced tremendous obstacles to ensure health facilities in the primary responsibility of the pandemic. The first step of minimizing the infection rate is the separation of the COVID-19 affected persons from the non-infected. But in the hospital where infections and cross-contamination are appearing as a significant phenomenon, and non-COVID patients are panic

enough about their medication. Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) is very expensive, time-consuming, and high technology-relied. So, Bangladesh is exasperated to do minimum tests per day (Islam *et al.*, 2020). While the rate of testing is 71 by 1000 in the US, the rate is 3 by 1000 in Bangladesh (Islam *et al.*, 2020). The contact tracing facility has developed very recently, but many people have no idea about its use. So, the government should establish its own biotechnologies to contain the infection and to increase the research. Rather than using western health securing terms, Bangladesh must innovate health management policies according to Bangladeshi culture, nature, and mentality. As a result, if the guidelines and rules are understandable to the local people, then the whole of the nation can fight against the virus effectively. In this situation, we should consider the words of Larson (2020) pronounced in his article 'How to Win the War on Coronavirus', "We have struggled with situational awareness. Victory will require a 'whole-of-nation' commitment-federal, state, and local government along with the private sector and every man, woman, and child."

The proposed budget of FY2020-21 raised a considerable scale of criticism as a 'growth-oriented budget' around the whole country. Professor of Health Economics of Dhaka University, Syed Ahmed Hamid, said that bureaucrats of the health ministry rarely understood about the health system while health professionals have ineffective insight about the budget allocation (Maswood, 2020). He also suggested for the systematic health budget allocation that needs more insightful and innovative knowledge and planning (Maswood, 2020). Bangladesh allocated as much as BDT 41,027 crores (\$484 crores) to the public health sector, which is 1.3 percent of the GDP and 7.2 percent of the total budget of FY 2020-21 (Hasan, 2020). The allocation should be more than or equal to 15 percent to reach sustainable development goals. Health professionals and the health ministry have an immediate need to be well-trained to manage the post-pandemic damages.

During the pandemic, reproductive health (Church, 2020) and the health of the aging population have faced shocking discrimination in Bangladesh (Hossain *et al.*, 2020). Heightening uncertainty and unforeseen aspects of the bio-disaster have accelerated psychological suffering and mental sickness (Banna *et al.*, 2020). Social distancing, isolation, lockdown, travel bans, working from home lead to extreme intimate partner violence, expanding the number of unintended pregnancies, abortions, and deaths, rape, and domestic violence (Short *et al.*, 2020). The situation is more alarming for those people with a particular disability who are unable to maintain social distancing, isolation, or any good hygiene policies. The current health policies have made them extremely vulnerable during the pandemic (Goggin

& Ellis, 2020). David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder, two disability scholars, term ‘biopolitics of disability’ which assesses the ‘normative modes of participation’ to transform the deficiency acquainted framework of the health care system (Goggin & Ellis, 2020). Bangladesh needs discrimination-free and exceptional service-oriented framing for the most vulnerable and powerless population. The country should take measures to prevent illnesses psychologically, which is the root of other significant hardships. Health professionals and the health ministry have an immediate need to be well-trained to manage the post-pandemic damages. The new-realism approach stresses practical and scientific solutions of health crises and biopolitics can be taken as rationality to standardize the new normal in Bangladesh.

Promoting the ‘Global Health Security’ in Bordering Issues

The International Health Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO) revised in 2005 and was agreed by all member states (Ferhani & Rushton, 2020). The IHR solidified ‘Global Health Security’ and the concept refers to the security of the individual state counts on the safety of all (Ferhani & Rushton, 2020). According to the paperwork of Ferhani and Rushton (2020), the IHR stands against the travel and trade impediments for four reasons: i) cannot contain the spread of viruses, ii) damage the economy, iii) help the government in maintaining the secrecy, hampering the proper medication and transportation of the medical, and iv) human rights violations in the border zones. Therefore, IHR maintains the biopolitics of border issues.

The state governments, including Bangladesh, confirmed travel and trade restrictions predominantly as a sign of nationalistic view. But the strict border regulations formulated into the politicization of medicine or the medicalization of politics. There are 2200 public and 5500 private hospitals and clinics in the country, but unfortunately, only more than 12 hospitals in the capital district and one hospital in every district are delivering health services dedicatedly. Only 733 Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and about 1800 ventilations are available in the country. Many patients who are tested positive cannot access medical care and only 25 percent of health workers are serving in rural which are inadequate compared to 70 percent population living in the rural areas (Ganguly, 2020). Most of the medication facilities are available only in Dhaka and are inaccessible to the general people living around the country. 39 public hospitals in Bangladesh cannot supply sufficient oxygen to the patients, so many people are stocking oxygen cylinders at home to be safe (BRAC, 2020). Five million transport workers are in high health risk (BRAC, 2020). The price of medicines and local health safety equipment is increasing daily because of trade and travel bans within the country. This leads to an artificial

scarcity in the local market as people have started overstocking medicines such as hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin (Huq & Biswas, 2020). Ultimately the initial border ban has proven a hardship for the local population.

The threat is collective, so the containment policy should be developed collectively. The IHR demands ‘globalization of disease control efforts’ as no individual country can keep disease out of its territory in this globalized world (Ferhani & Rushton, 2020). Bangladesh should follow the instructions provided by IHR in the post-COVID-19 new challenges to preserve its public health and economy.

Acceleration of Digitalization with Strict Cybersecurity

The SARS-2 episode exacerbated the worldwide development of the fourth Industrial Revolution. Automation is a reset strategy for all states. The more self-imposed and government regulated social distancing will be developing as the norm, the more digitalization and urbanization will materialize. Currently, spatial development is linked to the digitalization of the technology, which is emerging as e-shopping, e-medicine, e-economy, e-learning, e-government, e-tourism, *etc.* (Kunzmann, 2020). As a result, individual privacy is not considered as a human right after the epidemic. Immense virtualization of human life urges potential cybersecurity to secure the country’s people.

European culture of technocracy will dominate the world as more potent than any domestic government (Heisbourg, 2020). The growth of digitalization generates another significant challenge known as ‘infodemic’. The influential social media-constructed misinformation and fake news battle simulate a considerable threat to global and domestic governance. WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus announces, “We are not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic” (Islam & Whelan, 2020). So, Bangladesh should develop an effective containment measure and clarity of information, which is vital to regulate the spread of the virus (Ruiu, 2020). The digitalization of spaces demands new forms of securities of human society as such cybersecurity and information surveillance. And the protection should be politicized through the lenses of the biopolitical rationale theory.

Modification of the Tourist Industry

COVID-19 established Extended Reality (XR) as the alternative of real-life tourism as a result of worldwide travel and trade bans. Except for the travel prohibitions, people pursue social distancing as a precaution. Consequently, the tourism industry will not get back to the pre-pandemic situation. The XR (*e.g.*, virtual reality, augmented reality, mixed reality, and future

reality) presents the virtual tourists in a human-machine merged reality with integrated cyber and physical surroundings (Kwok & Koh, 2020). 'Creative destruction' and 'creative accumulation' can be converted into an innovative tourism industry scheme, according to Schumpeter's innovation hypothesis (Kwok & Koh, 2020). The application of XR has a diverse potential to recreate the travel adventure, which allows multi-stakeholders to endure the pandemic border impediments. This technological version of tourism and virtualization of human pleasure requires more consumer-centric technologies to ensure their safety and privacy. And the real-life tourist zones like Cox' Bazar can be re-designed according to the health regulations and proper planning; it may be proven more advantageous for Bangladesh.

Bangladeshi profitable pre-pandemic tourist enterprises can enact the strategies with the quantity of strict cybersecurity because the security of life is the prime priority for every person who will desire to enjoy traveling from home. As a tourist industry owner or a consumer, the Bangladesh government and business societies should incorporate the XR version with the prioritization of biopolitics affirmatively.

New Norm Employment and Career Development

The global pandemic reasonably diverted the working environment in organizations and influenced the workers in different industries. \$138 million work orders were canceled initially as the pandemic response in Bangladesh. As a result, the livelihood of 4.1 million working-class people is in uncertainty. One recent report of the Penn State Center for Global Worker's Rights (2020) shows that at least 1 million workers have been fired or furloughed in the garment factories of Bangladesh. The report (2020) also emphasized that 72 percent of the furloughed workers have not been paid, and 98 percent of the owners have refused to pay. The collaboration among the government, civil society, workers, enterprises, non-governmental organizations, foreign investors, and its development partners is also a dominant requirement to gain a better new normal. To secure the workers' livelihoods, the Bangladesh government must ensure strict health regulations and mitigating crisis system. The remittance amount of this fiscal year has declined by 24 percent. Many of the foreign industry owners exploited formal and informal migrants. Those Bangladeshi migrants are not only vulnerable to lack of payment, but also lack of food, shelter, and health security in this crisis. More than 1.4 million migrant workers have lost their jobs (BRAC, 2020).

Bangladesh can take a protectionist stance to be self-sufficient by taking advantage of the next normalization. The vast population can be an investment by undertaking the more effective

policies to produce all types of goods and to develop new industries (incredibly, the tech industry) within the border of Bangladesh. For instance, in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak, a Bangladeshi non-governmental garment industry started producing Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) rather than importing from outside (Sayeda, 2020). Recently, Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and its partners have taken the initiative to produce 500,000 PPE in response to the pandemic effect (Islam & Divadkar, 2020). The returned migrants can also get involved in economic development within the country. This outbreak also gives a significant opportunity to improve Bangladesh's agricultural position employing a massive number of workers.

Changing employment structures pose uncertainty and inconveniencing conditions among worker societies of all class and status. Career Resilience (CR) is a process which helps one to assess the risk factors and positive outcomes in adopting a career. The employee can take the chance to determine the job based on his/her need, and he/she should consider the needs of employers when the employers also prefer the necessities of an employee according to the CR (Hite & Mcdonald, 2020). Organizations should develop concentrated learning efforts and mental health aids for formulating a more compassionate organizational and more endurable career culture (Hite & Mcdonald, 2020). Country people of Bangladesh are going through virtualization of territory and space so that CR procedure will be productive for them. Another new management approach can be suitable for them, the Strategic Flexibility Analysis, which involves a four-step pattern. Developing socio-technological transformations of the new normal require 'Meaning of Work,' 'Organizational Leadership,' 'Contactless Commerce & Education', and 'Individual & Corporate Volunteerism' as a strategic tool in the employment sector (Yawson, 2020). The physical and psychological wellbeing of the working people will be the rationale for the policy implications.

The neorealist thinker Waltz discussed how the evolution of the international system continuously changes the means of national interest of the world states. Once the exploitation of workers was beneficial to the countries, now maintenance of their good health and bio-security is the only option to be successful overcoming the challenges of the new normal. Bangladesh's decision-makers should evaluate all the employment and industry policy strategies through the prism of the theory of biopolitical rationale.

Promoting Environment as ‘Solution’, not as ‘Problem’

The last years of the twentieth century are remarked as the points of the consideration in environmental problem. The 2020 global Corona pandemic has indicated that it is the time to acknowledge biology and ecology as the solution rather than as a problem. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) established the International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, which is considered as an international guideline to shape climate policies of the UN member states. The IPCC report warned the world leaders that the increase in the average temperature of the earth from 1.5 to 2.5 degrees celcius would stimulate the environmental catastrophe from 75 to 250 times than the present situation (Rehman, 2016). The 1992 Earth Summit and the 1997 Earth Summit are known as the earlier significant measures to protect the world atmosphere. These summits highlighted the concerns over environmental destruction before the world population.

In 1997, the most meaningful Kyoto Protocol was signed in the presence of 160 country representatives to control the rate of global warming. It was decided that industrial countries would decrease carbon emission by 5.2 percent on average, which would minimize their carbon generating rate of 1990. But the rejection of the USA in 2001 left the treaty ineffective. The USA Oil and Gas Giant Companies pressured the government to reject the protocol. The Bush Administration preferred economic benefits rather than the safety of the environment. The USA remits about 15 percent of the global carbon emission and at the same time, China remits 30 percent (Tiseo, 2020). The 1987 Montreal Protocol was also left inadequate to protect the ozone layer omission as the great powers gave less priority to the environment. The Paris Agreement was signed in December 2015 to strengthen the global response to mitigate climate change. The world hopes to establish the pact as an international norm within 2020. But the top environment polluters disagree with the standard of keeping the global warming rate less than 2 degrees celsius. The international society expected a responsible attitude from the dominant economies like China, the US, and India. Instead of accepting the protocols to mitigate the problems, they were separated into groups developing different agendas related to carbon concentration. But their preferences endangered ecology, biology, and ultimately the existence of humankind. The COVID-19 outbreak is the most terrible result of the endangerment.

According to the research of the World Watch Institute (1997), the top eight industrial countries are remarked as E-8 countries, which are responsible for 58 percent of the global carbon emission (Rehman, 2016). The developed countries are still not ready to accept their liability

on the environmental issue. The UNEP report indicated that the developed countries released 83.7 percent carbon dioxide from 1800 to 1988, while less developed or third world countries made only 16.3 percent (Rehman, 2016). As a consequence, Asia experiences a massive loss out of desertification which amounts to \$20.9 million annually. Bangladesh is the most vulnerable island country. According to the World Watch Institute (1992), the height of the global sea level will rise to 217 centimeters while in Bangladesh, it will be from 332 to 447 centimeters within 2100. The report reveals 26 to 34 percent of the land will be submerged, and 27 to 35 percent of the people's lives will be worsened by rising salinity. Sundarbans is in a significant threat of climate change, where the extinction of various species and trees will bring an ecological change and biological transformation. So, the existence of developing countries depends entirely on the attitude of the developed countries.

The First Earth Summit established two remarkable treaties: Framework Convention on Climate Change and Biological Diversity Convention. Bangladesh ratified the treaties. The Framework Convention on Climate Change prioritizes securing Sustainable Development by decreasing the damages of carbon emission. The Biological Diversity Convention prefers the protection of biological diversity through the national policy implementation processes. The world obtained several significant treaties, but none of them have come to the realization yet. Even the most vulnerable countries like Bangladesh give preference to economic growth rather than biology and nature. Bangladesh has established the Rampal Coal Power Plant near Sundarbans and Ruppur Nuclear Power Plant which pose a considerable danger to the atmosphere of the country of natural calamity. The government should take the long-term environment suited policies as the existence of the country depends more on its nature rather than the economy. The innovation of renewable energy-centric technologies like hydropower or solar power to energy production will be well utilized in Bangladesh. These innovations will be a new normal opportunity-driven scheme for the country. According to the neorealists, states should reshape their priorities following the prevailing situations and challenges.

Bangladesh must stand for its vulnerable climate conditions. The government must ensure a strong international representation to highlight its environmental vulnerability and to encourage neighbors and developed countries to stand for global environmental solutions. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina took a praiseworthy step to extend Bangladesh's climate strategy, which counts as significant international importance. She launched the first regional office of the Global Center on Adaptation (GCA) of South Asia in Dhaka on 8th September 2020. It is an extension of the Bangladesh Climate Strategy, Action Plan in 2009, and

Bangladesh Delta Plan-2100 (Akter, 2020). She explained in the virtual launch event: “I hope this regional office will share the best adaptation practices of Bangladesh as well as other countries and exchange practices within the region. It will serve as a Center of Excellence and a solution-broker for adaptation measures in the region” (Akter, 2020).

The GCA is a solution giving the international organization to expedite implementation and support adaptation strategies in uncertainties. The measure is the probability steered one to deal with the new normal challenges. Bangladesh took the Global Adaptation Center Establishment as a step forward to face the upcoming bio-disasters like the Corona outbreak and ensure integration among neighbors to combat environmental calamities.

Establishment of the ‘Green Economy’

The world economy is dealing with a severe effect of COVID-19. According to the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD, 2020), the current GDP growth rate of Bangladesh stands on 2.5 percent from 8.2 percent, while the fallen rate is 1.6 percent, according to the World Bank. Situation Report of BRAC (2020), the average family income has reduced by 70 percent having hit by the pandemic. Around 100.22 million Bangladeshis are at high economic, and health vulnerabilities (BRAC,2020). The report also shows 53.64 million people of Bangladesh are living in extreme poverty and among them, 47.33 million are at increased economic risk, while 36.33 million are at high health risk (BRAC, 2020). Bangladesh should give priority to the extreme sufferings of the people in the governance after the pandemic. The survival of peoples’ life and its mechanism will be the ultimate means of securing the country’s national interest.

Gills (2020) depicts that humankind currently struggles into a ‘triple conjuncture’ of global crisis: climate change and ecological deterioration, an ongoing dilemma of worldwide capitalism and neoliberal economic globalization (Alam & Ayanie, 2020), and the new global COVID-19 outburst. Coronavirus revealed that capitalist economies are operating without progress only depending upon public reserves and governmental interventions (Spash, 2020). The pandemic uncovered an eco-friendly economic revolution by many alternative economists (environmental economists, ecological economists, radical economists, and climate economists) who relied on global cost-benefit calculations against the mainstream economists. Ecological logic demonstrates that if climate actions incorporate economic policy, it will be efficient to save one rich person rather than 14 poor people (Spash, 2020). The Global Commission on the Economic Climate (GCEC) publicized a clear statement that: “In the long term if climate change is not tackled, growth itself will be at risk” (Spash, 2020). Bangladesh

should rethink and re-establish its economy by placing humanity and environmental ethics at the center of the economy. Corruption is the dominant barrier to all developments and growth in the country. A vast number of the population is dying, starving, and suffering every day for corrupted economic and administrative structures in the country, which is a matter of biopolitics.

Consequently, a green financial system must be redesigned to ensure sustainable development, green growth, circular economy, and enduring comprehensive growth (Spash, 2020). Unfortunately, more than BDT 711 crore (\$8.38 crore) is added as the allocation for the Ruppur Nuclear Power Plant in the proposed Budget 2020-21 FY rather Hydropower, and Solar Power Plants should be given emphasis. Further, the pharmaceutical business model in Bangladesh should be diversified. The big pharma companies did not invest in developing SARS-COV and MARS-COV small market as the death toll was low (Boudjelal, Nehdi & Islam, 2020). According to the biopolitical rationale theory, the pharma business model must accommodate affirmative biopolitics not only for the welfare of humanity, but also for their economic interests. For example, if the dominant pharma companies invested in inventing vaccines of the previous small market pandemics, they would get a massive benefit from the 30%-40% recovery of COVID-19 (Boudjelal *et al.*, 2020).

In greening the financial system, Bangladesh needs to include the life of the sufferers of poverty to utilize the environment rather than to exploit them, and needs not to consider death and war as rational rather than human life in economic policymaking. The developed theory exhibits the greening economy which is the logical requirement for the normalization of life in the post-pandemic era. Biology and the environment should be involved justly in the political agenda of Bangladesh to fight against bio-disasters and wars against viruses.

Combined Health and Military Services for Emergency Health Crisis

PM Sheikh Hasina announced that the government is working to modernize and well-train the armed and naval forces to pace with the technologically developed armed forces of the developed and developing countries of the world (The Daily Star, 2020). It is a must to survive and self-defend in this military-prone international society. But it is clear to the world that no one is prepared to win a war on viruses, whether it is caused by natural causes or bioterrorism. Bill Gates in 2015 alerted the world about this type of unpreparedness and more horrible war. Suppose we can create a combined action plan of military forces and the health sector, collaborative network of the Defense and Health Ministry. There will be a possibility of

defeating the global pandemic COVID-19 (Gates, 2020). Bill Gates (2015) also stated that if anyone does the rational calculation, he can measure the rising health budget allocation is significantly cheaper than the potential cost of the impacts of the war. Bangladesh needs a military-health combined structure to contain future pandemics.

The combination of the health and defense sector will help Bangladesh to prepare for the next pandemic. The process of this preparation should be started in the post-pandemic new normal. This is the way by which biology can be included affirmatively in the militarization. This phenomenon indicates the evolution of individual and international securitization processes according to the neorealism approach of IR. The current evolution demands a biopolitical strategy for every country including Bangladesh.

Conclusion

The new normal is the post-corona reconstruction and restarting phase. The era will be remarkably challenging for a developing and densely populated country like Bangladesh. From biotechnological intervention in the regular phenomenon of birth and death to other bioterrorism, deployment of biopolitics now has become unavoidable. So, the research has proposed the Biopolitical Rationale hypothesis to deal with the next normalization challenges. The present study suggests what type of policy strategy should be taken to manage the new normal reconstruction of Bangladesh but does not explore how to employ them.

Bangladesh should prioritize the biopolitical policy strategy to incorporate all settings of the life of the population rather than to negatively politicize their life. The government should hold on the patterns of biopower to set straight the bio-disaster damages in the health sector, economic employment, career development, tourism, pharma business sector, administrative bodies, environmental sector, information and technology sector, social security sector, *etc.* Several beneficial institutions, like the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, have not proven significant enough to make the state leaders understand the importance of the environmental solution yet. The emergence of the COVID-19 epidemic should be reasonable enough to take sufficient measures to highlight the environment as a solution rather than a problem. If biology and politics consolidate appropriately, the new normal reframing of Bangladesh will be a more progressive opportunity. The incorporation of biopolitics in the core governing system will be a crucial challenge to the government.

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The Rise of Political Symbolism in Post-Truth Era Democracies: Case Study of India during COVID-19 Pandemic

Mehnaz Najmi*

Introduction

The Post-truth era, also called post-factual politics, has resulted in a new kind of political culture in which debates are framed largely by appeals to emotion which are disconnected from the details of policy, and by the repeated assertion of talking points to which factual rebuttals are ignored. Post-truth can, thus, be understood as a shift from reason to emotion, where the emphasis is given to exaggerated feelings rather than logic. Post-truth politics largely rests on political symbolism. Symbols are created to enforce an artificial support system where emotionally charged issues are discussed and debated while ignoring the facts. It offers only one option, which is supporting the system; opposing it or staying neutral is not considered acceptable. Democratic rights like freedom of speech and expression threaten the whole idea of post-truth politics, which encourages citizens to ask pertinent questions about the policies and state matters. To impose the prominence of symbols credibility of important questions is put at stake (Najmi, 2017a).

A symbol can be defined as a person or a concept that represents, stands for, or suggests a particular idea, rituals, myths, belief, action, or material entity. Symbols take the form of words, sounds, gestures, ideas, or visual images and are used to convey approved/accepted ideas and beliefs of that particular period. The recent outbreak of coronavirus has yet again established this narrative especially in South Asia and particularly in India. Religious symbols and nuances like banging plates or lighting earthen lamps/candles or saying that it is God's wrath because we have stopped following righteous path has resulted in the pandemic. Promotion of non-scientific ideas like drinking cow urine or taking bath with cow dung can cure the disease as it has the symbolic holy cow attached to it. This practice has suddenly become a 'new normal'. People found these ideas more appealing and lucrative than visiting the medical practitioners or following the guidelines issued by competent authorities. It was easy for the leaders to unite and build trust by defying the scientific logic and bringing symbolism to the fore.

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Historical Disposition

Earlier historians and sophists use to create the symbols by praising the icons related to the kingship. The primary aim of these efforts was to make the king revered and important in the eyes of people. Such symbols also gave prominence to the ideals associated with the monarchy or even dictatorship. We find temples and shrines of kings in almost every part of the world, which are replete with such symbols. The symbols were enough to inform the people about laws, duties, punishment, rules, regulations, and expectations from citizens through them. Symbols spoke volumes about the glory of the King, his ministers, troops, and their achievements. Even the currency used at that time displayed the symbols of prevalent kingships of the time. Mummification of dead kings and pyramids were part of popular culture in Egypt. We all grew up listening to the stories of valor and pride of our ancestors and forefathers. Such stories or folk tales signify the importance of the symbols which we are carrying since ages like surname or family name. To be precise, symbols have played a really important role in uniting and dividing the human species (Najmi, 2017b).

Present Scenario

With the advent of the internet and the improvement of telecommunication, the world seems interconnected the way it has never been. It is easier to reach out to a larger audience at one click. The idea of globalization united the world by providing popular symbols to work as a unifying force against the things/ideas which created fragments in the world. The stress was shifted on the market economy which saw the world only as divided between buyers and sellers. To sell a thing or idea symbols were required which were beyond the notions of true and false. Media was used enthusiastically to create and capture large markets. The idea of globalization supported the ideals of democracy, which was all about public will and free choice. Sellers entered into the homes of prospective buyers to sell their products through vigorous advertising. Stress was given on the interaction and intermingling of people beyond boundaries. Social media made it easier and gave an interactive platform to different communities like Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. But as the recession hit the world during 2007-08, the idea of globalization came under the scanner. The idea which united the world as a global village was being questioned. Natives were losing their rights to the outsiders for-profit and business. The concept of globalization was vehemently rejected after the recession hit the world and new political leaders started demanding rights for the citizens. They questioned the allocation of jobs and resources to the alien workforces for cost-cutting. Newly emergent and right-wing

parties started focusing on the rights of citizens; importance was given to the historical symbols depicting majoritarian culture, tunes of hyper-nationalism started being played, and those who questioned it were declared anti-nationals.

Ralph Keyes, in his book, *The Post-Truth Era* writes:

At one time we had truth and lies. Now we have truth, lies, and statements that may not be true but we consider too benign to call false. Euphemisms abound. We're "economical with the truth," we "sweeten it," or tell "the truth improved." The term deceive gives way to spin. At worst we admit to "misspeaking," or "exercising poor judgment." Nor do we want to accuse others of lying. We say they're in denial. A liar is "ethically challenged," someone for whom "the truth is temporarily unavailable" (2004, p. 21).

Generally, issues having emotional connection are used as symbols in India and everywhere else, so that large masses are attached and attracted to them. If one has certain religious/social or political affiliations, then he/she must flaunt symbols to reaffirm and showcase his/her faith in those ideas. The relationship of symbols to the functioning of the state is also emerging as an important aspect of politics today in the post-truth era, which puts a question mark on the democratic process. Democracy in itself is a broad concept that allows people to participate in selecting and electing their representatives. It celebrates free will whereas post-truth politics is averse to alternative ideas.

As there is an outbreak of pandemic COVID-19 all over the world these days, the way different governments are dealing with it is making all the difference. Coronavirus is forcing governments to think about their citizens and for democracy itself. Since democracies give a lot of stress on individual rights, human rights, right to movement, etc., they were hesitant in putting lock down effectively. As it spread at a fast rate, the democracies turned out to be the most affected by the outbreak. Suddenly, they were faced with unprecedented disruption to the decision-making machinery of government – including travel bans and social-distancing restrictions on large meetings. All officials in capitals worldwide have started to adopt new working methods, including meetings by videoconference, and remote voting by ministers and parliaments. The new coronavirus pandemic is not only destroying the public health and the global economy but disrupting and questioning the idea of democracy worldwide. It has hit at a time when democracy was already under threat due to the rise of right-wing politics in the post-truth era, and now this pandemic risk is exacerbating democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation. Some governments have already started using the pandemic to expand their control, executive powers, and restrict individual rights. The coronavirus

pandemic is likely to transform other pillars of democratic governance – such as electoral processes, civilian control of militaries, and civic mobilization – and potentially reset the terms of the global debate on the merits of authoritarianism versus democracy (Edwards, 2020). In this background, an effort is being made to study India, democracy, and developing the nation's response to this pandemic.

Democratization Process in India

To begin with, we need to look at India's tryst with democracy itself. As we go back to 1947 and the adoption of democracy as a form of governance, we find many confusions, issues, chaos, and problems. As Indians were habitual of living under the monarchy and then under company rule, things did not change for them, but with the advent of democracy, they received a lot of rights. Actually, it took many years to understand the power they had received with democratic ideals. Earlier politics was all about the elites sitting and discussing the policies in the clubhouse or parties. Democracy changed the whole idea of politics in India. The poorest of the poor and the lowest of the lower classes got the right to vote and began participating in the elections after independence. Elections in a way empowered them by breaking the age-old shackles of caste and religious prejudices. Initially, the political leaders tried to focus on developing scientific temper along with strengthening the ideals of democracy.

The industrialization process started alongside the opening of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), new universities, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), and several research organizations that were inaugurated. All this was taking place, while the prejudices and traditions were still prevalent in the roots. Unlike the British Raj, people were made to trust the government and the ideal of a welfare socialist state was introduced. Schemes like ration cards, subsidies, pensions, free medical, and educational facilities were introduced by the government, bringing trust in the government. It was a shift for the masses from being ruled to the equal citizenry. With the advent of universities and free education, people started knowing the importance of their voting rights. They understood that if they are poor, it is the failure of government and the necessary conditions need to be created by the government to manage the affairs. For a poverty-ridden country with a dense population like India, this awareness was not considered as a good sign by the political elite, and hence emergency was forced by then PM Indira Gandhi to take things under control. Later on, she lost the elections and had to face the criminal charges. When she again contested elections, she brought emotionally charged symbolic issues and slogans and swayed the results. It can be seen as the

beginning of the erosion of democratic institutions which is still going on. With the rise of the pandemic, we can see how an issue of medical emergency is subsided by the politicians into symbolism like banging of thalis or making noise and claiming it to be killing the virus. The worst part is that instead of questioning the ridiculous insertions, the public is participating in these theatrics purely out of emotion.

Vote-bank Politics

In the course of time, the right to vote also came under the shadow of poverty, underdevelopment, caste, and social-religious prejudices. The politicians gradually started working to maintain their respective vote banks, ignoring the other sections of the masses. Instead of strengthening and uniting the nation, it began dividing the country on a different basis. Vote bank politics started dominating the politics of countries. Vote banks mean the loyal block of voters who vote enmass for a particular party, candidate, movement, cause, caste, or religion. This also depicts the collective emotional and attitudinal bias or mood of the section of people cited. Such behavior is often the result of an expectation of real or imagined benefits from the political formations, often at the cost of other communities. Generally, the poor get attracted to such politics, who find it the only way out of their problems. They vote enmass for political parties in return for some promises and short-term gains. This degradation of politics has shown its worst possible threat during the outbreak of the pandemic. Muslims were shamelessly characterized by media as carriers of disease due to the event by Tablighi Jamaat in Delhi where foreign nationals participated as delegates. There were cases where appeals were made by the politicians to boycott Muslim vendors and not to give them any job. Media, instead of questioning the government for allowing this even to take place, raised questions on the entire community supported particular political parties in order to keep vote banks intact. But when the priests and policemen of Ayodhya temple get affected by the virus because of lax attitude and not following the guidelines, media and politicians have not attacked their religion. It was simply a sad case of COVID-19. The majority of the community is transformed into a united vote bank against the minorities by creating such issues. Day and night, they are being told that 80% population is under threat by 15% minority. A symbolic demon surviving on hatred is created in the minds and hearts of the common populace to build a strong vote bank.

The Prominence of Political Symbolism over Reason

A new narrative has intruded the Indian politics that you cannot question the government; in case you do, you are anti-national. To prove oneself as a nationalist, he/she has to agree and

follow all the commands. The public servants are now the rulers and democracy is gradually transforming into demagogy. A huge amount of money is spent on project Vista when a common man is suffering from corona without proper treatment and facilities. Migrant laborers are stranded in different states but are not able to reach home. Doctors, nurses, and hospital staff are getting infected while treating patients due to a lack of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE). It is surprising that all these things are not even part of our demands. We were told by the prime minister as a nation to show reverence towards the medical professionals by coming out and clapping or banging the plates in the evening, which was a gesture of being thankful. Some so-called intellectuals sitting on media channels started telling that banging plates in the balcony will create vibrations and destroy the virus as it is an age-old Indian tradition. Suddenly, a religious angle was inserted and from a symbolic gesture, it turned into a religious event defying all ideas related to social distancing. On the second occasion, the PM asked the nation to switch off the lights and light earthen lamps or candles to show the solidarity in the dark times of the pandemic. Again, it was transformed into a hyper nationalistic and religious event, citing examples from the past with the argument that it will kill the virus. Those who decided not to participate in the event were ostracized in the society, ridiculed, and in some cases were attacked by their neighbors. A misconception was filled in common man's thought process that these symbolic gestures will eradicate the pandemic.

Edward Watts, a historian at the University of California, warns in his book *Mortal Republic: How Rome Fell into Tyranny*, that if citizens will not save their democratic political institutions, it will only strengthen the rulers as has happened in the Roman empire earlier. It will result in democracy changing into tyranny. History has a tendency to repeat itself if we do not take lessons from it and mend our ways. As we witness the erosion of democratic institutions of India especially in the backdrop of COVID-19, we find that the sane voices are being forcibly made silent by putting them into prisons or enforcing legal actions against them at the behest of the state. The PM care fund was collected to fight the disease but citizens are not allowed to ask for its accounts, as to where it is being spent. The country was under lockdown as a necessary measure to stop the outbreak but it has brought with-it large-scale migration, unemployment, poverty, domestic abuse, communal attacks, mob lynching, social fragmentation, and anxiety especially among the poor. Sadly, they do not use social media or raise their concerns in big rallies. They are just vote-banks that will be used in the next general elections. Doctors who raised the issue of non-payment of salary or medical equipment are forcibly removed by the hospitals. Courts are taking cognizance of Facebook and Twitter posts

but not about the conditions of the poor. The country is made to believe that everything is fine when it is not. Despite the looming medical emergency, the entire nation is busy celebrating the foundation ceremony of Ram Temple. It is clear that imaginary political symbols with unrealistic ideals have taken prominence in India where the educated class instead of questioning the policies is busy banging plates, taking selfies, and uploading them on social media. The future of democratic symbols seems under threat from these political symbols.

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Impact on International Trade during COVID-19 Pandemic: A Case Study of India

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Introduction

The Secretary-General Mukhisa Kituyi has rightly stated regarding COVID-19, during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), that the “economic fallout from the shock is ongoing and increasingly difficult to predict, but there are clear indications that things will get much worse for developing economies before they get better” (UNCTAD, 2020). The present article is focused on the impact of COVID-19 on India’s international trade and an effort has been made to highlight the expected impact under the limitation of availability of detailed data and information. Quantitative forecasting or prediction in a numerical way is not possible at this time due to said limitation hence the outcome is more indicative and based on perception.

As the COVID-19 is spreading, governments across the world took actions and imposed lockdowns. India imposed complete lockdown restrictions on 22 March having a population of more than 1.3 billion. As of now, more than half of the world population is under lockdown. Many production processes and economic activities are getting affected as a result of the lockdown; thus, its economic cost is huge. For example, Thunstrom *et al.* (2020) estimate the cost of lockdown in the US at 7.2 USD trillion. Another scholar, Fernando estimates the expected downfall in Indian GDP in three different scenario-based on the degree of influence as 1.4%, 3.1%, and whopping 5.3% downfall due to COVID-19 during 2020 (Fernando, 2020). The decision to unlock will end up with complex political, health, social, and economic issues, and finding a way forward to streamline them will be a more crucial phenomenon. A major risk exists that once the pandemic slows down or appears to be under control and lockdown measures are lifted, new waves of Covid-19 reappear (Gossner, 2020). The 20th century has known three influenza pandemics: the 1918 ‘Spanish flu’, the 1957 ‘Asian flu’, and the 1968 H3N2 ‘Hong Kong flu’. Later, the 21st century has already witnessed the 2009 ‘Swine Flu’. These four pandemics came in waves, with subsequent waves being more deadly than the first (Miller *et al.*, 2009). COVID-19 is the most challenging and destructive epidemic in terms of drastic changes in social behavior, economic activities, and environmental issues. To this

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effect, the objective of this commentary is to describe the effects of COVID-19 on the world economy in general and the Indian economy in particular with special reference to India's international trade and related measures. To this end, a descriptive and exploratory research approach has been followed in discussing the impacts and related aspects to give elementary research or study. Observational methods, secondary data, and expert opinion are prominent aspects of the methodology adopted to develop an early study and provide the basic research framework for further work and analysis.

Discussion and Descriptive Representation

India is not an exception in terms of economic outcomes and linkage. The rate of conversion may depend on the COVID-19 effects, control, and subsequent socio-political bill along with the trade-off between 'human capital and capital' or 'human health and economic health'. "From the economy's point of view, the lockdown undoubtedly looks costly right now, but compared to the lives of Indian citizens, it is nothing" (Original in Hindi, Translated From Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Speech to the Nation, 10 am, 14 April, 2020). It is a mammoth task to say firmly about the magnitude of the expected impacts but certainly, the direction is clear. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections of economic growth are indicating the disruptive impacts of a pandemic for the financial year ending 2020 and 2021 in Table – 1 below.

Table 1: Disruptive Impacts of Pandemic – A Projection (2020-2021)

Region	Year			
	2018	2019	2020 (Projected)	2021 (Projected)
World Output	3.6	2.9	-3.0	5.8
Advanced Economies	2.2	1.7	-6.1	4.5
Emerging Market and Developing Economies	4.5	3.7	-1.0	6.6
India	6.1	4.2	1.9	7.4
China	6.7	6.1	1.2	9.2
World Trade Volume (goods and services)	3.8	0.9	-11.0	8.4

Source: World Economic Outlook, (IMF, April 2020).

The picture is clear that the world output is expected to decrease by (-) 3% and is worse than the global economic recession of 2008-09, while the impact is severe for advanced economies which are projected for a deep downfall of (-) 6.1% even if they are resource-rich on both

economic and human health infrastructure fronts. The projection table is showing positive (though the figure is much less than the average growth rate of both nations during a couple of years) for China and India. The positive sides for India are many which include the dominant service sector - compared to the manufacturing sector, it is less affected and one of the reasons among many is that work from home is possible during lockdown up to a certain extent. More than 50% of the population engaged in the primary sector which is majorly away from the core urban area (urban areas are most affected by pandemic as compared to rural) and thereby, considered as one of the safe zones in economic fluctuations. It may have the advantage driven by the demand of the economy besides the resilient socio-economic setup.

Surprisingly, the top ten nations affected more by COVID-19 are more or less similar to the list of the top ten largest economies in the world. The major economies like the US, China, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, and Italy are all in the top-ten most affected by the pandemic. The last few days or a couple of weeks had shown an exponential growth of cases in the G7 economies (US, Canada, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, and Italy). G7 countries account for approximately 60% of world supply and demand (GDP), 65% of world manufacturing, and 41% of world manufacturing exports. To paraphrase an especially apt quip: when these economies sneeze, the rest of the world will catch a cold. So, their woes will produce 'supply-chain contagion' in virtually all nations (Mauro, 2020).

Interdependencies among the economies and various linkages in the supply chain whether it is due to supply shock or demand shock have been affecting the international trade of goods and services. It seems at this point unlikely that COVID-19 would hit the world economy as hard and as broadly as the Global Crisis did in 2008-09, but the evidence from that experience provides an outer limit on the range of likely outcomes this time (Tomura, 2020). The growth rate of international trade in goods and services was 3.8% during the financial year 2018, which dropped down to 0.9% in the 2019/20 Fiscal Year (FY) during the last quarter because of the pandemic. The projections are given by IMF (as shown in Table – 1 above) based on various impacts are horrible that world trade volume in goods and services will likely to dropdown by monstrous (-)11% indicating expected extreme impactful and miserable outcome in international trade during the financial year 2020, while the projection for the successive financial year is hopeful and positive with 8.4% growth rate. Similarly, UNCTAD and WTO showed their concern in various studies and reports that the pandemic will inflict international trade so the growth of it. According to the new analysis titled 'The COVID-19 Shock to Developing Countries' of UNCTAD, that "towards 'whatever it takes' program for the two-

thirds of the world's population is left behind". Commodity-rich exporting countries will face a USD 2 trillion to USD 3 trillion drops in investments from overseas in the next two years while IMF estimates as shown in Table - 1 are firm on a positive growth rate for world trade during 2021. The time required in recovery will affect or restrict the new avenues which generate the thrust in future trading aspects. The disruption and its cruel impacts on international trade seem to be visible even after it. The said momentum economies need to regain like before which depends on comparative situation or control over the COVID-19 across the nations or trading partners. Such disruptions are not only a big threat to food security across the globe but they create a big halt in the global economy. According to Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso, "The spread of the new coronavirus is a public health crisis that could pose a serious risk to the macroeconomy through the halt in production activities, interruptions of people's movement and cut-off of supply chains" while attending the G-20 gathering in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 24, 2020.


The rapid spread of the novel coronavirus globally had already raised the prospects of a hit to the Indian economy via weaker exports and disrupted imports. With major economies of the world slipping into a 'near-halt' due to pandemic coronavirus, Indian exporters find themselves in a state of turmoil as trade in the country's top destinations is paralyzed, making it imperative for an urgent relief measures for the exporting industries (Engineering Export Promotion Council (EEPC) of India said on 16 March, 2020). The said expectation was primarily dependent on the two aspects of the supply chain and early panic of the pandemic in trading nations. The US, UAE, Germany, UK, Singapore, Italy, and China, among others, are the largest contributors to India's basket of merchandise exports which are ahead of India on such a pandemic timeline. The situation was corroborated by the EEPC Chairman Ravi Sehgal while saying, "Trade is crippled in most of these destinations due to a near-collapse of the global supply chain even as the cargo movement has stopped. The warehousing capacity is over-stretched with severe blocking of export finance. The international shipping lines are affected. Even the urgent and less bulky cargo through air routes is paralyzed with the airlines trimming their operations."

Results

To analyze the impact of COVID-19 on India's foreign trade, it is desirable to cover the major trade items which are prominent in 'Export' and 'Import'. For India, the impact is estimated to be the most for the chemicals sector at USD 129 million, textiles and apparel at USD 64 million,

the automotive sector at USD 34 million, electrical machinery at USD 12 million, leather products at USD 13 million, metals and metal products at USD 27 million, and wood products and furniture at USD 15 million (The Economic Times, 5 March, 2020). The same article further claimed that among the “most affected economies are the European Union USD 15.6 billion, the United States USD 5.8 billion, Japan USD 5.2 billion, South Korea USD 3.8 billion, Taiwan Province of China USD 2.6 billion and Vietnam USD 2.3 billion”. The 2% contraction in China’s output has ripple effects through the global economy and, thus, has caused an estimated drop of about USD 50 billion across countries (UNCTAD, 2020). The most affected sectors, according to UNCTAD, include precision instruments machinery automotive and communication equipment. The data of selected and prominent lines as in ITC or commodity-specific analyses for India’s international trade are presented in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Summary of Overall Exports (Merchandise and Services)^{1*}



Source: Press Information Bureau, 15 April, 2020.

It is depicting that India’s overall exports (Merchandise and Services combined) in April-March 2019-20* are estimated to be USD 528.45 billion, exhibiting a negative growth of (-) 1.36% last year over the same period. Overall imports in April-March 2019-20* are estimated to be USD 598.61 billion, exhibiting a negative growth of (-) 6.33% over the same period last year (Bureau, 15-April-2020).

Merchandise Trade - Exports (including Re-Exports)

Exports during March 2020 were USD 21.41 billion, as compared to USD 32.72 billion in March 2019, showing negative growth of (-) 34.57 % Year-over-Year (YoY). The said decline

¹ Note that the latest data for the services sector released by Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is for February 2020. The data for March 2020 is estimation, which will be revised based on RBI’s subsequent release.

is mainly because of the ongoing global slowdown, which is further aggravated due to the COVID-19 crisis. Except for Iron ore with a positive growth of 58.43%, all other commodities/commodity groups have registered negative growth in March 2020 on a YoY basis. The top in negative list are Oil meals (-69.85%), Meat, Dairy and Poultry Products (-45.48%), Engineering goods (-42.32%), Gems and jewelry (-41.05%), Leather and Leather Products (-36.78%), Plastic and Linoleum (-35.67%), RMG of all textiles (-34.91%), Carpet (-34.72%), Mica, Coal and other ores, minerals including processed minerals (-34.06%), Tea (-33.74%), Other cereals (-33.42%), Organic and inorganic chemicals (-32.88%), Cotton yarn/fabrics/made-ups, Handloom products etc. (-32.16%), Petroleum products (-31.12%) and Rice (-28.28%). Non-petroleum, Non-Gems, and Jewelry exports in March 2020 were USD 16.90 billion, as compared to USD 25.68 billion in March 2019, exhibiting a negative growth of (-) 34.19%.

The cumulative value of exports for April-March 2019-20 was USD 314.31 billion, but it was USD 330.08 billion during April-March 2018-19, registering a negative growth of (-) 4.78%. Non-petroleum, Non-Gems, and Jewelry exports in April-March 2019-20 were USD 235.73 billion, as compared to USD 243.27 billion for the corresponding period in 2018-19, which shows a decrease of (-) 3.10%.

Merchandise Trade – Imports

Imports during March 2020 were USD 31.16 billion, which was 28.72% lower than imports of USD 43.72 billion during March 2019. Major commodity groups of import showing negative growth in March 2020 over the corresponding month of last year are Pearls, Precious and Semi-Precious Stones (-53.46%), Machinery, Electrical and Non-Electrical (-31.72%), Electronic Goods (-29.09%), Coal, Coke, Briquettes, etc. (-23.54%), and Petroleum, Crude and Products (-15%). Also, Oil imports in March 2020 were USD 10.01 billion, 15.00% lower compared to USD 11.78 billion on a YoY basis. On the other hand, non-oil imports in March 2020 were estimated at USD 21.15 billion, 33.78 % lower in comparison with USD 31.94 billion during March 2019, Non-Oil and Non-Gold imports were USD 19.92 billion in March 2020, recording a negative growth of (-)30.47%, as compared to USD 28.65 billion in March 2019 while a rise in import in March 2020 was witnessed only in Transport equipment, which registered a growth of 11.94% over March 2019.

The cumulative value of imports for the period April-March 2019-20 was USD 467.19 billion whereas it was USD 514.08 billion during April-March 2018-19, registering a negative growth

of (-)9.12%. Non-oil imports in April-March 2019-20 were USD 337.76 billion which was 9.49% lower compared to USD 373.16 billion in April-March 2018-19. Non-Oil and Non-Gold imports were USD 309.53 billion in April-March 2019-20, recording a negative growth of (-)9.03%, as compared to USD 340.25 billion in April-March 2018-19.

Trade-in Services - Exports (Receipts) and Imports (Payments)

As per the latest press release by RBI (RBI, 15 April 2020), exports in Services during February 2020 were USD 17.73 billion, which registered a positive growth of 6.88% from February 2019. The estimated value of export services for March 2020² is USD 17.69 billion. Similarly, imports in February 2020 were USD 11.07 billion registering a positive growth of 12.82% in comparison with February 2019. The estimated value of import services for March 2020³ is USD 10.97 billion.

Initially, it was expected and predicted that the impact on perishable items such as seafood, fruits, vegetables, and non-vegetarian items will be less and the alternative to export them to other markets can be explored instead of China especially for shrimp. But soon such projections have been disappearing and proven wrong when the COVID-19 became a global pandemic instead of local as was expected in China only. The same is applicable at this point because claiming anything firmly is still too early to say in such mid-way where only expectations are prominent instead of the unknown reality. Till 21st of March, the biggest concern was to deal with those trading partners who were affected by the pandemic at that time; after this, however, a domestic measure of lockdown is playing a different role in international trade which can be divided into two broad categories: loss due to inability and fear of losing due to further conditional restrictions.

Conclusion and Recommendations

As of now, the relative position is not clear as to where a lot will go which is depending on how COVID-19 will be overcome and it is purely depending on medical science in terms of inventing a vaccine or a defined way of cure. Hopefully, it will end very quickly but if not the impact can be severe and will have long-term impacts. The estimation will again be proven wrong but of course, the direction is defined and the magnitude is the function of time, the recovery, and restrictions over COVID-19. It is recommended that empirical research design

²The latest data for the service sector released by RBI is for February 2020. The data for March 2020 is estimation, which will be revised based on RBI's subsequent release.

³ The latest data for services sector released by RBI is for February 2020. The data for March 2020 is estimation, which will be revised based on RBI's subsequent release.

and subsequent analysis may proceed to identify the cause and effect relationship. This study may further extend to identify the developmental goal in the post-COVID situation and related policy issues.

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